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DEFINING A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS PATTERNS

Abstract

Following Huntington's construct in The Soldier and the State, healthy civil-military relations (CMR) strike a balance between two imperatives -functional and societal- which maximizes military effectiveness without harming the democratic nature of the state. Maintaining the stability of a CMR pattern demands constant monitoring, so as to be able to identify flaws that might break the balance.

The paper proposes a model for analysis of CMR patterns that covers four areas: Professional Autonomy, Military Participation in Policy-making, Relation of the Military with its Civil Society, and Military Non-partisanship. It then tries to define the optimum point of balance in each area to outline how an "ideal" CMR profile should look like. The paper, then, applies the model to two cases that are compared against the proposed one. At the end, the paper draws some general conclusions and identifies issues left open for further research.

Keywords

Civil-Military Relations, Professional Autonomy, Defense, Policy, Society, Non-Partisanship.

INTRODUCTION

It is commonly accepted that healthy civil-military relations (CMR) are essential to the stability of democratic regimes, and that toxic relationships between civilians and soldiers produce either ineffective armed forces or militaries that become a permanent threat to the polis they are supposed to protect. In either case, a deterioration of the democratic life of the state ensues.

What exactly "healthy" means is positional, culture-dependent –one man's medicine is another man's poison-, and remains open to debate. To the effects of this paper, the term refers to a relationship that has stricken the optimum balance between the Huntingtonian *functional* and *societal* imperatives;[1] one that maximizes the professional effectiveness of the armed forces without damaging the democratic essence of the state,[2] even if environmental changes force the system to adapt; and that is based on mutual trust, respect and recognition.

CMR regimes are dynamic and change with the circumstances, both external and internal, generating friction in the way until the system finds a new point of equilibrium and adapts to the changed environment. The stability of a CMR pattern, thus, cannot be taken for granted and requires nurturing through a constant process of dialogue and bargaining that should preserve the key principles of civilian supremacy and of military neutrality.

As part of this nurturing, the CMR pattern has to be scanned in order to identify flaws and to be able to introduce the corrective measures necessary to redress the stability and health of the system. This scanning has to be comprehensive and methodical so as not to neglect dark areas apt to generate instability.

Among the abundant scholarly production on CMR, there is nowhere to find a methodology that comes to the help of the analyst who wants to conduct such a scanning. Specialized literature is abundant, but most of it approaches CMR from partial angles,[3] and it is not possible to find works that offer a comprehensive model for CMR analysis. With all its limitations, this paper proposes one such model.

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1   HUNTINGTON, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 2.

2   ULRICH, Marybeth P., "Infusing Normative Civil-Military Relations Principles in the Officer Corps," in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews, Boston, MA: McGraw Hill, 2005, p. 656.

3   Just to mention a few authors, Desch approaches CMR from the point of view of the influence of external threats on the quality of civil control. (DESCH, Michael, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1999). Finer's study of military direct intervention in politics is a classic of the CMR literature (FINER, Samuel Edward, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1972). Feaver and Herspring deal in their research mostly with the civil-military nexus, respectively

The paper starts by presenting the conceptual foundation of the model and the four areas it defines for focused study, synthetized with ingredients taken from the analysis of some of the most relevant works on civil-military relations. The areas are developed in the following sections and applied to the cases of two Western democracies; the United Kingdom and Greece.[4] In the last section, the paper offers some conclusions and proposes issues left open for further study.

A PROPOSED MODEL FOR CMR ANALYSIS

The model here proposed is only one among the possible ones designed to methodically analyze the status of a given CMR pattern. However it looks, an analytical model should meet certain conditions. First, it has to be complete. As such, it must consider holistically all the facets shaping the complex issue of CMR without leaving unexamined areas.

It should also account for all the stakeholders involved in a civil-military relation. In *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz characterized war as a "paradoxical trinity" composed of violence, chance, and subordination to reason, elements that he mainly equated to the people, the commander, and the government.[5] In a broader sense, we can follow this scheme to identify a CMR trinity composed of civilian society, the armed forces, and the political elites. Interestingly, Clausewitz also described their interaction as a balance between the three elements that have to maintain equilibrium "like an object suspended between three magnets."[6]

Second, the model has to account for the essential principles that sustain the building of democratic civil-military relations, namely civilian supremacy, and military neutrality or non-partisanship. Any CMR system has to preserve or even reinforce these two principles.

Third, it has to be of universal application. Any CMR analysis should account for the role culture plays in the pattern, something not always appropriately considered in CMR studies.[7] Issues like the existence or not of a historical record of militarism in a state, its demographic and ethnic composition, or the system of beliefs prevalent in society are of explanatory value to understand where a CMR pattern comes from, and to provide some guidance to avoid traps if it has to be reformed. For the model to be useful, though, it has to be applicable to any CMR pattern, regardless of the cultural framework in which it is inserted.

Fourth, the model has to provide a reference against which any pattern may be compared. In other words, it should offer an ideal CMR system. If, as we have earlier suggested, the health of a CMR system is defined in terms of equilibrium between imperatives, then the model has to define where the ideal point of balance is.

The model we propose meets all these conditions. It covers most of the topics recurrent in the CMR literature and groups them in four thematic areas for the sake of systematization: Professional Autonomy, or Management of the Profession (Area 1); Military Participation in Policy-Making (Area 2); Military Interaction with Society (Area 3); and Politicization of the Military, or Non-Partisanship (Area 4).

Areas 2 and 3 analyze, respectively, the link between the armed forces and those civilians entrusted with the responsibility of exercising the legitimate power of the state –what Snider calls the "civil-military nexus"-,[8] and that between civil society and the soldiers that defend it. Area 1 puts the focus on civilian control by looking into the level of military self-management of the profession, while Area 4 assesses specifically the degree of political neutrality of the uniformed.

The four areas will be examined in the following sections. An exhaustive analysis of the existing literature on CMR will help determine the topics that have to be considered under each rubric. The model will then be applied to the cases of United Kingdom and Greece, two Western democracies with different records of militarism that offer patterns comparable against each other and against the model defined as ideal.

Area 1 Professional Autonomy (Management of the Profession)

In the field of civil-military relations, the expression "professional autonomy" alludes to the freedom the armed forces have to decide on their professional affairs

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7   SCHIFF, Rebecca L., The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations, New York, NY: Routledge, 2009, p. 6. Under the rubric "culture", we include here aspects with a decisive influence on the shaping of a CMR pattern like the system of values, beliefs, and usages of the nation; its history; or its environment, both domestic and international.

8   NIELSEN, Suzanne C. and SNIDER, Don M., "Introduction," in *American Civil-Military Relations. The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, p. 3.

without interference of or pressure from external actors, by which we naturally mean their political masters. The term may be contemplated in two different ways: political and institutional.[9] The first one would be coterminous with independence from and even defiance to civilian control. In this approach there is an assumption, not just of military independence vis-à-vis the political masters, but even of superiority of the former over the latter, with autonomy a function of how much the military is determined to stripe the civilians of their political prerogatives and to claim them for itself. In other words: the military may graduate autonomy at will, the only limit being self-imposed restraint.

Such an interpretation of autonomy, which assumes a military confronted to the political leadership and willing to encroach in the responsibilities shared at the civil-military nexus, is rather rare among democratic states, and more proper of authoritarian regimes or of states transitioning to democracy. More often, professional autonomy will come in the guise of institutional autonomy, an interpretation that refers to it as professional independence and exclusivity.[10]

Institutional autonomy does not dispute civilian supremacy, nor denies the existence of a principal-agent relationship between civilians and soldiers. It advocates, though, the existence of an area left to the professionals of the armed forces in which they should enjoy freedom to self-govern the institution as an entity with own, specific, personality and interests. It also predicates clear-cut limits between the respective responsibilities of civilians and soldiers that should be mutually respected. This is the kind of autonomy discussed in this paper.

