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THE CULTURE OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE: A PROPOSAL FOR CON- CEPTUAL ANALYSIS FROM A POLITI- CAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE

Abstract

This paper analyses the concept of the culture of security and defence from the perspective of Political Science, studying the important implications and consequences of its definition based on the idea of political culture. On the other hand, also from this disciplinary viewpoint, it discusses the meanings of the terms Culture of Defence, Culture of Security and Defence, and Culture of Security. In conclusion, it suggests a series of theoretical and conceptual proposals in order to achieve a better and more effective development of this public policy.

Keywords

Culture of Security and Defence, Political Science, Political Culture, Awareness of Defence, Public Policy

INTRODUCTION

The last fifteen years have borne witness to the implementation of the so-called *culture of security and defence*. This public policy emerged as a reaction to the lack of knowledge surrounding government security and defence policies, as well as low levels of identification among citizens with the armed forces (hereinafter AF) and their missions in the eyes of Ministry of Defence officials, and with a view to thus reducing these shortcomings.

Notwithstanding the extensive use of the term *culture of security and defence*, it has not been recognised with a clearly defined conceptual notion, due to, among other reasons, the almost parallel use of two other expressions: *culture of defence* -the first to be coined- and *culture of security*. Although all share several basic characteristics, which have amassed a certain consensus and consequently allowed for work to be undertaken on this basis, this «smallest common denominator» has been detrimental to more in-depth study thereof. Yet the truth is that this terminological plurality is not innocuous, since it gives rise to a whole raft of consequences of a political nature and of unquestionable practical significance, which is seldom highlighted. Moreover, the fact that it is often incorporated into *political culture* has deepened the complexity of the nature of the concept. Despite this, this issue has rarely been addressed from a Political Science angle, which, given that this is a long-standing field and of great interest to study of this scientific discipline, we consider to be a gap in its conceptualisation.

For the reasons cited above, this paper explores the conceptual dimension of the term *culture of security and defence*. First of all, and from a strict political science viewpoint, the concept of political culture, its nature and essential elements are analysed, which also invites us to qualify certain statements that are frequently made about the culture of security and defence, as well as to distinguish this concept from others such as public opinion or awareness [of defence]. Secondly, the terms that have been seen to accompany this culture are described: defence, security and defence, and security. This is done by studying their origins and development and identifying the main formal and material consequences of their adoption. It concludes with a proposal for a theoretical construct that would complete existing concepts.

THE CULTURE OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE AS PART OF POLITICAL CULTURE

In literature relating to the *culture of security and defence*, it is commonplace to approach the concept on the basis of the notion of *culture* provided by the dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy of Language (hereafter referred to as DRAE): “body of knowledge that allows someone to develop critical judgement”. This is often put to

good use to present the idea by way of a preliminary note but we consider it to be one that is clearly lacking.

It is also possible to approach this idea from an anthropological angle, understanding culture not just to be knowledge, but also to be “belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man *as a member of society*”¹. We would hence say that culture goes far beyond mere conscious information, since it corresponds to a miscellany of skills and/or insights whose distinguishing feature is that they stem from the development of the individual within a society.

This almost intuitive social concept, together with its essential political element, invite one to position it as part of *political culture*, an approximation that has found widespread acceptance in discussion forums and in literature on the subject². However, no matter how correct this stance may be, it is true that subsequently the implications and consequences of inserting it within this political science context have hardly been explored. This has sometimes afforded an incorrect interpretation of the meaning of the term, an oversight that we see fit to remedy in this paper. As the researcher Mary Kaldor states: “Social Science [ergo, Political Science too] is about telling stories”. Consequently, a better insight into this specific public policy will hinge upon a proper understanding of all the elements that form this *story* about political culture within society.

The political culture of security and defence

The initial outline of the idea of political culture implies that we are dealing with a variable that connects the different levels of the political system, the individual and collective levels. This helps us to better understand how individuals develop within

1 Italics added by author. See TYLOR in BERGER, Arthur, *Political Culture and Public Opinion*, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1989, p. 2.

