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THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IN NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION OF STATES AND LEGITIMATE SECURITY

Abstract

The two best examples of the implementation of the concept of the “comprehensive approach” to nation-building operations are those of the international community’s participation in Iraq and Afghanistan, both under the relevant legal endorsement of the United Nations. Considering the results obtained in each of the countries, with the conclusion of the security sector reform phase in the former (and with the latter going through its final consultancy phase and mentoring period), it is now time to question whether the lessons learned have been the correct ones or whether there is a need to rethink these operations, particularly those relating to security and governance.

KeyWords

Comprehensive approach, national reconstruction, legitimate security, governance, control mechanisms.

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INTRODUCTION

This article works on the assumption that the efforts made by the international stakeholders' armed forces and police forces will not achieve the desired stabilisation in the failed states in which they are active – territories with a level of violence that we can consider to be that of a declared civil war -, unless there is a simultaneous effort made in the area of governance and, especially, through the *legitimate use of violence*¹ in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations.

Here we will look at the concepts of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, analysing the fundamental difference between them. We will then move on to analyse the difference between the concepts of state-building and nation-building. From there we will present the fundamental characteristics of the methodology of the comprehensive approach in these operations in order to debate the need for the integration of the security and governance sectors at a higher level than what we are currently seeing.

FROM PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS TO PEACEBUILDING OPERATIONS

As stated in the United Nations (UN) document known as the *Brahimi Report*², the peacekeeping operations carried out during the period of the Cold War were operations aimed at maintaining the existing status between states. They didn't address the true causes of the conflicts but rather alleviated their symptoms – their mandates were to monitor the ceasefire and they had no direct responsibilities as to the causes of the conflict. These operations were small in size and didn't require large command and control or intelligence and logistics support structures; they were operations that were easy to build and maintain on the ground and answered to the type of conflicts

1 Legitimacy understood as social acceptance by the group, in this case referring to the use of violence as necessary and fair. See BARRETO I., HENRY B., SERRANO Y. y LÓPEZ-LÓPEZ W.: *La legitimación como proceso en la violencia política, medios de comunicación y construcción de culturas de paz*. Universidad Javierana de Bogotá, Bogotá: 2009, V. 8, p. 737-748.

2 United Nations (UN), General Assembly Security Council. *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (A/55/305-S/2000/809)*. 21 August 2000. Online, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/a55305.pdf>, consulted 31/10/15.

that occurred in a situation of international relations whereby the states were doubtless the only actors. In situations defined by a bipolar world in which the *Westphalian* concept of the state ruled, and whereby, therefore, the sovereignty exercised over a determined territory and its population was almost unlimited. From that situation there was an evolution towards a new type of situation that arose following the fall of the Berlin Wall, in which the internal players who, until that moment had been subject to a situation of forced freezing due to the threat of inter-state conflict at the global level, emerged with great strength – ethnic, religious and political groups, ... - turning the borders that had existed up until that point into a fallacy and, as a consequence, giving rise to internal conflicts with the corresponding humanitarian crises that made international intervention necessary.

As already mentioned, these peacebuilding operations were still focused on supporting state institutions and so the Westphalian concept of the state and a negative sense of peace as an *absence of violence* was still being talked about. These peacekeeping³ actions could be placed together with state-building⁴ actions, without even focusing on the new security concepts that started to emerge at the beginning of the nineties⁵. For this reason, over these years a desired final situation (and good enough reason to consider the operation finalised) was to finalise a democratic process of elections that would serve to consolidate the situation of peace that had been achieved⁶. But it was the conflicts during the nineties in Rwanda and Liberia that really pushed the international community to widen their field of vision, rethinking the support they were giving almost exclusively to state institutions and focusing on the root causes of the violence being produced. And the talk was no longer of inter-state crisis management but of interventions for humanitarian reasons in sovereign states. However, while entering into these interventions is a delicate issue from the legal point of view, exiting is even more so, as a situation with a notable absence of violence as well as sufficient level of development of the state institutions must be reached. In addition, the necessary legitimacy must be strengthened which necessarily entails long periods of time (as in the case of Cyprus, Palestine, Indo-Pakistani Kashmir), alongside international pressure to obtain immediate results and the fact that this would de facto imply a permanent occupation of sovereign states as well as an intolerable logistical burden.

3 These operations are understood as being those that are deployed to implement a ceasefire agreement or a peace agreement. They usually don't require the use of force unless to protect the civilian population or in self-defence, and their aim is to help states make the transition from conflict to peace. (United Nations Peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations, peace and security. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml>, consulted 12/01/16)

4 These were focused mainly on rebuilding a state's government institutions and bodies. (SCOTT, Z. Literature Review on State Building. Birmingham: University of Birmingham, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, 2007, p. 3-4).

5 BRINKERHOFF, D. W. Introduction, Governance Challenges in Fragile States: Reestablishing Security, Rebuilding Effectiveness and Reconstituting Legitimacy. In Governance in Post-Conflict, Rebuilding Fragile States. Derik W. Brinkerhoff ed. London: Routledge, 2007, p. 1-23.