No military in the Western world enjoys absolute professional autonomy in the sense of total independence from the oversight of a civilian body. That would eliminate from the CMR equation the unequal tug of war that civilians and soldiers need to maintain to determine the optimum point of balance between the societal and the functional imperatives, leaving the decision on where to strike that balance entirely in the hands of the military, which might lead either to a damaging quest for military effectiveness à outrance, or to weak and ineffective armed forces ailing under the self-restraint imposed by a military too timid to challenge or displease its civilian masters.

On the other extreme, absolute lack of autonomy would risk, in the long run, rendering the military instrument useless if the civilians decided to ignore the demands of the functional imperative. It might, furthermore, damage the self-esteem of the members of the armed forces and disenfranchise the institution from its own society. Moreover, it would very likely result in the politicization of the armed forces by civilians who might be tempted to use the military as a weapon in their political

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9   PION-BERLIN, David, "Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America," *Comparative Politics* Vol. 25, no. 1 (October 1992), p. 85.

10   Ibid. p. 84.

infights or to assure absolute control over them by selecting sympathizers for the highest positions of the military hierarchy.

Most of the CMR literature admits the need to grant to the armed forces some level of autonomy, and even sees it as something desirable. Authors like Huntington and Bland are among those that advocate the need to keep open a space for military autonomy.[11] Part of the literature, on the contrary, sees military autonomy in a negative light and dismisses it as undesirable and contrary to the health of democratic CMR.[12]

Notwithstanding this lack of unanimity, empirical evidence indicates that in most Western democracies the armed forces enjoy some space to self-govern the institution, something that grows out of the need to professionalize the ever more complex management of war.[13] Thus, the practical question of military autonomy is not so much one of whether it should be conceded or not, but of how much of it a state should bestow on its military.

There is not a preordained degree of autonomy to be granted and maintained in order for a democratic state to ensure a stable CMR regime, nor a military "right" to military autonomy. How much or how little of it the armed forces enjoy is something that the civilians should decide free from military pressure but, ideally, in cooperation with the soldiers. The definition of that limit will, to a great extent, depend on how much the civilians trust the military institution which, in turn, is related to the role the military has historically played in the political life of the state, and to the existence or not of past episodes of militarism.

The degree of autonomy of the armed forces can be assessed by looking into how decisions are taken on the key management fields of personnel; equipment and infrastructure; and roles, rules and procedures. The first one includes aspects like access to the profession; professional military education (PME); promotions and appointments; or military justice. The second area considers the way how the armed forces acquire their major weapons systems. Finally, the third one looks into the definition of roles and missions of the armed forces, codes of conduct, doctrine or internal administrative procedures.

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11   Huntington puts professional autonomy at the center of his preferred construct of *objective* control. HUNTINGTON, Samuel, The Soldier and the State, p. 83. Bland, in turn, considers that in a context of shared responsibility between civilians and soldiers, the civilians must leave to the military matters such as military doctrine, discipline, operational planning, internal organization, promotion below general and flag grade, and the tactical direction of units in operations. BLAND, Douglas L., "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Fall 1999), p. 19.

12   SERRA, Narcís, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 26.

13   KOHN, Richard H., "How Democracies Control the Military," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1997), p. 142.

At the one extreme of the spectrum we find CMR patterns that deny the armed forces even a limited space of professional autonomy. In these regimes, all the decisions are taken by the civilians without giving the military a voice on them or systematically disregarding its advice. In this model, the politicians impose the military the criteria for accession to the profession and the curricula in the education institutions; define criteria for promotion to generalship and impose their candidates or routinely manipulate the recommendations of the professionals; decide on major weapons systems without due consideration to the operational requirements advanced by the technicians; and force on them decisions on the code of conduct, roles and missions or on other administrative issues.

At the extreme of absolute autonomy there would be CMR regimes in which the armed forces can decide without the least civilian interference on each and every one of the fields considered in the area. The military is in a position of strength because the civilians are weak and fear military power, because they neglect military issues, or because they have an absolute trust on the soldiers.

The ideal point of balance lays somewhere in between. In an ideal CMR pattern, the civilians trust the armed forces and exert a loose *laissez faire, laissez passer* control over military management of the profession, only occasionally intervening to moderate slight deviations. This requires a solid institutional framework with a clear chain of command to supervise the institution and, above all, civilians that understand the armed forces, their role and their professional needs, and soldiers that have genuine respect for the legitimacy of their political masters and that do not take advantage of that loose control to "shirk" in the sense Feaver uses the term.[14]

In an ideal CMR pattern, the system promotes individuals based on professional criteria of merit and potential to assume the responsibilities inherent to the various ranks of generalship. In such a pattern, PME facilitates exchange with civil society, grants equal opportunities to all citizens irrespective of their social extraction, leaves to the military the responsibility to determine curricula that are consistent with the principles of democratic CMR, and facilitates smooth integration in society of those members of the armed forces not willing to continue a military career.

In what concerns procurement and acquisitions, the ideal CMR pattern cares for the operational needs of the armed forces –adjusted to the roles and missions determined at the political level-, and genuinely tries to satisfy them within the budgetary possibilities. Political considerations do not diminish the overall effectiveness of the armed forces.

This authority for self-management is reciprocated by a scrupulous respect to the principles of democratic CMR. The military does not use it to shirk, or to impose on

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14   FEAVER, Peter D., Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 55.

the civilians parochial interests that do not serve the general ones of the citizens. Any deviation from this rule is effective- and adequately self-policed.

The application of the model to the cases of the United Kingdom and Greece yields interesting information about their respective patterns (Table I). This is hardly surprising: the armed forces of the United Kingdom can exhibit an impeccable record of respect to civil supremacy, while the short history of modern Greece is punctuated by several cases of military intervention in politics, the last one as recent as 1967-1974.

In the field of management of human resources, the analysis of the British CMR pattern shows how the government, probably because of the high level of trust it deposits on the subordination of the armed forces, exercises a loose control over professional decisions. For sure, the civilians hold the key to those decisions and retain the authority to veto, reverse or modify them, but they use it only in extraordinary circumstances.

Examples like the rather informal decision taken by PM Blair's Chief of Staff to appoint General Sir Richard Dannatt as Chief of the General Staff (CGS) without even consulting the Prime Minister[15] would indicate how comfortable the politicians feel in the United Kingdom about the attachment of their soldiers to the principles of democratic CMR.

The field of professional military education (PME) in the United Kingdom shows a significant level of permeability between the military and the civilian education systems. The PME curriculum for officers ensures frequent and intense contact with civilians –both students and faculty-, and offers a blend of military and civilian subjects, as well as civilian titles, which promote mutual knowledge and understanding and facilitate the integration into the civilian labor market of those not willing to further their career in the armed forces.

Procurement and acquisitions (P&A) and military justice are two areas where recent changes have modified the CMR pattern, in this case reducing the margin of military autonomy. On the first one, the Ministry of Defense introduced in 2011 a comprehensive reform of the P&A procedures to adopt a more business-like approach that should make the system more efficient. The reform came at the expense of the military, which has seen reduced its capacity to influence the decisions on equipment taken at the political level, establishing a more clear separation between the customer and the supplier.

In the case of military justice, the transformation has been operated in the two ways of *civilianization* and *juridification*.[16] While the former is little more than an adaptation to civilian procedures with negligible consequences for the existing CMR

15   INGHAM, Sarah, The Military Covenant. Its Impact on Civil-Military Relations in Britain, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2014), p. 123.