2 Inter alia: CALDUCH, Rafael, «La cultura de defensa en España y los nuevos retos estratégicos» in LÓPEZ MORA, F. and BALLESTEROS, M.A. (eds.) *Ensayos sobre la cultura de defensa y la paz en la España actual*, Cordoba-Madrid, University of Cordoba- Directorate-General of Defence Institutional Relations, 2011; BALLESTEROS, Miguel Ángel, «La evolución de la cultura de la seguridad y la defensa», in LÓPEZ MORA, F. and BALLESTEROS, M.A. (eds.) *Ensayos sobre la cultura de defensa y la paz en la España actual*, Cordoba-Madrid, University of Cordoba- Directorate-General of Defence Institutional Relations, 2011; LLERA, Francisco José, «La opinión pública española ante la defensa nacional» in *XXI Curso Internacional de Defensa: Potenciar la cultura de seguridad, una necesidad para comprender la defensa nacional*, Jaca (Huesca), General Military Academy-University of Saragossa, 2014; PALACIOS, José Miguel, «Evolución del concepto de seguridad» in *XXI Curso Internacional de Defensa: Potenciar la cultura de seguridad, una necesidad para comprender la defensa nacional*, Jaca (Huesca), General Military Academy-University of Saragossa, 2014.

3 KALDOR, Mary, *El poder y la fuerza*, Barcelona, Tusquets, 2010, p. 27.

this system and how it, in turn, evolves. Arguyen Powell et. al.⁴ contend that in order to understand how people think and act politically, one must begin by understanding their political culture, since “the political behaviour of each country is a *function* of its political culture”⁵. The interplay between both levels allows us to explain why political systems prevail or change.

If we take the classic definition presented by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba as a starting point, and by bringing together a series of conceptualisation proposals made by various other academics⁶, we can define political culture -in an all-embracing way and by synthesising this input- as *the set of beliefs, values, guidelines, standards, symbols, practices and customs of a specifically political nature and shared in a more or less homogenous and/or diverse manner by the citizens of a political community that shapes the political system and processes and determine the attitudes of citizens to other citizens and to themselves and that directs their affiliation patterns towards political objectives*.

This reasoning allows for a holistic interpretation, by following the diagram presented in Figure 1, of the way in which political culture transforms the stimuli provoked by political objectives into behaviours that generate a political effect among the affected individuals. One should note that this effect may be explicitly or implicitly in favour or against this objective, whereby non-action is also a position. Almond and

4 POWELL Jr., G. Bingham, et.al., *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*, Londres, Pearson-Longman 10^a Intern., 2012.

5 Emphasis in the original.

6 GARCÍA COTARELO, Ramón, and PANIAGUA, Juan Luis, *Introducción a la Ciencia Política*, Madrid, UNED 4th ed., 1989, p. 126.

7 Both authors, Almond and Verba, define political culture as a “particular distribution of affiliation patterns towards political objectives amongst the members of a nation”. Although it is true that, almost a decade before, Almond had already produced a preliminary notion of the same concept defining it as “a particular tendency of political action, in which all political systems are situated”. Despite the fact that this concept found great acceptance among the academic community following the publication of this book, we are not, however, faced with an entirely original concept; Almond himself held the words of Plato and Aristoteles in high esteem, just like many of the works of classic authors such as Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau or Tocqueville, the first allusive mentions of political culture. ALMOND, Gabriel and VERBA, Sidney, *La cultura cívica [The Civic Culture]*, Madrid, FOESSA, 1970, p. 31; ALMOND, Gabriel, «Comparative Political Systems», *Journal of Politics*, no. 18: pp. 391–409, 1956; ALMOND, Gabriel, *A Discipline Divided*, United States, SAGE Publications, 1990, pp. 138-140.

8 CAZORLA, José, *Manual de Introducción a la Ciencia Política*, Granada, Gráficas Jufer, 1991; MAGRE, Jaume, and HERRERA MARTÍNEZ, Enric, «La cultura política» in CAMINAL, M. (ed.), *Manual de Ciencia Política*, Madrid, Tecnos 3rd ed, 2006; URIARTE, Eudurne, *Introducción a la Ciencia Política. La política en las sociedades democráticas*, Madrid, Tecnos 3rd ed., 2010; VALLÈS, Josep M., *Ciencia Política. Una Introducción*, Barcelona, Ariel 8th ed., 2011.

Verba⁹ themselves also underscore that culture refers to “specifically political affiliations”¹⁰.