6 PARIS, R. At War's End, Building Peace after Civil Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 7-8.

These new types of intervention that aim to resolve the root cause of conflicts cannot be referred to as peacekeeping but rather *peacebuilding*. These types of interventions do not have the state as the principal reference point but rather the citizens as human beings. We no longer talk of *Westphalian* peace but rather of *positive peace*⁷, in which a series of minimum conditions for living, security and social justice are identified so as to ensure that lasting peace can exist⁸. These conditions are set out in the United Nations' *New Concept of Human Security*⁹: "For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime—these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world."

Together with this new concept of human security, Boutros-Ghali's proposals in his well-known *Agenda for Democratization*¹⁰, which itself built on two previous documents, *An Agenda for Peace*¹¹ and *An Agenda for Development*¹², would make the international community evolve from the concept of state-building towards nation-building, as we will see further on. The conclusions of the first of the three above-mentioned documents state the need for a comprehensive approach so as to be able to achieve the desired peace and security, as without minimum democratisation and development processes this would be impossible to achieve.

FROM STATE-BUILDING TO NATION-BUILDING

We should start by saying that the concept of nation-building originated in the period following World War II when this concept became popular mainly in US academic circles for describing the reconstruction activities taking place in German and Japanese

7 Peace understood as a conscious construction based on justice, a generator of positive and lasting values, capable of integrating politically and socially, of creating expectations and of aiming at meeting human needs. (MUÑOZ, Francisco A.. *An Imperfect Peace*. University of Granada Institute for Peace and Conflicts, s.f. Online, <http://www.ugr.es/~fmunoz/documentos/pimunozespa%C3%B9.pdf>, consulted 15/01/16).

8 JIMÉNEZ BAUTISTA, F. *Hacia una antropología para la paz* (artículo 43). *Gazeta de Antropología* 25 (2). Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2009. Online, http://www.ugr.es/~pwlac/G25_43Francisco_Jimenez_Bautista.html, consulted 3/10/15.

9 United Nations Development Program (UNDP). *Human Development Report: A new concept of human security*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.15.

10 BOUTROS-GHALI, B. *An Agenda for Democratization*. United Nations, New York, 1996.

11 BOUTROS-GHALI, B. *Report by the UN Secretary-General: An Agenda for Peace*, 17 June, 1992 (A/47/277 – S/24/2411).

12 BOUTROS-GHALI, B. *An Agenda for Development, Report of Secretary General*, A/45/935. United Nations, New York, 6 May 1994.

societies¹³. The aim was not to reestablish the state but rather to create new democratic societies through purges, development aid, reeducation and establishing new state institutions. The concept was forgotten, however, by the neoliberals, perhaps because it was considered as being something that was only viable at a specific time in history and only able to be carried out by occupying forces imposing it. And so the United Nations was interested neither in the concept nor in the way in which it was implemented.

It was precisely the fact that state-building became a typical UN mission, alongside the appearance of development and human security theories that led to the recognition of the need to include development and governance in this concept. In line with the *Weberian* theory, the main condition of statehood is the monopoly of the use of physical force within a given territory¹⁴, but that a series of elements have to be added to this, without delegitimising the first point, if we want to ensure that it is enough to maintain the desired *social peace*. It was in this form that the concept of *human development*¹⁵ appeared in the 90s and within the sphere of the United Nations. The development of states no longer merely covered institutions and macroeconomic data, but now focused attention on citizens and on the important existing social and economic differences between them. This is why, in order to build and consolidate the necessary civil society upon which the state and lasting peace will rise, it is necessary to look at the concept of nation-building as regards democratic values, civil participation, human development, governance and social justice, all of which hadn't been given the due attention up until this point. If we want stable democratic societies to be able to achieve the highly-desired *Kantian peace*, we should try to establish fair and well-governed societies in which the concept of nation clearly prevails over the concept of state.

The next question we should ask ourselves is who is more entitled to develop and build a nation within a state - the state itself; another country - with the resulting risk that it could be considered an *occupier*; a legitimately recognised multinational organisation like the United Nations; the communities that live upon the territory in which we aim to build this failed nation-state? Let us look more fully at the concept of the comprehensive approach and at the observations that we will make further on as regards the multiple stakeholders.

NATION-BUILDING OPERATIONS

When talking about nation-building operations, it is essential that we mention the United States of America (USA) - the state that has, without doubt, most frequent-

13 DEUTSCH, K. and FOLTZ, W. *Nation Building and Nation Development: some issues for political research*. Deutsch & Foltz editors. New York: Atherton Press, 1966.

14 WEBER, M. *Politics as a Vocation*. 1919. Online, <http://disenso.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/La-politica-como-vocacion-M.-Weber.pdf>, consulted 31/10/15.

15 United Nations Development Program (UNDP). *Human Development Report 1990: Concept and Measurement of Human Development*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

ly used its military and civil resources in nation-building operations in other states. During the 20th century alone, the USA carried out several nation-building operations in other sovereign states with the following commonalities¹⁶:

- a) The aim was to change or maintain the existing political regime, bearing in mind that this aim was not set out based on democratic ideals (this has only been the case in the most recent operations) but rather in most cases was done to maintain friendly regimes due to geopolitical or economic interests, or to otherwise overthrow them.
- b) They were usually preceded by a massive deployment of ground forces, not just to overthrow or support regimes but also in police missions to maintain law and order.
- c) US civilian and military personnel was used in the administration of the state in question. Through this process of immersion in state institutions, the USA was able to exert decisive influence upon the selection of national leaders of the supported regimes.