16   RUBIN, G.R., "United Kingdom Military Law: Autonomy, Civilianisation, Juridification," *The Modern Law Review*, Vol. 65, No. 1 (January 2002), p. 37.

http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee

pattern, the latter means the introduction of an independent judicial authority into rulings up to then decided by the military chain of command. That was the case, for example, of the decision to apply the provisions of the Human Rights Act[17] to the military even in operations.

In the case of Greece, the current CMR pattern is shaped by two main factors that work in opposite directions. On the one hand, it is directly connected to the restoration of democratic government in the mid-1970s, after some seven years of military dictatorship that ended with the military divided and discredited for the poor management of the public affairs of the country. On the other hand, it is decisively influenced by the broad perception of an external security threat to the country coming from Turkey.

After 1974, the CMR pattern was reformed to adapt it to the parameters of democratic civil-military relations. The reform gave Greece all the trappings of democratic CMR, with a solid institutional scaffolding that ensured civilian supremacy over the military. A Council on Foreign Policy and National Defense (KYSEA) under full civilian control was created and given the authority to decide on key security matters and on promotions and appointments.

	United Kingdom	Greece
Record of direct military participation in politics	No historical record of direct threat to the principle of civil supremacy.	Military dictatorship in the period 1967-1974. The armed forces transitioned to democracy from a position of weakness.
Promotions to generalship and appointments to key positions	Loose civilian control assured by rules-setting in the Defense Council and by proviso that no promotion will take place without the approval of the Secretary of State (MoD) Professional criteria prevail. The military enjoys broad leeway to select and recommend officers for promotion and for key positions. Political interference is low.	Decisions on promotions and appointments at 1- and 2-stars level are taken at the service level and approved by the Minister of Defense. 3-star generals and above require PM approval. All decisions require Presidential sanction. The system is subject to frequent political interference.
Professional Military Education (PME)	The MoD oversees PME. The Defence Board (DB) decides on strategic issues. The Chief of Defense People (CDP), a military under the DB, sets overall policy. Details and day-to-day management are left to the services. The system requests civilian degrees or supports obtaining them at different levels. Transition to civilian life is relatively easy. High level of civ-mil interaction. Civil and military students share lessons in some institutions at all levels.	PME system reformed in 1974. Curricula were de-politicized. Access to the profession adjusted to the civil Pan-Hellenic University Entrance Exams. Since 2010, PME facilitates interaction with civilians, and promotes the civilian education of officers. Early transition to civilian life is not a frequent path. Broad supervision at the Ministerial level. General Staffs and PME institutions enjoy ample freedom to define programs.

17   ROWLINSON, Simon P., "The British System of Military Justice," *The Air Force Law Review*, Vol. 52 (2002), p. 20. The Human Rights Act is a piece of legislation introduced by the Labor government in 1998 to adapt to European human rights law.

	United Kingdom	Greece
Military Justice	Separate military justice system controlled by a civilian tribunal, the Courts-Martial Appeals Court. The system is under the external pressures of *juridification* and *civilianization* which restrain the autonomy of the military.	Enshrined in the Constitution (Art 96) and is invested with broad autonomy. System reformed in 1995 to improve impartiality and to restrict application to members of the armed forces. System of appeals to a civilian instance in cassation, with no authority to amend ruling of previous –military- instances.
Procurement and Acquisitions (P&A)	P&A rules and procedures were reformed in 2011 to make the system more business-oriented and economically effective, reducing military influence, increasing separation between supplier and customer. Military input is considered at different steps of the process.	Prime Minister, through KYSEA, decides on P&A. The armed forces may influence the decisions along the whole process. System subject to external influence and pressure.

Table I - AREA 1. Military Autonomy (Management of the Profession).

The smooth transition of the CMR pattern was made possible by a change in the security environment perception that moved the armed forces away from their post-war internal role of fighting communism, to an external one oriented to counter the Turkish threat. This new, external, orientation of the armed forces facilitated the democratization of the CMR pattern but, paradoxically, permitted the armed forces to retain high levels of autonomy.

The picture in the area of military autonomy is, thus, somewhat irregular in Greece, with areas under close civilian oversight and areas in which the military enjoys a high level of autonomy almost unopposed by the political elites. In what concerns promotions and appointments the system, generally following criteria of professional competence and merit, is frequently interfered by external stakeholders who try to influence decisions for political or parochial reasons, or who alter military recommendations to impose candidates of their liking. The resignation of Chief of Staff of the Army General Ziazias in 2012 attests to this interference and to the relatively high level of politicization at the topmost levels of the armed forces.[18]

In the rest of the fields that complete the area, the Greek pattern shows nominal civilian control of the processes and decisions, but a high level of military autonomy. Civilians –politicians and the public in general- seldom challenge military decisions,

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[18]   In July 2012 General Ziazias resigned his position as Chief of Staff of the Army hours before a scheduled meeting of the KYSEA. Allegedly, in that meeting, the recently appointed government of Samaras was going to impose some promotions and appointments over the names proposed by the Chiefs of Staff of the services. The decision, that included also the return to active duty of some officers retired in 2011, was deemed unacceptable for Ziazias. The general decided to go public with his resignation, justifying it on arguments that "touch on ethics and dignity, both personal and Army's." Of note is that, Ziazias' appointment to the post by PM Papandreou only some six months earlier, had been equally controversial.

partly because they are accepted as justified in view of the security environment that surrounds the country, partly because civilians are not acquainted with security issues, and because the Parliament is not empowered to exercise an effective control over the government and its agents.

In PME, for instance, the government introduced deep reforms in 1983 to adjust access to the profession to the same parameters of the general education system, to broaden the social base of the armed forces, and to de-politicize the curricula of the schools. On this base, Greece has developed a PME system that confers to the military ample authority to decide on curricula and detailed education programs.

Something similar can be said of military justice and of the P&A procedures. In justice, the system was reformed in 1995 to improve its independence and impartiality. In spite of that, though, the system still gives the armed forces ample autonomy to judge military personnel, even for non-military crimes, and keeps a weak link with the general judicial system of the country by providing an opportunity of second appeal to the Supreme Court, albeit only in cassation and without a possibility to revoke the ruling of the military courts bar procedural flaws.

In P&A, the military has many ways and opportunities to influence the system and get the equipment it wants without real accountability to a rather weak parliament. That influence starts with the central role the armed forces play on the definition of the threat assessment and of the operational requirements needed to face it; continues with its active participation in the processes to define the medium-term programs of development and modernization (EMPAE) and to decide on purchases;[19] and ends with their influence on the evaluation of the systems already acquired.

Area 2 Military Participation in Policy-Making

Among the different connections existing within the trinity of CMR stakeholders, those linking the high ranks of the armed forces with their political masters are of particular relevance. It is at the civil-military nexus that civilian control materializes, and where the overall tone of the civil-military relation is set so that, it can be said, civil-military relations in a state are as good as its civil-military nexus.

A central responsibility of that nexus is the provision of security what, in turn, demands the crafting of sound policy, a complex endeavor in and of itself, made today all the more complicated by the multifaceted nature of the security environment.

Notwithstanding the fact that security is more and more defined today in terms that transcend a purely military approach, the armed forces continue to be the security provider of the state *par excellence*. Because of the grave consequences it has on the life

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19   Decisions on P&A are taken in the KYSEA.

and purse of the citizens, the decision to commit the armed forces has to be careful pondered, and their employment subject to the technical demands of such a complex and lethal tool. The military, therefore, as the expert in the use of force, must be given a voice in the process established to craft security policy, on the same footing as the rest of the stakeholders of the security community. Good integration of the military in the security debate, if kept within the limits of democratic CMR, facilitates the nesting of military strategy into the superior level of the overall security policy and strategy. It is not a guarantee for appropriately vetted policy but, at least, makes that comprehensive vetting possible.