Figure 1: Political behaviour explained by political culture. Author's own diagram adapted from that of Vallès.

Political affiliations, which serve as a 'filter' and interpret these stimuli, may be broken down into three types according to the traditional classification made by the political scientists cited: cognitive, affective and evaluative. Vallès¹¹ adds a fourth: intentional¹². The interplay between all these and their distinguishing characteristics determines the way in which an individual participates in the political process and system¹³. These affiliations may be either directed at the *inputs*¹⁴, or the *outputs* of the system, given that the consequences of the behaviour of its members also help to shape political culture, in a “feedback process”¹⁶.

9 ALMOND and VERBA, op. cit., p. 30.

10 This is without prejudice to there being greater or lesser stress placed on subjective feelings or on structural and/or historical conditions, since connecting both levels of politics combines both the personal experiences of individuals and the collective history of the political system as a whole. MATEOS, Araceli, «El concepto de cultura política», 2015 Available online (consulted on 31 May 2015): <http://campus.usal.es/~dpublico/areacp/materiales/Culturapolitica.pdf>.

11 VALLÈS, op. cit., p. 257.

12 VALLÈS, op. cit., p. 259.

13 According to these authors, cognitive affiliations are those regarding to knowledge of the subjects and political objectives of the system; the affective ones are those feelings regarding the political system, its functions and achievements, that is attachment, rejection, commitment, etc., that are aroused by these subjects and political objectives; the evaluative affiliations, for their part, point to judgements and opinions thereof, whereby value criteria are combined with information and feelings; and the intentional ones focus on the tendency to act in one way or another.

14 Political system understood as a way of representing the manner of behaviour in a society and the values present, EASTON, David, *Esquema para el análisis político*, Argentina, Amorrortu Editores 3rd ed, 1976, pp. 60, 88.

15 ALMOND, op. cit. 1990; POWELL et. al., op. cit.

16 EASTON, David, *The Analysis of Political Structure*, London, Routledge, 1990, p. 35.



Figure 2: David Easton's political system. Author's own diagram.

Figure 2 illustrates how political culture is related to the political system of a society, “encapsulating both the general historical experience of a society as well as the private and personal experience of each citizen as a member of society”¹⁷. It reflects stable values¹⁸ and tends to stay in place over time, which does not imply, however, that it may not change gradually.

This concept permeates far more deeply than a simple critical judgment, since it responds to a whole system of political affiliations that have been shaped by personal experience and the collective evolution of society, thereby lubricating the machinery of the political system. The *culture of security and defence* viewed in such a way serves both as the purpose, that is to say, a political culture to be changed, and as the backdrop to such policy. The *culture of security and defence* must address all these affiliations for the sake of better performance, in the knowledge that, as noted by Easton¹⁹, these help to generate the demands and support that make up the political system.

As a corollary, and, in fact, by understanding *the culture of security and defence* to be part of political culture, we define it as *the set of knowledge, beliefs, judgements, customs etc. that guide citizens as they express their attitudes to the issues of security and defence, which translate into a series of behaviours with regard to the security and defence policies developed by the government, whether they support or reject these.*

The 'weak' culture of security and defence in Spain

Accounting for this theoretical framework, we must qualify a common precept in specialised fields: the 'weak' culture of security and defence among the Spanish population.

17 PYE, Lucian W., *Politics, Personality and Nation Building*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1962.

18 POWELL et. al., op. cit.

19 EASTON, David, «Categorías para el análisis sistémico de la política» in BATLLE, A. (ed.), *Diez Textos Básicos de Ciencia Política*, Barcelona, Ariel, 1992, p. 228.

If we declare this culture to be part of political culture, we must avoid the confusion to which Vallès²⁰ alerts us: that the concept of political culture is not equivalent to a greater or lesser accumulation of knowledge surrounding politics; groups with scant political information possess their own political culture, based on a series of common affiliations or orientations. Thus there do not exist groups with more or less political culture, since each possesses their own, but instead there are subcultures, that is to say, “groups of citizens with special positions”²¹, which have their own specific tendencies with respect to political attitudes, beliefs and behaviours²². They have a specific culture, not an inferior or weak one²³. If the *culture of security and defence* were to refer to a mere quantification of knowledge, we could claim that it is weak; if we understand it to be broader, just as we have presented above, this precept requires revision.

