Disuasión multiinestable. El poder igualador de la precisión y la guerra de salvas en la tercera era nuclear
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La proliferación de municiones de precisión de largo alcance conforma un entorno operativo que genera efectos estratégicos, hasta ahora inéditos, que implican una disrupción en los conceptos clásicos sobre disuasión y estabilidad estratégica. En primer lugar, se genera el efecto igualador de la precisión, en el que la proliferación de armas guiadas produce que contendientes muy desiguales en tamaño y potencial puedan causarse un daño masivo mutuo. En segundo lugar, la tendencia a la proliferación de armas de precisión induce a la creación de un nuevo tipo de conflicto militar que denominamos como de «guerra de salvas».
En tercer lugar, el daño masivo causado por municiones de precisión convencionales hace emerger el fenómeno estratégico de la disuasión multiinestable. La combinación de todo lo anterior crea un entorno estratégico de tercera era nuclear en el que las armas nucleares fomentan la inestabilidad, en contraposición a la estabilidad de la primera era nuclear de la Guerra Fría, y la escalada.
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