Security policymaking is a political process that entails some conflict and bargaining.[20] When participating in it, the military abandons the military sphere to enter into the political realm. In his role as contributor in the process, he must develop his political acumen to grasp the intricacies and limitations of politics. He must also give his best advice, providing military options and the point of view of the technician without advocating openly any of them so as not to unnecessarily constrain the politician in his decision, or to satisfy only the corporate interests of the military. He has to be listened, not just because he is a legitimate member of the security community, but because neglecting him a say in the process deprives the citizens of their right to the best possible policy.

In the course of this participation, the military has to engage in the political debate while being careful not to trespass the limits of what is acceptable in democratic civil-military relations. If the soldier abandons his role as honest, technically competent, and uninterested contributor to the process, very soon he will be viewed by politicians and citizens alike as cynically as they see other institutions.[21]

To gauge the health of a civil-military relations pattern in this area, we may want to look into the process itself to see whether it is or not institutionalized, with the military a member of it; if it leaves reasonable room for military advice; and if that advice is considered, not necessarily heeded.

The analysis should also consider the quality of the participation. Good policy-crafting requires political elites educated on security issues and not tainted by ideological prejudices about the use of force. Weak or inept political leadership is an invitation to military encroachment into the political realm.[22] It also demands a military that is politics-savvy and able to provide candid advice, without trespassing

20   SZAYNA, Thomas S., et al. The Civil-Military Gap in the United States. Does It Exist, Why, and Does It Matter? (Santa Mónica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), p. 20.

21   BROOKS, Risa A., "Militaries and Political Activity in Democracies," in American Civil-Military Relations. The Soldier and the State in a New Era (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), p. 216.

22   BLAND, Douglas L., "Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vo. 27, No. 4 (Summer 2001), p. 535.

the limits of what is acceptable in democratic CMR, and with the certitude that his advice will be heard.[23]

Finally, the analysis should look into the existence of rules to manage dissent. Legitimate disagreement is an unavoidable part to any collaborative decision-making process.[24] The issue is what the military does in case of serious disagreement with the adopted policy: is resignation used as a way to show dissent? Does it take place quietly, or is it publicized as a way to exercise pressure on the politicians and to destabilize civilian authority?

The ideal pattern in this area lies between two extremes. At the one side, there may be a CMR model, usually non-institutionalized, in which the military does not participate at all, or in which his input is insufficiently considered by political elites uneducated in security issues and guided by ideological prejudices about the military. Policy crafting is chaotic, follows no method, is done by a reduced group of trusted agents and, therefore, not appropriately vetted. The result is suboptimal policy.

At the other extreme we would find an equally non-institutionalized process, dominated by the functional imperative, and in which the military enjoys too much of a voice. In this pattern, the military uses its position of advantage as technical advisor to advocate options and influence policy outcomes in a way that serve the parochial ends of the armed forces –or a part of them- over the general interest. Decisions are taken by a small group of individuals and systematically reflect the military point of view, ignoring other legitimate inputs. Because decisions normally satisfy the military, dissent is hardly present. When it occurs, the military uses any tool –including resignation- as a way to press the politicians.

In the ideal pattern, there is a procedure –formalized or not- for security policy definition that methodically considers all the different aspects of the security challenges facing the state and that gives voice to all the stakeholders of the security community. The technical advice of the military is heard and adequately pondered by policymakers educated in security matters. The process takes place in a cooperative climate that favors candid exchange of views. The military does not use its position as technical expert as an advantage to promote its parochial interests. Dissent is managed internally, even in case of resignation.

The application of the model to the United Kingdom and Greece (Table II) shows how both countries have institutionalized processes for security policy making, differently conceived on account of their respective political cultures. In both countries, the process is under the democratic control of solid political institutions, although in the United Kingdom it is less regulated, which is consistent with a political culture that dislikes prescriptive legislation.

23   ULRICH, "Infusing Normative Civil-Military Relations Principles," 665.

24   Ibid. 663.

In the United Kingdom, because this low level of normativization, the process has traditionally been agile and responsive. It has also called for friction and inconsistencies, because it is highly based on personal judgements and relationships,[25] which makes it vulnerable to breakdowns of trust between politicians and senior military officers.[26]

The British system maintains a typically "Huntingtonian" separation of functions between politicians and soldiers by virtue of which the former set political objectives and muster national resources, while the latter conduct military operations to achieve the objectives set at the political level.

The experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan exposed the vulnerabilities of the system in different ways. For example, it evidenced the absence of a shared understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the key players,[27] or the lack of sufficient political oversight over military activities *a priori* of tactical level, but with important strategic and political consequences.

To fix these deficiencies, the British government initiated a review of the policy-making process, completed in 2015, to streamline the structure so as to make it more clear in the allocation of responsibilities, and more effective.

The reviewed system is based on a strong Ministry of Defense and maintains the same "Huntingtonian" division of labor. It provides for military advice to the Prime Minister and the Government through the Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS), but has restricted military influence by withdrawing the direct participation of the Chiefs of Staff of the services in the process, replacing it with the consolidated contribution of the CDS. Additionally, the new system has created a National Security Council (NSC) modeled after the one in the United States, in which the CDS is only an *ad hoc* participant.

Experience shows how the policy-makers tend to circumvent the process when and how they see fit. During the Blair years, for example, the PM conferred the CDS a strong role in his decision-making process, to the point that someone suggested that "an 'executive of two' was running the decision-making."[28]

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25   DE WAAL, James, Depending on the Right People. British Political-Military Relations, 2001-10, (London: Chatham House, 2013), p. 19.

26   Ibid. VI.

27   PORSTOKEN, Lord Levene of et al., Defense Reform. An Independent Report into the Structure and Management of the Ministry of Defence, (London: Ministry of Defence, 2011), p. 14.

28   ELLIOTT, Christopher L., High Command. British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 172.

	United Kingdom	Greece
Institutionalization of security and defense policy- and strategy making	Strong policy-making institutions but weak level of normativization of the process.	Institutionalized system centered on the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense through the Council on Foreign Policy and National Defense (KYSEA).
Is the military input appropriately considered?	The system, reformed in 2015, caters for military input at Ministerial level or even at the level of the PM. The Chief of Staff of the Defense (CDS) is the statutory adviser to the PM and the government. The National Security Council (NSC) does not have permanent military representation. System based on a division of labor between civilians and soldiers.	The system offers different venues: personal advice of Chief of HNDGS to Minister of Defense, participation of Chief HNDGS in KYSEA, and of the service chiefs in the Defense Council. Defective implementation of the system. KYSEA has no instruments for effectively policy definition. Decisions are often taken in an informal way.
Education of political elites on security and defense issues	Civilians in the security establishment have a good understanding of security issues. Dual nature of the Ministry of Defense facilitates civ-mil interaction on a daily basis.	Low level of education on security and defense issues, and of political debate on security, partly due to a widely shared perception of security threat. Reduced opportunities to improve civilian education on security and defense issues.
Handling of military dissent	Public manifestations of dissent seem to be tolerated as not threatening civilian supremacy.	Registered cases of public resignation for individual or sectorial interests (General Ziazias).

Table II - AREA 2. Military Participation in Policy-Making.

Recent experience shows frequent use by the military of public outlets to air its dissatisfaction with government's policy or decisions, taking advantage of the prestige the armed forces have among the civilian population. The case of General Sir Richard Dannatt is not an isolated one.[29] In 2008, for example, four senior commanders of Para and SAS units fighting in Afghanistan resigned over what they judged was "chronic underinvestment" in equipment for the troops, making public their frustration and disagreement with the government's policies.[30] The fact that these public manifestations went unpunished might indicate a high degree of political tolerance toward this attitude, probably because it is not perceived as a challenge to civilian supremacy.

Greece has a policy-making system enshrined in legislation that delineates roles and responsibilities of those participating in it. The system is under civilian control and revolves around the Council on Foreign Policy and National Defense (KYSEA), a collegiate body in which the military is represented by the Chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff (HNDGS), who should present the consolidated views of the Chiefs of the services.