In accordance with these criteria, we can clearly distinguish between military operations usually carried out prior to the nation-building operation, and the operations described above. While a successful military campaign was necessary in all cases as a preliminary step, it is important to point out that the more decisive and crushing the military victory, the less challenging it was to carry out nation-building. In the table below you will see 15 crisis management and nation-building operations.

País	Periodo	Población	Carácter	Mandato ONU	Administración Interina	Democracia después de 10 años
Cuba	1898-1902	1,6 M	Unilateral	—	Administrado por EUA	No
Panamá	1903-1936	450.000	Unilateral	—	Régimen vicario	No
Cuba	1906-1909	2 M	Unilateral	—	Administrado por EUA	No
Nicaragua	1909-1933	620.000	Unilateral	—	Régimen vicario	No
Haiti	1915-1934	2 M	Unilateral	—	Régimen vicario	No
Cuba	1917-1922	2,8 M	Unilateral	—	Régimen vicario	No
República Dominicana	1916-1924	895.000	Unilateral	—	Administrado por EUA	No
Alemania Occidental	1945-1949	46 M	Multilateral	—	Administración multilateral	Sí
Japón	1945-1952	72 M	Unilateral (1)	—	Administrado por EUA	Sí
República Dominicana	1965-1966	3,8 M	Unilateral	No	Régimen vicario	No
Vietnam del Sur	1964-1973	19 M	Unilateral	No	Régimen vicario	No
Camboya	1970-1973	7 M	Unilateral	No	Administración multilateral	No
Granada	1983	92.000	Unilateral	No	Administración local	Sí
Panamá	1989	2,3 M	Unilateral	No	Administración local	Sí
Haiti	1994-1996	7 M	Multilateral	Sí	Administración local	No

(1) Aunque con cobertura multilateral

Table I: National reconstruction operations undertaken by the USA during the 20th century. Source: prepared by the author.¹⁷

¹⁶ PEI, M. & KASPER, S. *Lessons from the Past: the American record in nation building*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief 24, 2004. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

¹⁷ Supplemented with data taken from, among others, Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, Steele, Teltschik y Timilsins (DOBBINS, J., JONES, S. G., CRANE, K, RATHMELL, A, STEELE, B., TELTSCHIK, R., TIMILSINS, A. *The UN's Role in Nation-Building, From the Congo to Iraq*.

The most significant successes were in East Germany and Japan, both due to the sizes of these states as well as the reach of the national reconstruction processes; and in Granada and Panama where democratic regimes were established, although the small size of the countries means that these successes were less important. As for the other national reconstruction operations, these could not be considered particularly successful considering the fact that 10 years after finalising operations, only four of the countries were still under democratic regimes. Of the 15 cases analysed, only one had UN authorisation together with the added legitimacy that this brought to it¹⁸.

The list only goes up to the year 2000 meaning that neither the operation in Afghanistan, started in 2002¹⁹, nor the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq²⁰ are included. The latter mission is an excellent example of sound internal coordination, although the success of the operation based on the desired final situation is unclear²¹ (the decisions taken in this operation as regards national reconstruction were so wide of the mark that they led to the current situation of total internal warfare as can be seen in both Iraq and Syria).

The influence that the USA exercised on the internal policies of each one of these countries over the period of the intervention was decisive when selecting their leaders. What is even more striking is the tendency of the countries with mentored governments to be incapable of maintaining democratic regimes, perhaps due to the political and economic support given to their military leaders. This support facilitated the task of stabilising the security sphere but, ultimately, made the political leaders incapable of managing their respective governments without the aid of foreign elements.

According to Pei and Kasper²², it can be stated that the success or failure of nation-building in a failed state depends on three variables: the internal characteristics of the country; the convergence of interests of the internal and external actors involved; and a lasting commitment from the side of the international community to the state's economic and social development.

Santa Mónica: RAND Corporation, 2005. Online http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG304.sum.pdf, consulted 15/01/16).

18 The operations in Bosnia and Kosovo have not been included as they were considered as primarily humanitarian aid actions and not nation-building operations, although they took on this responsibility once intervention had taken place in both territories.

19 United Nations (UN). Security Council Res. 1401 (2002), March 28. Online, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1401.pdf>, consulted 31/10/15.

20 United Nations (UN), Security Council. Res. 1500 (2003), August 14. Online, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7843.doc.htm>, consulted 31/10/15.

21 HASAN AL QARAWEE, H. Political Violence and Failures of Nation-Building in Iraq. World Peace Foundation. June 25, 2013. Online, <http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/06/25/political-violence-and-failures-of-nation-building-in-iraq/>, consulted 31/10/15.

22 PEI, M. & KASPER, S. Ref. 16, Op. Cit.

The internal characteristics of the country are connected to its previous level of national coherence and its lack of national identity due to ethnic, religious or ideological divisions or due to extreme social injustice. This fragmentation causes each group or social class to try tirelessly to position their own leaders with the resulting danger of political and social clashes. Another important characteristic is the previous level of development of state bureaucracy: the absence thereof would lead to the necessary involvement of foreign powers to make it work and, subsequently, to mentor it; this would be seen as a desire to control what is native and local to the country as an occupying force, with the resulting danger of failure. Equally, if the country has had previous democratic experiences, albethey imperfect, it makes the success of the nation-building operation much more likely.

As regards common interests between the foreign powers and the country to be rebuilt, here we are referring to geopolitical and economic interests; if the elite, the citizens and the foreign powers have overlapping interests, the possibilities of success are high.