This theoretical reflection can be clearly understood if we take so-called “defence counterculture” as a reference point, that is, movements and ideologies with “extremely different or clashing visions regarding the form and means employed to maintain peace and resolve conflicts or the use of the armed forces by the state”²⁴. We would be talking about, merely by way of illustration, certain social and/or anti-globalisation movements, schools of academic thought linked to the field of peace research or about political ideologies such as pacifism or environmentalism. It is very difficult to assert that these movements and professional groups have no knowledge or information about issues relating to security and defence, and that these schools of thought do not speak out against such issues, with evidence to the contrary. Yet their affiliations and positions differ greatly from assumptions made by political decision-makers in the government and administration. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that they have a weak security and defence culture, but instead that their culture is a different one.

Political culture and public opinion: a brief digression for the sake of distinction

We deem it necessary to also dedicate an epigraph to demarcating the terms *political culture* and *public opinion*. This is because on repeated occasions one notes that, despite referring to the *culture of security and defence* -or its other formulations- as

20 VALLÈS, op. cit.

21 ALMOND and VERBA, op. cit., p. 50.

22 ALDEGUER, Bernabé, «La cultura política», in José Manuel CANALES, J.M. and SANMARTÍN, J.J. (eds.) *Introducción a la Ciencia Política*, Madrid, Universitas, 2014.

23 VALLÈS, op. cit.

24 BERNAL, Pedro, «La cultura de seguridad y defensa en España. Orígenes y evolución», in *La Cultura de seguridad y defensa. Un proyecto en marcha*, Madrid, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategy Paper 155, 2011, p. 38.

political culture, what is in fact being discussed is public opinion. Although both concepts are intimately linked, they are by no means interchangeable.

The concept of public opinion, “key to democratic systems”²⁵, refers to the body of opinions that citizens hold regarding a topic [subject] of the political system “which are shared by a significant proportion of the citizens of a society”²⁶. It is fostered by ideas, beliefs, judgements etc. that represent a certain level of reflection and reasoning by a community -that is to say, that we are talking about a supra-individual opinion²⁷- about political events, yet with the essential specificity that they are sensitive to changes in environment and, consequently, malleable²⁸. If political attitudes are these states of mind directed towards specifically political subjects and situations, the more specific and relevant to current circumstances these subjects are, the more we associate the perceptions of these with public opinion, unlike political culture, which is more abstract but stable²⁹.

Thus, by way of example we may posit that the support or lack of support for a military operation abroad at a specific point in time is closely linked to the climate of public opinion –the fruit of interaction between citizens, the media and political parties etc.–. The more or less pacifist positions of citizens, the predisposition or refusal to embark upon military actions abroad etc. would be related to political culture. This example allows us to appreciate the marked influence of political culture on the public opinion expressed with regard to a certain event at a given moment in time. The latter plays an essential role in relation to political culture³⁰, and provides us with clues about the former³¹.

For this reason, in order to indirectly influence or foster future and potential states of public opinion more likely to be in favour of public security and defence policy, it is important to take governmental action towards change and improvement to the political culture of security and defence. This aims to guide the conduct of individuals over the long term and to screen the stimuli acting upon individuals -that is to say, to modify the ‘filter’ so as to change the structural patterns of the system.

25 D’ALMEIDA, Nicole, *La opinión pública*. Tucumán, La Crujía Ediciones, 2012, p. 7.

26 GALAIS, Carol, «Socialización política, cultura política y opinión pública» in SÁNCHEZ MEDERO, G. and SÁNCHEZ MEDERO, R. (dirs.), *Fundamentos de la Ciencia Política y de la Administración*, Madrid, Tecnos, 2015, p. 179.

27 HERNÁNDEZ, Alfredo, *Diccionario de la opinión pública*, Madrid, Ediciones Paraninfo, 2010.

28 MAGRE and MARTÍNEZ HERRERA, op. cit. p. 288.

29 GALAIS, op. cit., pp. 179-180.

30 DALTON, Russel J., «Comparative Politics: Micro-Behavioral Perspectives», in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., *A New Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.