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29   In 2006, General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff, openly complained about government policy in Iraq. His public manifestations were not met by dismissal so as "not to make a martyr." Ingham, *The Military Covenant*, 123.

30   Brigadier Butler did not made this point explicit and gave personal reasons as an explanation for his resignation.

The military input is further granted through the role of the Chief of the HNDGS as advisor to the Minister of Defense, and through the participation of the chiefs of the services in the Defense Council, a consultative instrument to discuss issue like force structure, armament, budget, or research programs

This appearance of formality conceals important flaws in the Greek process of policy-crafting. Experience shows that the KYSEA meets on an *ad-hoc* basis, and that it lacks a permanent secretariat and the necessary in-house elements to effectively define and coordinate policy and grand strategy.[31] More important, the Prime Minister often decides in a rather informal way, bypassing the system and relying on a small group of ministers or other trusted individuals,[32] a problem further compounded by the general low level of knowledge key decision-makers show on issues capital to security policy-making.[33]

Area 3 Military Interaction with Civil Society

The quality and intensity of the interaction the armed forces entertain with the society they serve is an issue of great importance in CMR, particularly so in democratic regimes because of the weight public opinion has on decisions made on issues like force levels, conscription, roles and missions of the armed forces, rules on the use of force, or operational commitments.

The armed forces are a subset of the society they serve. Because of the nature of the military profession, soldiers must abide by values that differ to some extent from those prevalent in general society. Although some scholarship considers this difference problematic for democratic CMR,[34] empirical evidence seems to show that civilian control is possible, and even thrives, in the presence of a gap in values that some even see as necessary and desirable for the effectiveness of the armed forces.[35] The problem arises when the gap widens to the point where it becomes a chasm that compromises the effectiveness of the military, impedes civil-military cooperation,[36] or pits the armed forces against the civilians.

Some factors may contribute to this widening of the civil-military gap. First of all is the growing divergence between military values based on the importance of the group above

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31 LIAROPOULOS, Andrew N., "The Institutional Dimension of Greek Security Policy: Is There a Need for a National Security Council?" *National Security and the Future*, Vol 3, No. 9 (2008), p. 31.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid. 34.

34 JANOWITZ, Morris, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1960), p. 420.

35 COHEN, Eliot A., "Why the Gap Matters," *The National Interest*, No. 61 (Fall 2000), p. 39.

36 FEAVER, Peter D., and KOHN, Richard H., "The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians and their Mutual Misunderstanding," *The National Interest*, No. 61 (Fall 2000), p. 29.

the individual, and on a willingness to use force for the sake of a superior good, and civilian ones based on individual affirmation and a rejection of violence. Second is the decrease of day-to-day civil-military interaction, notwithstanding the contact the soldier, as *citizen*, maintains with its society. Third, connected to the other two, and partly a consequence of them, is a reduction in public interest for security questions in general, and for things military in particular, that leaves security issues out of the public and political debate.

The level of civil-military interaction, and the quality thereof can be measured by looking into issues like the social composition of the armed forces to assess how much they are a reflection of society writ large; or like the comparison of values prevalent in the military and in society. Other yardsticks may be the existence of recruitment and retention issues; the overall degree of acceptance or popularity of the armed forces; or the level of public debate on security issues which, in turn, may be assessed by examining the number and quality of security-related think tanks, charities, academic publications, and the presence of these topics in the media (Table III).

As in the previous areas, in this one the ideal pattern lays between two extremes. The first one assumes an antimilitaristic society that has its armed forces in low regard. This extreme considers the two possibilities of the armed forces embracing, or forced to embrace, societal values in their entirety, and of a military retaining its core values within such an antimilitaristic society.

The first possibility may result in an ineffective military, more a bureaucracy than the sharp tool the security of a state needs. In this scenario, recruitment may not be an issue, but service in the armed forces is seen only as an occupation, not as a duty that entails individual sacrifice. The armed forces may enjoy high levels of popularity, but because they are employed in non-combat, or even in traditionally non-military roles.

In the second one, the armed forces would enjoy low levels of social acceptability and experience significant recruitment problems because the military career attracts only a small segment of the social body. The armed forces would be disenfranchised from the rest of society, under-budgeted and under-equipped.

At the other side of the spectrum we find a pattern in which the civil-military gap has disappeared because civilians have accepted and embraced military values as the moral foundation of society. The armed forces enjoy high levels of acceptance and have no problem to attract candidates to serve in them. Such a CMR pattern, in which the military and its objective would become prevalent in society, is more reminiscent of the Lasswellian "garrison state" construct than of a democratic society.

The ideal pattern lies somewhere in between these two extremes. It accepts a gap between civilians and the military, but keeps it narrow. Civil society understands the need the military has "to be different." Military values are not incompatible with civilian ones, and whatever limitations civilians impose on the military, they do not impinge on military effectiveness. The practice of military values is a benefit, not a threat, to civil society. The military respects the principle of civil supremacy and does not challenge civil control. The social composition of the armed forces is reflective the one existing in the civilian society.

In that ideal pattern, civil society interacts with its military as a matter of course. Civilians understand the role of their armed forces and extend consideration and respect to them for the service they perform for the benefit of society. Security and defense issues are a part of the public debate and receive a reasonable degree of public attention. The political elites are educated in security and defense issues, understand the needs and requirements of the military as security providers, and exercise effective supervision of the armed forces.

For reasons that have to do with its insularity and its history, civil-military interaction in the United Kingdom has traditionally been weak, and relatively ambivalent,[37] characterized as "ambiguous" –a combination of respect, admiration, indifference, ignorance and an unwillingness to pay more tax to support them.[38]

	United Kingdom	Greece
Public appreciation of the armed forces	Ambivalent public attitude toward the armed forces. However, the institution enjoys one of the highest levels of acceptance among Britons.	The armed forces are the most appreciated institution in Greece (above the Orthodox Church). The military is perceived as the least corrupted institution
Recruitment and retention issues	Chronic problem of recruitment. Service in the armed forces is not attractive enough to compete with options in the civilian world. Demographic trends complicate recruitment.	Conscription system. Currently recruitment is not an issue, neither in officers nor in other ranks. Current demographic trends point to future shortages in personnel with adverse effects on recruitment.
Existence of values gap between society and the military	Existence of a structural CMR gap due to low interaction between soldiers and civilians. Growing divergence of values that is seen with some concern in the post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan scenario.	The armed forces experience deep transformation after the period 1967-1074 to converge with societal values. The military has transitioned from an institutional toward an occupational model.
Presence of security issues and of the armed forces in the public debate	Dense network of civil society's initiatives to support the armed forces (peaking during wars in Iraq and Afghanistan). Intense academic debate on security and military issues. Concern among the military for post-Afghanistan fall in public attention (and support) for the armed forces.	Low level of presence and debate due to widespread agreement on security issues. Security ranks low among Greek citizen's concerns. The military tends to be unquestioned and left out of the political debate. Legal arrangements and low political culture limit open debate on security issues.
Social composition of the armed forces	The armed forces tend to recruit among lower social strata. Middle-class citizens are underrepresented. Ethnic minorities are underrepresented in the Armed Forces (15% of non-whites countrywide; less than 7% in the armed forces)	The military has traditionally reproduced clientage and patronage patterns. Historically, the Navy has recruited from urban, more liberal, areas, and the Army from rural, more conservative regions. After 1974, the armed forces transformed to more closely reflect social diversity.

Table III - AREA 3. Military Interaction with Civil Society.

37   HINES, Lindsey A. et al., "Are the Armed Forces Understood and Supported by the Public? A View from the United Kingdom," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (October 2015), p. 690.