Lasting commitment to the social and economic development of the country is a fundamental requirement for nation-building of a failed country. There must be not only an important military and police commitment in the security sphere, but there must also be a huge and lasting commitment to the economic and social development of the country, as well as the institutions for its governance. Investments must be focused on development and economic self-sufficiency; they should never be aimed at the exploitation of the country as then the perception of the foreign powers as occupying forces will be inevitable.

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO NATION-BUILDING OPERATIONS

The definition of the concept

In his Agenda for Development²³, then UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali presented the *comprehensive approach* as the process for integrating the different tools – preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding – that the international community had at its disposal for achieving peace, emphasising as well the direct relationship between security and development. So it was the UN that first used this concept in one of its executive resolutions on the occasion of the post-conflict management of the Kosovo crisis²⁴:

23 BOUTROS-GHALI, B. Ref. 12, Op. Cit.

24 United Nations (UN), Security Council. Res. 1244 (1999), June 19, art. 17. Online, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1244\(1999\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1244(1999)), consulted 31/10/15.

“Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.”

The comprehensive approach is a term for which there is no agreed definition. Without being exhaustive, in this chapter we will try to look at the interpretations of the term that we feel are the most interesting. The comprehensive approach is about how and where: how we dissect the conflict, analysing all of its parts and identifying the root causes of each one of the parts; how we identify the way in which they are interrelated; prioritising the place and the moment to act, and with what level of force; establishing what the enablers and stoppers are in each of the functions or sectors. Finally, determining which action should be taken for each one of them to facilitate the main function in each one of the phases²⁵. And this has to be done for each of the levels at which work is done: strategic, operational and tactical. We are approaching a concept of security in which it is accepted that it is necessary to take action in all state functions as a whole in order to provide stable development. Acting in any other manner, just focusing on the symptoms of external violence, will only provide temporary results and not the desired lasting peace.

For these reasons, the comprehensive approach in crisis management has also been defined as a process that aims to facilitate the convergence of priorities and avoid a lack of reality or duplication-conflict of strategies by the main actors, requiring the coordination of strategies and actions from the first planning phase and from the highest level, sharing objectives and decision-making processes²⁶.

Need for the comprehensive approach

As for the question of what truly brings a comprehensive approach to crisis management, and considering the two biggest and successful nation-building operations of the 40s and early 50s, the answer needs to include two different points of view: the first, setting out the reasons for which we need to change some procedures for stabilisation operations with well-known capabilities and methodologies for others with greater levels of uncertainty due to the huge number of actors involved from different backgrounds – actors who aren't used to working together and through simultaneous

25 FAULKNER R, DABBS, Jr y VAN MAANEN, J. *Varieties of Qualitative Research*. London: Sage Publications. 1982.

26 SAN ANTONIO, Demetrio, apud CASTILLO BAREA, S. El concepto de comprehensive approach en la ONU y OTAN: alcance e implicaciones. *Documentos de Seguridad y Defensa* 37. 2010. Ministry of Defence, Madrid., p. 37.

action by all of them. In addition, it should be assumed that the level of control and coordination over each one of the parts is much lower than before when the different phases of crisis management were successive – conventional war phase followed by a state-building phase.

The second point of view has to be focused on determining what contributions the new concept can bring to the field of methodology and management procedures.

Different reasons could be debated but the most obvious is probably the shift in adversary over the last two decades and the new stage on which operations take place. Current stabilisation operations are carried out to resolve serious internal crises in states where, with a clear weakness in their power tools and a section of the population taking up arms, a situation of civil war has emerged causing huge suffering to large sections of the population. The lack of respect for human rights and the international laws of armed conflict undermine the institutions' capabilities to protect their own citizens and to provide essential public services. The talk, therefore, is of new asymmetrical conflicts in which the enemy lives, fights and protects himself in the midst of the rest of the population. Operations have to be developed in this new scenario, with all of the resulting danger of casualties and collateral damage. An enemy that, faced with an obvious inferiority as regards technology and human resources, uses terror as his best tool to win the support of local populations and to ensure that public opinion of the international actors brings pressure to bear on their respective governments as regards the futility of their efforts.

This is why this is an enemy that has to be neutralised using military, police and diplomatic means. At the same time, the population must be protected and a minimum of public services provided: justice, education, health... And to achieve this, we can no longer use the procedures that were used during the first half of the 20th century when conflicts were between states, and the customs and rights of warfare were respected. This new asymmetrical enemy, that can't be formally defeated because he hasn't formally declared war, requires a new procedure using all the tools that the international community has available to it: hard and soft power – military and police, diplomatic, economic means, etc. At the same time, it is necessary to protect and provide humanitarian aid to the population affected, and to help rebuild state institutions. All of this is only possible through the crisis management procedure called the comprehensive approach.

The second point of view, complimentary to the first point, is more procedural and consists of determining which truly innovative aspects the implementation of the comprehensive approach has brought to crisis management: Firstly, it should be pointed out that it is not the relationship between security and development as this was already being done, as explained in section 4. A sequential relationship between the military and civilian elements was established and the second phase wouldn't have been possible if the first phase hadn't been achieved beforehand²⁷ – just as was studied

27 HULL, Cecilia. Focus and convergence through a Comprehensive Approach: but which among

and applied until the 90s in Western academic circles and general staff schools. The innovation brought in by the comprehensive approach is based on a functional relationship between both, whereby it is not considered possible to reach a certain level of security if a sufficient level of development and governance is not reached at the same time. This was confirmed in numerous conflicts at the end of the last century.