31 GLYNN, Carroll J., et.al., *Public Opinion*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1999.

Delimitation of the culture of security and defence: its separation from awareness of defence

Another term has been used at the same time as *culture* is the term *awareness*, which has not been outlined in such a clear-cut and constant way as the former. In order to understand and address this term it is essential to realise that awareness has a far more subjective component, driven by personal reflection –ergo private and exclusive to that individual– based on the affiliations and knowledge facilitated by culture. We consider that, whilst culture is based on the characteristics described in the previous section, awareness corresponds to the understanding of the importance of defence policy for the well-being of society. Awareness would thus be the ultimate aim of the culture of security and defence as it indicates the acquiescence of a population for the missions of the armed forces designed by a particular government.

Apropos the awareness of defence, the philosopher José Antonio Marina³² discussed the matter, presenting two useful definitions for the sake of better understanding: firstly, that awareness was equivalent to “moral conscience”, that is to say, the civic awareness of duties, responsibilities and the means to fulfil these; secondly, it would be seen as ‘realising something’, i.e., and according to the philosopher himself, becoming aware of the importance, difficulties and complexities that the security and defence of a nation entails. Similar definitions can also be seen in the work of Tamarit³³, who believes awareness to be both perception and *acceptance* on the part of citizens of the specific action taken to protect the common values and interests identified by the government.

The latter sense of this term as conveyed by Marina is the one that we believe to be most fitting to the lines of reasoning of this paper: awareness of defence develops by means of open reflection about the knowledge, information etc. provided by the culture of security and defence, which enables citizens to perceive these issues as important and then, if so, for them to accept and support the lines of action taken and the way in which these are implemented. Nonetheless, and by way of counter-argument to Tamarit, we must be aware that this exercise in reflection, if one accepts its importance, may also lead to the rejection of the decisions made by public officials.

Nevertheless, in practice interpretations interweave both concepts, opting for a meaning along the lines of ‘moral conscience’ and situating this in terms of other values

32 MARINA, José Antonio, «Pegagogía de la cultura de la seguridad en la enseñanza no universitaria» in *La Cultura de seguridad y defensa. Un proyecto en marcha*, Madrid, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategy Paper 155, 2011, p. 68.

33 TAMARIT, Joaquín, «La seguridad y la defensa de la sociedad española» in LÓPEZ MORA, F. and BALLESTEROS, M.A. (eds.) *Ensayos sobre la cultura de defensa y la paz en la España actual*, Cordoba-Madrid, University of Cordoba-General Directorate-General of Defence Institutional Relations, 2011, p. 321.

such as patriotism and national identity etc. In this vein, Quero³⁴ refers to a *national awareness [of defence]* and the recognition of the real importance of defence and its relative value along the scale of values in society, which leads to society recognising it as a real part of a nation. From this standpoint, Calduch³⁵ reformulates the definition of culture by stating that this is made up of “the different spiritual, historical and material elements that configure awareness or collective identity”. Culture and awareness are thus confused. Authors such as López Mora³⁶ or Marsal³⁷ relate the culture of defence with the commitment or sacrifice that contemporary societies and their citizens demonstrate for national defence. Some even go as far as to call for this culture to form part of “popular culture” [*sic*]³⁸ and for it to find its roots in the values of society³⁹, since, as the former states, perhaps the problem lies in the fact that “it is not clear what must be defended, that is to say, the absence of patriotism about the ideas of the homeland”.

These are conflicting perspectives, since doubts as to what patriotism does or does not represent, about national awareness, popular culture and up to what point would such sacrifice be made as well as about which spiritual elements make up collective identity are inevitable and almost impossible to determine since they are a politically-, socially- and even psychologically-charged to a considerable extent. They are terms ingrained with profoundly ideological personal values and they stem from more traditional notions relating to the nation and its social construct. They are matters that are difficult to dovetail within plural, open societies with multiple interests such as those of today. The idea of awareness/conscience has always been accompanied by the term defence -in its most classic definition, as will be illustrated in the following section-, which results in a more conservative perception, as a matter of morals and responsi-

34 QUERO, Felipe, *Introducción a la teoría de la seguridad nacional*, Spain, Ediciones Ejército, 1989, p. 73.

35 CALDUCH, op. cit., pp. 82, 87.

36 LÓPEZ MORA, Fernando, «La cultura de seguridad y defensa en el ámbito universitario» in *La Cultura de seguridad y defensa. Un proyecto en marcha*, Madrid, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategy Paper 155, 2011, p. 85.