38   INGHAM, *The Military Covenant*, 173.

This picture seems not to harm the appreciation most Britons show for their armed forces. A study conducted by Lord Ashcroft in 2012 concluded that the armed forces are one of the most appreciated institutions in the United Kingdom, above other as deeply ingrained in the British life as the BBC or the National Health System.[39] Some surveys reveal high rates of public support oscillating between 50% and 80%.[40]

This high level of appreciation, though, does not translate into a comparably high level of interest for the military career, partly because a thriving economy provides for an attractive and competitive civil sector more attuned to the worldview of the cohorts of the population that could choose a career in the armed forces. As a consequence, the military faces chronic recruitment and retention issues.[41]

The existence of this structural gap seems to be broadly accepted. In fact, the armed forces resist civilian efforts to force a convergence in values between civilians and soldiers by invoking their "need to be different" in the fulfillment of their mission.[42] The civilians seem also to accept this situation, as the political assumption of the system of values implicit in the *Military Covenant* might indicate.

What the military sees with concern is the steady widening of the structural gap on account of the growing divergence of values between the armed forces and the British society. While the former cherish and cultivate values like self-sacrifice, unit cohesion, obedience, and loyalty to the Crown; liberal, post-modern, civil society puts a premium on individual autonomy, self-accomplishment or personal fulfilment over the good of the community, which would make it more prone to question military campaigns.[43] For the military, this negative trend may accelerate now that the operational deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan are over and the armed forces are no longer at the center of public interest, leading them into oblivion, disconnected from, and irrelevant to, the general population.[44]

The underrepresentation of ethnic minorities in the ranks is a permanent concern for the British military. While current estimates indicate that the percentage of non-whites in the country is of around 15% of the total population that of non-whites in

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39   ASHCROFT, Lord, KCMG, The Armed Forces & Society. The Military in Britain Through the Eyes of Service Personnel, Employers and the Public, 2012. http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2012/05/the-armed-forces-society/ (accessed December 6, 2015), p. 13.

40   HINES et al., "Are the Armed Forces Understood," p. 695.

41   In 2007, for example, the Army fell short in almost 6,000 men of the approved force. See EDMUNDS, Timothy and FORSTER, Anthony, Out of Step. The Case for Change in the British Armed Forces, (London: Demos, 2007), p. 51.

42   FORSTER, Anthony, "The Military Covenant and British Civil-Military Relations: Letting the Genie out of the Bottle," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vil. 38, No. 2 (April 2012), p. 274.

43   HINES et al., "Are the Armed Forces Understood," p. 693.

44   Ibid. p. 691.

the armed forces is less than 7%. This issue comes on top of concerns for recruitment derived from the country's dwindling demographic indicators.[45]

A dense network of think tanks as respected as Chatham House or the International Institute for Strategic Studies facilitates public debate on security issues among the British public. In fact, the operational deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought military issues at the forefront of public attention, forcing policy adjustments to accommodate public demands.

On the years following the restoration of democracy in 1974, the Greek armed forces saw a profound transformation that de-politicized them and broadened the social base of the officer's corps, until then restricted to accredited sympathizers of the regime.[46] Today's pattern is the result of incremental efforts made by successive governments to break the institutional isolation of the armed forces.[47]

Since 1974, the armed forces have adapted to democratic standards and have abstained from intervening in politics. Today, the military is perceived by the Greek public as one of the most appreciated and trusted –and least corrupt- institutions in the country, even ahead of the Orthodox Church.[48] There is no hard evidence to prove it, but it seems plausible that the combination of this adaptation to democratic rule, and the perception of a threat coming from Turkey have contributed to this improvement in the public image of the armed forces.

In spite of this high regard, or maybe because of it, public debate on security and defense issues is rather weak in Greece, where security issues rank low in the scale of public concerns.[49] Consensus on the need to maintain a strong military regardless the cost is broad, and military issues are usually taken for granted and left out of the political debate.[50]

45　KIRKUP, James, "Threats to Army units failing to recruit ethnic minorities," *The Telegraph*, June 07, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9317898/Threats-to-Army-units-failing-to-recruit-ethnic-minorities.html (accessed June 21, 2016).

46　KOLIOPOULOS, John S. and VEREMIS, Thanos. Greece. The Modern Sequel. (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), p. 168.

47　DOKOS, Thanos P., "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe: The Case of Greece," in The Evolution of Civil-Mlitary Relations in South East Europe. Continuing Democratic Reform and Adapting to the Needs of Fighting Terrorism, eds. FLURI, Philipp H., GUSTENEAU, Gustav E. and PANTEV, Plamen I. (Heidelberg: Physika Verlag, 2005), p. 138.

48　In fact, surveys suggest that the armed forces is the most appreciated institution among the Greek citizenship, ahead even of the Orthodox Church. See Public Issue, *Greek Index of Confidence in Institutions (GICI), 2014.* http://www.mavris.gr (acceded 07 April 2016). On the issue of corruption, see SOTIROPOULOS, Dimitri A. and KARAMAGIOLI, Evika, Greek Civil Society: The Long Road to Maturity (2005), (Athens: Access2democracy, 2006), p. 48.

49　European Commission, *Public Opinion in the European Union. First Results.* Standard Eurobarometer 83 (Brussels: Spring, 2015), p. 18.

50　DOKOS, "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations", p. 142.

This situation is exacerbated by a constitutional provision that restricts public debate on a broad range of issues, not necessarily classified, related to the armed forces,[51] and by a political culture with an underdeveloped and poorly organized civil society[52] with a sparse network of civil organizations like think tanks, lobbies, or pressure groups to scrutinize the activity of the armed forces and act as fire alarms to redress potential excesses.[53]

Recruitment in Greece does not seem to be an issue currently, if only because the military maintains a conscription system that seems to be broadly accepted.[54] Cases of draft evasion and conscientious objection are officially few; partly because draft evasion is severely punished and conscientious objection penalized with substantially longer terms of service; partly because the almost universal agreement on the existence of an external threat.

The future, however, looks less rosy. Demographic projections show that the manpower available for military service will decrease in 2019 to 42,3 percent of the total population, from its current level of 45,7 percent.[55] This trend is seen with concern by the HNDGS because of the implications it may have on recruitment, and is forcing it to reconsider the future composition of the armed forces and other issues like the duration of military service.[56]

Area 4 Politicization of the Military (Non-Partisanship)[57]

It is a fact of life that the members of the armed forces hold their own views on political issues and feel attraction for or repulsion against the different legitimate options available in the political marketplace. Soldiers, after all, are citizens, in spite of

51   ALIVIZATOS, Nicos C., "Civilian Supremacy Over the Military. The Case of Modern Greece," *Military Law and Law of War Review*, Vol. 30, Issues 1-4 (1991), p. 19.

52   SOTIROPOULOS, Dimitri A. and KARAMAGIOLI, Evika. Greek Civil Society: The Long Road to Maturity (2005). (Athens: Access 2 Democracy, 2006), p. 8.

53   DOKOS, Thanos P., "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations and Progress in Greek Security Sector Reform," in Security Sector Transformation in Southeastern Europe and the Middle East, ed. Thanos P. Dokos (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2007), p. 45.

54   COLOUMBIS, Theodore and DOKOS, Thanos. "National Security" In Greece. A Country Study, edited by CURTIS, Glen E., 269-323. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1995.

55   BMI Research, *Greece. Defense and Security Report. 2015* (London: BMI Research, 2015), 18.

56   Hellenic Republic Ministry of National Defense. *White Book on Defense 2014*. (Athens: Hellenic Army's Printing Office, 2015), 135.