Thus the comprehensive approach is the only method that allows us to take sufficient account of the complexity of factors that interact in current crises and that work on three levels: security, development and governance. There is also the certainty, as I will explain further on, that action taken on one of the parts will never bring about sufficient results for them to be recognisable in a permanent way on the whole, and, thus, that the action has to be at least coordinated if integration is not possible.

Its origins: the Copenhagen School and the crisis of the nineties

To discover the reasons that explain the force with which this new methodology burst through for conflict resolution at the start of the 20th century, we have to look back at the previous decade and, from our point of view, the reasons are two-fold and simultaneous: the first, academic circles and in particular the Danish school of international relations; the second, the experience in the 90s with the resolution of the Balkans conflict.

As regards the first reason, the relationship between the Copenhagen School's *securitisation* theory²⁸ and the comprehensive approach to conflict resolution would seem obvious. This school of social thought considers that incidents in different sectors of society (military, economic, social...) can become security problems from the moment it is considered that they could affect the essential functions/sectors of the state or society to which they belong. When this perception exists, the state or regional-global organisation is legitimised to use extraordinary means to resolve it.

At the same time, a series of internal conflicts arose that transformed the United Nations into a crisis management and peacebuilding operations factory: Namibia (1989), Nicaragua (1989), Angola (1991), Cambodia (1991), El Salvador (1991), Mozambique (1992), Liberia (1993), Rwanda (1993), Bosnia (1995), Croatia (1995), Guatemala (1997), East Timor (1999), Kosovo (1999) and Sierra Leona (1999). In all of these cases, conflict resolution was obliged to deal with the essential state functions and the root causes, and bear in mind the different social groups that made up society. But there was also a new element that didn't exist during the middle of the 20th century: the end-of-century new professional armies, reduced and highly specialised, did not have the capabilities or the

the many? Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2011.

28 What we here refer to as securitisation is a concept defined and developed by WÆVER, O. On Security, Securitization and Desecuritization. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.). New York: Columbia University Press. 1995, pp. 46-86.

knowledge potential of non-military techniques that the mobilising armies had. Here we are referring to the capabilities that the mobilised personnel provided from within civil society. This is why these capabilities have to be integrated through cooperation, or even integration, with official and private organisation that do possess them.

On the other hand, we cannot forget the existing relationship between the comprehensive approach and the concept of human security²⁹, a relationship that is an extremely important element of legitimacy given the existing close relationship between human security and development³⁰, differing from the position that clings to the concept of *freedom from fear* to avoid falling into situations that are so broad as to be unachievable³¹. It is precisely this narrow vision of the concept that, in our opinion, is causing the failure in national reconstruction operations, as we will see further on.

One concept, two methodologies

When analysing the concept, we can agree that the methodology for its implementation can be carried out in two ways that, frequently, we confuse and use indiscriminately:

- a) The comprehensive approach as a holistic approach in which there are different stakeholders and factors over which there is no possibility of control and over which, therefore, there must be interaction through a culture of coordination and cooperation in order to achieve the same strategic goal. As an example we could cite the necessary cooperation between international security forces and local and humanitarian stakeholders.
- b) The comprehensive approach as a structured process subject to rules and procedures to which participants involved the management of the operation are subjected voluntarily in order to reach a determined level of coherence in the policies and actions to be developed. This is the case of the different interpretations at the national level and by international organisations that try to limit the approach to structured planning processes, both within the international organisations themselves as well as with other actors, and aim for the integration of their actions – the most symptomatic case would be NATO itself.

These methodologies are not mutually exclusive, quite the contrary. But multinational security organisations worked with the second to try to come to conclusions

29 UNDP, Human Development Report (1994). Ref. 9, Op. Cit., p. 15.

30 WENDLING, C. The comprehensive approach to civil-military crisis management, a critical analysis and perspective. Paris: Institut de la Recherche de l'École Militaire (IRSEM), 2011.

31 KALDOR M. & JOHNSON A. New wars and human security: an interview with Mary Kaldor. Democratiya 11, 2007. Online, file:///C:/Users/Agredkabal/Downloads/Ch9_New_Wars.pdf, consulted 16/01/16.

that would lead to models. These models have not led to the desired results and because of this, there is a shift to looking towards a more holistic and collaborative process when faced with the rejection that the rigid and highly structured processes cause among the main stakeholders in the governance and development sectors³².

Characteristics

The characteristics of the comprehensive approach model that may be implemented, whatever its methodology, will be common to the characteristics that are outlined in the next paragraphs. In conclusion, what we can say is that none of the participating actors, in spite of their independence, will be able to achieve the desired final outcome alone. And thus there is a determined level of interdependence as each player possesses the necessary know-how specific to one particular area of activity. Interdependence is the rule and the success of each individual activity is related to the success of the whole.

The second conclusion that we can draw from the analysis of the characteristics and practical cases presented is that there must be different “comprehensive approach models” depending on the type of strategic line of action to be taken – security, development or governance – as for each area there will be, a priori, different leadership during each one of the phases.