37 MARSAL, Jordi, «Cultura de defensa, transformación de las FAS y cambio social en la España democrática» en LÓPEZ MORA, F. and BALLESTEROS, M.A. (eds.) *Ensayos sobre la cultura de defensa y la paz en la España actual*, Cordoba-Madrid, University of Cordoba-General Directorate-General of Defence Institutional Relations, 2011, p. 218.

38 LAGUNA, Francisco, «Reflexiones sobre el problema de la cultura de defensa», Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014, p. 5, available online (consulted 25 January 2015): http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2014/DIEEEO132-2014_Reflexiones_CulturaDefensa_Fco.Laguna.pdf.

39 ALONSO, Miguel, «Conciencia y cultura de la defensa en España y en Europa», in LÓPEZ MORA, F. and BALLESTEROS, M.A. (eds.) *Ensayos sobre la cultura de defensa y la paz en la España actual*, Cordoba-Madrid, University of Cordoba-General Directorate-General of Defence Institutional Relations, 2011.

bility⁴⁰. It is not the aim of this study to examine such arguments in great depth, yet it becomes clear that this is no straightforward matter, since although they represent values rather than political principles and may have a bearing on the culture of security and defence, the fact remains that it is highly complex to address such notions from the perspective of public political action. Furthermore, it seems difficult to establish an effective correlation between 'deficits' and the lack of an appropriate culture of security and defence.

Open reflection gets to the very heart of the subjective and personal sphere of a citizen. This is why we believe that although creating a political community is in fact a legitimate aim of any government, this must be fostered on the basis of open debate and critical judgement, stemming from the reason that is afforded by knowledge and information relating to security and defence policies, by the nature and characteristics of the risks and threats that affect us; as well as by our conscience and awareness of the importance and complexity of all this.

Having thus explained and delimited both concepts, we conclude that the *culture of security and defence* influences the political culture of citizens so that they become aware of and grasp the issues pertaining to both political fields, their problems and vicissitudes. As a medial device, it may give rise to personal reflection that leads citizens to accept or *not* to accept security and defence policies, as well as making them aware that security and defence are essential. We believe this to be the way in which this introspective process must be constructed, a real "intersection between strategy and philosophy [philosophy understood as system of values] of security and defence"⁴¹.

CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE TERMS CULTURE OF DEFENCE, CULTURE OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE, AND CULTURE OF SECURITY

Once the culture of security and defence is defined as part of political culture, the keystone lies in the conceptual approach to the terms *defence*, *security and defence*, and *security*. As we pointed out in the introductory paragraphs above, the use of these terms has not been accompanied by a clear-cut delimitation of their meaning and perspectives. These terms, in any event distinct but not far-removed from one another,

40 Responsible in the sense described by the DRAE in its first definition, as "obliged to respond to something". This thus begs the question as to where this imposition or moral obligation to respond comes from.

41 GARCÍA PALOMERO, Ignacio, and MOURE, Fernando, «La cultura de seguridad y defensa: filosofía y estados de futuro», Instituto Universitario de Investigación Sobre Seguridad Interior, *Documento de Investigación sobre Seguridad Interior* 19/2013, 2013, p. 7, available online (consulted 20 February 2015): http://www.iuisi.es/I5_boletines/I5_isie/doc_isie_19_2013.pdf.

have been subject to comprehensive and epistemological⁴² revision due to the constant evolution experienced by the subjects and backdrops pertaining to security and defence; concepts that require constant redefinition to keep pace with the major political, social and technological transformations that occur in the world⁴³.

It is for this reason that we deem it necessary to address such concepts in this section, with a view to explaining their configuration and justifying the adoption of one of them for the purpose of political action; a conclusion that has already been presented in the title and this text.

War and the need for a culture of defence

Inherent to the concept of the nation state, defence has been an idea linked to the protection of territory -i.e. area of sovereignty⁴⁴- and its vital interests. The consolidation of the state in the modern era is marked by its consecration as the only legitimate actor for warfare and one that boasts “the monopoly on the legitimate use of force”⁴⁵, an essential feature of its coercive nature and power⁴⁶. Therefore, the state, by way of its essentially political and sovereign unity, possessed inherent power as regards *ius belli*⁴⁷. Nevertheless, and in a two-way process, the formation of states also established a colossal machinery of war⁴⁸.