57   Unless otherwise indicated, we use in this paper the term "politicization" not in the sense of the military having the necessary political acumen to interact with the civilians in the civil-military nexus, where the limits of the political and of the military are blurred, but rather as synonymous to "political partisanship."

having their individual rights curtailed for the sake of the superior end of duty to the nation and to the state.

Having political preferences, however, is one thing. Making them public, or letting them to influence advice professionally due on technical issues, is another thing. Liberal democracies tend to keep public manifestations of political partisanship off-limits to their soldiers, maintaining the armed forces neutral and away from the political fray as the best way to ensure their loyalty to the legitimate political authorities, irrespective of their color, and to avoid the corrosive effects politicization has on internal cohesion.

A non-partisan military is, therefore, of the utmost importance to any democratic state. This neutrality goes beyond the mere prohibition to actively militate in a political party or movement, and demands from the members of the armed forces abstention from making public manifestations, even within the purely military milieu, which might be construed as giving support or endorsing any one of the political options legitimately competing in the political arena.

A particular reference to unionism is here in order. Besides provoking the same politicization we have seen in the case of political parties, unions may damage military discipline and cohesion, two central values for the armed forces. It has to be considered, though, that unionism usually grows out of a break of confidence in the chain of command, or in its capacity to satisfy the professional needs of the members of the armed forces.[58]

It is also possible to recognize two opposed extremes in this area. On the one side we find the case of a highly politicized military. This extreme allows several variations depending on the military being overwhelmingly and overtly politicized in one sense –be it for or against its political masters-, or internally split along the mainstream political options.

All cases are equally undesirable. They are rare in democratic regimes and more proper of non-democratic, soviet-style systems, or of weak democracies. In that sense, this possibility has to be almost entirely excluded from the analysis of a democratic CMR pattern. More plausible is the possibility of the armed forces, through negative selection at access and socialization of their members, quietly acquiring a dominant political outlook that, if left unchecked, might damage military effectiveness or run against the obedience due to the political masters, challenging the principle of civilian control.

The soldier breaks his obligation to be neutral not only when he makes public his political preferences, but also in much more subtle ways. For example, when he intentionally leaks to the media information about policy he opposes with the intention of shaping public opinion against it; when he publicly advocates a certain policy using

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58   The very fact that unions are prohibited in the military may be used by the political level as an advantage to impose on the armed forces policies or measures that they would not dare to introduce had the armed forces mechanisms –by this we mean unions- to react to such impositions.

the high levels of public acceptance of the armed forces to leverage his opinions; or when he plays off one political institution against another one –for example, the Executive against the Legislature.

At the other end of the spectrum we would have a pattern in which the political elites try to use the military as a tool in their political infighting and for the advancement of their partisan interest, or to erode the party in the government. This is the kind of political competition Huntington warned against when describing his *subjective control* paradigm.[59]

This kind of politicization may take place in different ways; appointing officers to the highest military offices based on criteria of political affinity over merit and professional competency; using *divide et impera* tactics appealing to one fraction of the military for reasons of political interest or to keep the military weak; or using military officers as spokespeople as a screen to publicize or advocate government's policy.

All of them are negative for the military. They sow division within the institution; negatively affect professional effectiveness; undermine the legitimate authority of the chain of command; erode trust between civilians and soldiers because the armed forces start to be seen as a group of interest and lose legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens;[60] and, above all, destroy the climate of mutual trust between the military and its political masters, and between the members of the armed forces and their leadership. Needless to say that the military should resist political overtures to get him involved in partisan politics.

In many democratic nations, the obligation to remain neutral extinguishes when the individual retires. Even if legal, the involvement of retired officers in politics may have nefarious consequences over the internal cohesion of the armed forces and over civilian control, particularly when charismatic high-ranking officers are involved.

In a healthy CMR pattern, the military professional, and the armed forces as a public institution, remain scrupulously neutral in regard to the different legitimate political options, and refrain from openly expressing their preferences, even after retirement, at least for a number of years enough to operate an effective disconnection from the institution. Those at the civil-military nexus provide the best possible technical advice, and faithfully implement the policies decided at the political level, irrespective of their personal political preferences.

In this ideal pattern, the parties –or, for the case, other groups of pressure or interest- resist the temptation of utilizing the armed forces as a weapon to serve their partisan interests or as a tool for political confrontation to erode the rivals. The neutrality of the military is reciprocated by the civilians with respect to criteria of merit on matters of

59   HUNTINGTON, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 80.

60   OWENS, Mackubin Thomas, "Military Officers. Political Without Partisanship," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Fall 2015, p. 99.

promotion and appointments. There is a broad consensus among parties on the need to support, within the possibilities of the nation, the military in their professional needs, and to improve the living standards of the members of the armed forces. Such a care should make military unions unnecessary.

	United Kingdom	Greece
Political (partisan) activity of the military	As per service regulations, members of the armed forces are apolitical. Public manifestations of political nature by high-ranking officers are relatively frequent.	Political activity or public manifestations of political preferences are constitutionally prohibited to the members of the armed forces. Military informal adscription to political patronage networks continues to be a reality in Greece.
Politicization of the military by civilians	The Military Covenant is a recent example of instrumentalization of the armed forces by the opposition to erode the Government. Efforts to coopt the military done by British National Party (BNP) in 2009.	Politicization of the military by political elites and parties is common.
Rules for public manifestations or political commitment of --retired personnel	There are no limitations to political activism of retired members of the armed forces.	There are no limitations to political activism of retired members of the armed forces.
Unionization of the military	Military unions are not legal in the UK. Professional associations like the British Armed Forces Federation (BAFF) are legal. Efforts to unionize the military initiated in the 1990s. The system is currently under pressure.	Military unions are forbidden. There is no right to strike. Professional associations to protect professional interests are legal after a 2012 ruling in the Supreme Court.

Table IV - AREA 4. Politicization of the Military (Non-Partisanship).

In the United Kingdom the military is nominally apolitical, as the Queen's Regulations for the services recognize, banning active participation of Regular Service personnel in the affairs of any political organization, or in political marches and demonstrations.

This principle, though, is broken with relative frequency and in a matter-of-fact manner, like the already referred case of General Dannatt, or the one of General Sir Nicholas Houghton (CDS) who, in 2015, openly criticized Jeremy Corbyn's[61] views on security issues without consequences in his career, which would attest to a high tolerance threshold to military utterances on political preferences.

Recent experience also registers cases of political instrumentalization of the armed forces for partisan interest. Probably the clearest one is that of the recent assumption

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61   Leader of Labor opposition in 2015.

of the *Army Covenant*[62] at the political level. The development of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Covenant, were used by the Conservative opposition as a tool to erode the Labor government, and to gain public support, taking advantage of the high level of popularity of the armed forces among the British citizenship.[63]

Military unions are not legal in the United Kingdom. Since the mid-1990s, though, the CMR pattern is subject to significant pressures to introduce them in the armed forces as a way to fill the breakdown of trust the soldiers have on the chain of command as an instrument to protect and advance their professional interests. Although unions remain off-limits for the military, professional associations have been legalized, albeit with restrictions in their ways of action.

In Greece, the Constitution of the Republic consecrates the political neutrality of the armed forces.[64] As per the basic law, the members of the armed forces are not allowed to make public manifestations in support or against any political option, and cannot run for election to the Parliament unless they retire.

Behind this official neutrality, and despite the successful efforts done by the military to adopt a democratic CMR pattern, there might remain a residual level of military politicization in the guise of a more or less loose adscription of individual professionals to political patronage networks. The already mentioned controversial appointment of general Ziazias as Chief of Staff of the Army by the outgoing PASOK government at the end of 2011, and his resignation only some seven months later in protest against the interference of the New Democracy Ministry of Defense in military appointments seems to indicate that politicization of the armed forces by civilians is not totally a thing of the past in Greece.