The multiple dimensions of the comprehensive approach and the necessary leadership


In this crisis management process, the number and complexity of actors present – be they internal stakeholders such as political parties, governmental institutions, ex-combatants associations, tribal representation groups, human rights associations or associations representing specific sectors of the population (particularly the least favoured groups), or external stakeholders such as international security and development organisations, diplomatic missions from donor governments, NGOs or even private companies with interests in the area – mean that there is a need for coherence and coordination at different levels and with each one of the actors present at each level³³.

This horizontal interaction should be developed between the actors present and for each essential function where action is required. It should be done for each stage of the operation and for each group, through temporary leadership that will, for the

32 DYNDAL, Gjert Lage and VIKAN, Cornelia. NATO's Comprehensive Approach: Still Something for the Future? Paper presented at the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (NDCSC) Doctrine Conference, Oslo, 25–26 June 2014; NATO, Civil Military Planning and Support. Catalogue of Ideas: Third Informal Community of Interest Workshop on the Implementation of a Comprehensive Approach Capacity Building to Support Conflict Prevention or Transition. Brussels, 11–12 December 2014.

33 HULL, C. Ref. 27, Op. Cit.

most past, lead to multiple friction³⁴, inevitable in each stage, bearing in mind that depending on the stage, the predominant sector will be different. The graph below shows the theoretical prioritisation of leadership between the players present during the initial peacebuilding stage. The leadership should be held by the security forces, in particular the international peace enforcement units but, on many occasions, they will be at heads with other actors present³⁵.



Graph 1: The thickness of the arrows represents the different level of leadership of each one of the players during the initial stage of a peacebuilding operation when the security sector is fundamental. Source: prepared by the author.

The lead stakeholder at each stage should be established at the highest level of planning, the strategic political level, but the specific conditions in the theatre of operations may set out a very short-term alternative calendar – for example, during the post-conflict phase, Reconstruction and Development (R&D) will become the top priority but a momentary worsening of the security conditions

34 To give an example: the group made up of judges and prosecutors could present objections to having to work under the leadership of members of other groups, even raising legal objections as regards being temporarily subordinated during a specific stage, claiming the necessary separation of powers in a democratic state – for instance the DDR stage and the legal actions against some of their members for supposed abuses committed during the conflict.

35 This was the case in Darfur (2005) with those who advocated for the detention of President Bashir and those who advocated for an agreement between the parties in conflict to achieve immediate peace.

would mean that the security group would have to take priority until R&D could once again take the lead.

Conflicts of values, principles and mandates

Another aspect of these conflicts occurs when we try to coordinate humanitarian aid agencies and stakeholders that operate in the field of security and diplomacy. Some agencies, due to their own code of values³⁶, oppose being integrated into a comprehensive approach process for fear of losing their political neutrality and, as a consequence, their own personal security. A further aggravating factor is that most of these NGOs have a management, planning and control strategic level located in the city, but they jump straight from this level to the tactical level without any element of management and coordination at the theatre of operations operational level³⁷.

Those responsible for achieving coherence between these types of organisations should be aware of the fact that the ideal solution does not exist and that the aim should be to find a practicable solution - *the second best or workable solution* – as these types of conflicts of values and principles are non-negotiable and form part of the constraints that always exist, to a greater or lesser extent, in all processes where efforts are concentrated. Being able to manage and maintain the level of conflict at a level that allows the group to continue to advance has to be the aim, bearing in mind that not doing so will most likely lead to failure.

Different rhythm, internal and external

It should be recognised that the rhythms for the implementation of development processes in the different sectors for a scenario of post-conflict stabilisation and nation-building are very different, with local stakeholders usually being completely stretched beyond their capacity for absorption and learning. The local actors need to be the ones leading the processes and making the development programmes theirs as it is essential that they are able to lead them without outside mentoring as quickly as possible. However, the local actors don't have the necessary institutional structures nor, very often, the appropriate people, nor the essential structures and they need time to build these up. An example of this type of friction was evident in Burundi in 2007 when the UN team in charge of checking the series of actions ongoing in the country asked the Commissioner of the Mission not to bring more pressure to bear on

36 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGO,s in Disaster Relief. 1994. Online, <http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/code-of-conduct/> , consulted 31/10/15.

37 GARY, L. & MIKE, F. Insights and Best Practices: Interagency, intergovernmental and nongovernmental coordination (A Joint Force Operational Perspective). Focus Paper, Joint War Fighting Center. Norfolk (USA): July, 3, 2007, p. 16.

the local government but rather to postpone the commission's work and put in place a monitoring mechanism³⁸.

THE INTEGRATION OF SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

Following Salvatore Jennings³⁹, we can state that during the immediate post-conflict period the security and governance aspects are essential for the success of humanitarian aid, rebuilding and political reform, and that from the very beginning all existing ethnic, political and religious groups should be integrated into the new institutions that are formed⁴⁰, without adopting short term decisions. The so-called peace dividends should reach as many citizens as possible, with no exclusions, to ensure that the initial expectations are upheld⁴¹.

The aim of stabilisation and national reconstruction operations is the development of the legitimacy of national governments which can be achieved by guaranteeing, in the following order, the rule of law, essential public services, respect for human rights and democratic participation in internal political processes, enabling the gradual assumption of competencies and responsibilities by national institutions.

