¿El fin de la sorpresa? Un estudio sobre la mutación del elemento sorpresa en el siglo de la (des)información
Keywords:
Sorpresa,, Desinformación,, Incertidumbre,, Sesgos cognitivos.Abstract
The revolution in intelligence gathering and analysis has transformed the role of surprise in modern warfare. Surveillance technologies, Big Data analytics and artificial intelligence have drastically reduced strategic uncertainty, limiting the ability of actors to execute surprise attacks. However, this apparent end of surprise faces a growing challenge: disinformation. The proliferation of false information, data manipulation and information poisoning has generated a new kind of digital fog of war, in which information overload and strategic noise can generate false certainties. This paper explores how surprise has been transformed in the information age and how the struggle between transparency and deception continues to define the modern battlefield. Finally, it discusses the role of intelligence analysis in turning data into useful knowledge, highlighting the importance of distinguishing between truthful information and strategic manipulation in order to avoid critical vulnerabilities.
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