The demonstrations of open support SYRIZA and Golden Dawn extended in September 2011 to a mob of hundreds of retired officers that stormed the Ministry of Defense, shouting anti-PASOK slogans and protesting for the reduction in pensions imposed by the government would offer still another example of instrumentalization of the armed forces for a political gain and to erode the political rivals.

Unions and the right to strike are also off-limits to the Greek military although in 2012 the Supreme Court ruled that the armed forces should fully enjoy the right to associate, when not in operations, for professional purposes to protect their professional interests. In this spirit, a number of professional associations have been created, with some of them members of the *Pan-Hellenic Federation of Armed Forces Unions (PFAFU)*, and umbrella organization of associations.

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62   The *Army Covenant* is a military doctrinal document in which the Army, unilaterally, referred to the existence of a covenant between the British Army and the citizenship by virtue of which the British people should extend appreciation and support to the soldiers in exchange for their service and sacrifice.

63   INGHAM, The Military Covenant, p. 129.

64   Articles 29.3 and 56 of the Constitution of the Hellenic Republic.

Synthesis

The scanning of the CMR patterns we have done in the previous sections should have given us enough information to make a final, comprehensive, assessment of the current status of civil-military relations in the countries considered. Figure 1 depicts the proposed CMR profiles for the United Kingdom and Greece, based on the analysis, and compares them with the "ideal" model.

In the case of the United Kingdom, the analysis concludes that its CMR pattern is based on a solid foundation of mutual trust between soldiers and civilians that explains the relatively high level of professional autonomy granted to the military, and the tolerance the British political elites show for the public manifestations of political nature done by members of the armed forces.


Figure 1 – Compared CMR profiles.

The British CMR pattern is at a crossroads as a consequence of the operational deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The system is subject to important pressures coming both from the political level and from the citizenship, and is in a process of change to adapt to the new environment.

Two trends are recognizable in that change. The first one is motivated by the deficiencies identified in the strategy-making process at the political level and in the political oversight of the operations, which imposed in 2010 a comprehensive review of the management of Defense. This review resulted in a movement toward tighter political supervision of what the military does operationally, toward a more formalized policy-making process with more clearly laid out responsibilities and less

military influence, and toward less professional autonomy, already restricted in areas like procurement and acquisitions and military justice.

A second trend flows directly from what seems to be the growing gap between civilians and the military, and between their respective sets of values. This trend manifests itself in issues like the low public tolerance to military misbehavior in operations; the process of *juridification* of an ever more questioned military justice; the chronic issues with recruitment and retention of personnel in the armed forces; or the mounting pressure for unionization.

As a side effect, the recent deployments have stimulated the use of the military as a tool in the political infighting. The protracted operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have stirred up a public debate on the "social contract" linking the citizens with their soldiers -with the *Army Covenant* at the center-, in which the common people have shown a high level of support to the welfare of their soldiers. The opposition has used this issue as an opportunity to erode the party in the government, without consideration to the negative consequences that this move might have in the long run for the health of civil-military relations.

This debate, and the need to make service in the military attractive in order to mitigate recruitment issues, has resulted in an improvement of social support extended to servicemen and their families which. This is a positive development in and of itself. However, now that the operations are over and the military has left the spotlight, there is a possibility that this situation backfire under the growing discomfort of a civilian population that may start to see the armed forces as a privileged group, and the soldier as a "citizen-plus" within the British society.[65] Both sides of the civil-military relationship should work to prevent this from happening.

It is not clear whether these trends are short-lived, or if they are producing a more profound shift in the CMR profile of the United Kingdom. Whatever the case, the potential these changes have to generate friction seems high, and deserves special care and attention from all the stakeholders of the CMR trinity.

As for Greece, the analysis shows a pattern totally adapted to democratic standards, and subject to the tension of two opposing forces. On the one hand, the fact that the transition to democracy from authoritarian rule took place with a military institution sunk in disrepute and with the civilians adapting the CMR pattern from a position of strength, moves CMR towards low levels of professional autonomy. On the other hand, the almost unanimously shared perception of an external security threat coming from Turkey operates in the opposite direction, towards weaker civilian control and broader autonomy. This helps to explain why the military enjoys high levels of acceptance among the Greek population, as well as the levels of professional autonomy the civilians in Greece grant to the armed forces in spite of the recent and negative episode of militarism of 1967-1974.

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65   INGHAM, The Military Covenant, p. 165.

Exception to this seems to be the system of promotions and appointments. Although in principle there is a procedure based on merit and professional proficiency to regulate them, empirical evidence would show that it is subject to the frequent interference of external forces that try to impose on the system criteria of ideological and political affinity. This might mean that politicization of the armed forces is yet an issue in Greece's CMR, and would indicate that Greece's civil-military relations are more based on bonds of personal trust or clientage than they are on the trust the civilians extend to the armed forces as a "politically sterile" institution.

As it is now, the civil-military nexus is much regulated in Greece. Abundant legislation lays out roles, responsibilities and procedures of those involved in the relationship. However, the procedures set forth in it are not always followed and so, they are not of much practical value sometimes. The level of supervision of the military seems also to be low; partly due to the relatively weak public debate on security, and the generally insufficient level of understanding of defense issues among the public and the political elites alike; partly due to the weak oversight role the Parliament plays in the political life of Greece.

Greece is among the few European nations still maintaining a military based on conscription. The system appears to be generally accepted, and the country does not seem to be confronted with the kind of strong opposition to conscription other Western democracies have experienced in the past. The system, however, may be challenged in the future, on account of the nation's negative demographic indicators. This will force Greece, sooner or later, to review its model, and to reevaluate its CMR pattern.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have tried to develop a methodology to analyze civil-military relations patterns. Obviously, other approaches are possible. The practical application of the proposed one to the cases of the United Kingdom and Greece illustrates how it can help to identify deficiencies that may cause friction, dysfunctional CMR, or even threats to civilian supremacy. The value of the method lies in that it does it by holistically considering the many facets shaping civil-military relations, and by keeping their interrelations in sight, instead of taking them one by one.

The analysis should serve as a compass to orientate the search for remedial actions that might help, if needed, to redress and optimize the CMR balance. Because the approach is holistic, any recommendation of change in one area has to consider the impact it may have on the rest so as to minimize the possibility of improving one area at the cost of deteriorating another one.

As we have already suggested, civil-military relations are ultimately culture-based. For that reason, the application of the model, the conclusions we might reach and, above all, any recommendation on remedial action has to pass through the filter of whatever is acceptable and feasible in the cultural environment of the pattern under

analysis. Changes that do not account for or disregard cultural realities may easily make the pattern derail.

This study leaves certain aspects open to further research. One of them has to do with the metrics used to assess the analysis. Admittedly, the definition of the deviation of the CMR profiles of the United Kingdom and Greece from the ideal one shown in Figure 1 is more based on an informed estimation than on quantifiable data. Whenever possible, the assessment has to be based on hard, objective, data. This is often problematic for the analyst either because the information is not available, or because, even if it is, its interpretation is elusive. As an example, the absence of open CMR incidents -quantifiable data- cannot automatically be construed as an indicator of healthy CMR, because it is not possible to ascertain whether that apparent calm is the result of civil-military harmony, or if it is only due to an absolute submission of the military to civilian dictates that might be hiding deep problems in CMR.

Whatever the case, the scanning here proposed intends solely to offer a methodology to proactively address potential civil-military friction, even before conflict surfaces. The method only claims to offer a guide to the identification of CMR issues in a pattern. It would be wrong to expect from it formulas to solve CMR problems.

Some issues require time and cultural change. And, at the end of the day, we are talking about human relationships. Therefore, any method of analysis, no matter how sophisticated, will be useless if the individuals involved in the civil-military relationship do not have the will to constructively cooperate for the common good and the good of a stable, healthy, democratic system.

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