The essential pillars or functions that are managed during a national reconstruction operations are security, governance, development; a fourth essential element should be added to these, and is the function made up of humanitarian aspects. The comprehensive approach deals with the three first groups while the fourth maintains an independent and non-committed position as regards each one of them. If the comprehensive approach advocates for simultaneous activities in the three sectors that are fundamental for state-building, in volatile post-conflict situations it is security together with humanitarian aid that become the basic necessity for the protection of citizens to allow for governance and development.

38 United Nations (UN). Annual Report of the Peacebuilding Commission, S/2007/458-A/62/137, 25 July 2007. Online, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/doc_oc.shtml, consulted 31/10/15.

39 JENNINGS, S. *The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq*. Peaceworks N° 49, 2003. United States Institute for Peace, Washington DC.

40 Attitudes of caste superiority or support to a specific faction or ethnic group will cause discontent and mistrust in the population, making the implementation of any type of reform slower and more difficult.

41 On this point it is interesting to analyse what is currently occurring in Afghanistan with the National Unity Government and the breakdown of the ruling elites, with each party fearing the loss of power accumulated over recent years.

According to Jackson⁴², the essential elements are security and governance, or going one step further, obtaining the necessary legitimate, legal and responsible security. In other words, a state of security provided by the security forces and through legal and legitimate procedures with which the majority of the population can identify, avoiding sectarianism and revanchism. Any state of security reached through other means will be illegal or illegitimate and, therefore, will fail in its attempt to achieve the necessary stability and development.

Thus the *use of violence in a legitimate and proportional manner* becomes a key aspect to ensure that governance can be implemented in a broader sense. For this task, an essential aspect will be the control mechanisms that are implemented to ensure that the stakeholders charged with providing security (military and police forces and intelligence) do so in accordance with the established mechanisms and in a transparent way as regards the local population and the international community, allowing international organisations, particularly and in the first instance the UN, to be able to control the use of violence to then gradually pass on this function to the nation-state that is being reconstructed. In most cases, security sector reform programmes exclude governance and, even worse, there is no type of control by the bodies in charge of the overall supervision of the state-building operation. This is essential. Legitimate security should be seen and understood in a much broader sense than the simple lack of physical violence, despite this being the primary need.

A fundamental aspect when designing security sector reforms (SSR) is the necessary understanding of the social and political context in which we are working. We should never fall into the temptation of believing that the inexistence of state structures means that there are no informal decision-making institutions in line with local traditions and history. It is vital to learn about them and integrate them, as far as possible, into the new institutions that are being created. Doing the opposite would lead to certain rejection by the population of what they would consider as something foreign and imposed upon them. Herein lies the difficulty of establishing general models for the reform of any of these sectors and, therefore, the implementation of the comprehensive approach in these operations.

CONCLUSIONS

The need for coherence

Despite the fact that theoretical studies and, above all, the lessons learned show us the fundamental importance of coherence between the multiple stakeholders active in

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42 JACKSON, P. Chapter 9: Security Sector Reform. Back to the roots, security sector reform and development. Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva: 2012, pp. 252-253.

the reconstruction of failed states, we have to come to terms with the existing gap between what we are aiming for and the inability to implement this at operational level⁴³. Figures show that almost 55% of all peacebuilding operations do not have a strategy for reconstruction at state level. Even more serious is noting that in 2003 there was talk of the possibility of 25% - 50% of all active peace processes becoming paralysed in the following five years⁴⁴.

Accordingly, the best way to achieve full coherence in the comprehensive approach is the complete integration of civilian and military structures in peace time to allow for joint planning and preparation⁴⁵. Although this is the ideal ambition, a unified structure will only be achieved in military organisations⁴⁶. And so, a relationship of mere coexistence could be achieved, through the so desired cooperation⁴⁷. The actors involved contribute to reaching common aims in a type of cooperation that is not free from difficulties, as experience has shown us⁴⁸, through a series of intermediary situations like integration and coordination⁴⁹.

Possibly the main obstacle to achieving full coherence is managing the *shared command and control* of the different resources available: where, when and how to use them. We shouldn't forget that the protagonists of the comprehensive approach never lose command and control of their resources – be they international or governmental organisations or NGOs. Each one has its own strategic objectives, its own legal norms for operation, its own system for generating resources and a system for the control and

43 SMITH, D. Towards a strategic framework for peace-building: the synthesis report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peace-building. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo: 2003.

44 CONING, C. & KARSTEN, F. Coherence and Coordination, the limits of the comprehensive approach. NUPI, Journal of International Peacekeeping n. 15, 2011. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, p. 243-272.

45 EGNELL, R. Complex Peace Operations and Civil-Military Relations: Winning the Peace. London: Routledge, 2009.

46 This was the case of the Multinational Alliance led by Australia for the stabilisation operation carried out in East Timor (INTERFET-1999), just as in the case of the agreement reached by NATO for participation in the ISAF mission together with the non-NATO members that joined it.

47 KARSTEN, F & JARMYR, P. Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management. NUPI Report 11. 2008. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo.

48 An example of this type of conflict is the timetables prioritising the achievement of certain objectives to the detriment of others, as was the case for the return of internally displaced persons (IDP) to Monrovia in 2005 so as to register them and consequently enable them to participate in the elections in Liberia: the UN's Special Representative brought pressure to bear on the humanitarian agencies working with the IDPs in the refugee camps to return the IDPs to their communities of origin so they could participate in elections; the problem lay in the fact that the situation of instability was too severe to guarantee their survival, leading to a clear confrontation between the mission's political sector and security sector.

49 CONING, C. & KARSTEN, F. Ref. 44, Op. Cit., p. 243-272.

use of the resources. With this in mind, realism is necessary because if the expectations for coherency are higher than the actual possibilities of achieving it then we enter into a vicious circle where the efforts made to reach a desired level of unrealistic coherence will turn into just another burden during the process and will contribute to greater inefficiency and lack of sustainability.

Necessary legitimacy in security

In the works by Friis and Jarmyr⁵⁰ on the comprehensive approach in national reconstruction operations, the following justification criteria of the comprehensive approach are highlighted: efficiency, consistency, urgency, security, public opinion and legitimacy. Of those we would like to underline the following:

- a) Efficiency. Bearing in mind the lack of available resources and the complexity of the development and resolution of conflicts, we should use this method due to the cost-efficiency principle. Here we should mention the experience gained in Afghanistan where the lack of specific civilian capabilities to support local governments and directly help the population were close to leading to the failure of the successful military operations carried out in the province of Kandahar⁵¹.
- b) Legitimacy. The more actors involved in conflict resolution, the greater the legitimacy of the actions undertaken. This factor is fundamental in democratic Western societies where transparency of information and citizens' votes move governments and determine their policies.

And even more important, if possible, is legitimacy towards the citizens of the intervention country, as it will be the citizens who will be the real factor in finalising the conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to talk about national reconstruction operations or state-building (as it is more commonly known, although we have seen that these two terms do not have the same meaning), as essentially political operations as it will be political determinants that will define when, where and how interventions will take place. Doing the opposite will lead us to a profusion of the use of force that will make success impossible. Providing security and reforming the sector at the same time is not a simple task and requires integration strategies that include all vital stakeholders in the area of security – international forces, local forces, police, intelligence bodies, bodies central to the corresponding ministries including judges and public prosecutors

50 FRIIS, K. & JARMYR, P. *Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management*. NUPI Report 11, 2008. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, p.3.

51 ROTMANN, P. *Built on shaky ground: the comprehensive approach in practice*. Rome: NATO Defence College, 2010, p.2.

– to work in an integrated way with the other international and local stakeholders⁵².

Security is part of governance, as the most important essential public service that a state has to offer its citizens. The academic debate on whether security or development is the most important⁵³ is unnecessary as those who suffer from the lowest levels of development have already made the choice and consider security as the most important and fundamental need⁵⁴. And this security, as a fundamental lesson identified in the Afghan and Iraqi cases, must be legitimate.

The neoliberal state-building model in which states are left to evolve themselves, has not been successful. The recent national reconstruction operations undertaken by the international community in failed states show that failure is not an option to avoid perpetuating forms of violence, systems of abuse of power and general impoverishment. We should opt for providing secure environments through the legitimate use of violence, not just from the side of the international stakeholders involved but also from the side of the local stakeholders, controlling and correcting any divergence that may result.

To state that the celebration of parliamentary or presidential elections is condition enough to establish an exit strategy from the operation is highly questionable. And so, it is worrying to see the lack of institutional memory that the UN suffers from⁵⁵, whereby the organisation continues to consider the celebration of democratic elections as an adequate exit strategy from this type of operation⁵⁶.

One final important aspect is the integration of the local community's traditional law and order institutions into the new institutions, imported by the international community and completely foreign to the country. While these institutions may become transparent and trustworthy, the problem lies in the level of acceptance that they can achieve. If there is a lack of efficiency or transparency, the failure of these foreign institutions is assured – and this is closely linked to the governance of the security sector. The possibility of integrating these traditional institutions or at least the most important of them into the newly created institutional systems will have to be addressed on a case by case and country by country basis.

52 GARRASI, D., KUTTNER, S. & WAM, P. *The Security Sector and Poverty Reduction Strategies*. Washington DC: The World Bank Group, Social Development Department, 2009, p. 23. Online, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1164107274725/SecuritySectorPRS-wb.pdf>, consulted 16/01/16.

53 CALVILLO CISNEROS, J.M. *El proceso de reconstrucción internacional de Afganistán: el papel de España en un nuevo modelo de cooperación posconflicto (2001-2009)*. Doctoral thesis, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid: 2010, p. 354. [ISBN: 978-84-693-7845-8]

54 JACKSON, P. Ref. 42, Op. Cit., p. 264.

55 FUKUYAMA, F. *The Imperative of State-Building*. *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 15, Number 2, 2004, p. 17-31. Online, <http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/fuksb.pdf>, consulted 16/01/16.

56 JACKSON, P. Ref. 42, Op. Cit., p. 257.

Until now, we have developed the concept of a type of operation that has been consolidated throughout the nineties, but that has been put to the test in Afghanistan and Iraq. There are already excellent academic studies on Iraq that indicated that the forced involution of classes and tribes would entail an unpredictable social fracture, just like what we are unfortunately seeing now. It's not too late to partially correct the mistakes made in Afghanistan in order to avoid another similar situation to what we saw in Iraq. However, there is still no comprehensive academic study on the lessons identified in Afghanistan. In any event, there is a need to clearly determine the lessons identified, be they mistakes or a lack of capability, as the current situations in Africa and the Middle East show very clearly that there will be a need to continue this type of nation-building operation in the future.

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- Submitted: June 1, 2015.

- Accepted: November 1, 2015.