War was seen, not merely as action taken to defend sovereign territory, but also rather as a continuation of policy, an act of force committed with a view to imposing one's own will on the adversary, in the view of Karl von Clausewitz⁴⁹. War, interpreted

42 LÓPEZ MORA, op. cit., p. 87; MARRERO, Inmaculada C., *Hacia una nueva cultura de la defensa en España*, Fundación Alternativas, *Observatorio de Política Exterior Española, Documento de Trabajo 11/2007*, 2007, p. 12. Available online (consulted 20 February 2015): <http://www.fundacionalternativas.org/opex/documentos/documentos-de-trabajo/hacia-una-nueva-cultura-de-la-defensa-en-espana>.

43 DÍEZ ALCALDE, Jesús, «Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional: Un proyecto compartido» in *XXI Curso Internacional de Defensa: Potenciar la cultura de seguridad, una necesidad para comprender la defensa nacional*, Jaca (Huesca), General Military Academy-University of Saragossa, 2014, p. 82.

44 MOLINER, Juan, «La defensa y el Consejo de Defensa Nacional» in *XXI Curso Internacional de Defensa: Potenciar la cultura de seguridad, una necesidad para comprender la defensa nacional*, Jaca (Huesca), General Military Academy-University of Saragossa, 2014, p. 112.

45 WEBER, Max, *El político y el científico*, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1998, p. 83.

46 CRUZ, Alfredo, *La razón de la fuerza*, Madrid, Pearson, 2004, p. 50.

47 SCHMITT, Carl, *El concepto de lo político*, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1991.

48 TILLY, Charles, *Coerción, capital y los estados europeos. 990-1990*, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1992.

49 CLAUSEWITZ, Karl von, *De la guerra*, Barcelona, Mateu, 1972.

in this manner, was “a conflict between states with a politically definable objective”⁵⁰ and, exactly for this reason, an instrument of a political nature. This premise inspired the view that, in order to achieve military objectives, war effort would include a country’s full capacity, which would involve society as a whole: defence thus concerns the community of citizens that comprises a nation state⁵¹.

These ideas reveal the importance attached to the people when it comes to the success of a war venture, one of the vertices of the trinity of war presented by Clausewitz: the armed forces, as the volitional part; the government, as the rational part, and the people, as the passionate part⁵². Although these ideas may today lead to certain controversial aspects and must be qualified, it is vital to point out that we are not dealing with an original idea, since we appreciate how the population of a country has always been a major factor in the mainstay of national defence. War, far from being an exclusively military phenomenon, has been and continues to also be a political and social phenomenon⁵³.

Nonetheless, it is precisely this idea of all-out war that took hold towards the end of the 19th Century -with a clearly offensive tone- and which was to culminate in the two world wars, that was abandoned and instead we saw the criminalisation of this type of warfare and greater efforts made to avoid it. This idea of warfare is gradually yielding in the face of political thinking and attitudes that are more inclined to reflect the current concept of defence, an evolution which has involved a significant “shift in values”⁵⁴ within European societies. The belligerent predisposition of states is losing ground to a restrictive defence-based concept of war, whereby it is understood only to be an action whose purpose is to protect the state and its citizens from attacks, threats, danger or harm, and which entails the use of force against the will of the state which has fallen victim to this attack in order to deal with an attack inflicted upon it⁵⁵.

50 KALDOR, Mary, *Las nuevas guerras. La violencia organizada en la era global*, Barcelona, Tusquets, 2001, p. 31.

51 ALONSO, op. cit.

52 AZNAR, Federico, “Conflicto y opinión pública”, *Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies*, 2013, available online (consulted 23 February 2015):

http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_analisis/2013/DIEEEA35-2013_Conflicto_OpinionPublica_FAFM.pdf.

53 José Luis Calvo asks the very pertinent question regarding where the fourth power, that is, mass media, would currently fit into the Clausewitzian trinity of war. CALVO, José Luis, «Tres ideas de Clausewitz que invitan actualmente a la reflexión», Grupo de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional, 2014, available online (consulted 1 June 2015):

<http://www.seguridadinternacional.es/blog.mosaico/?q=es/content/tres-ideas-de-clausewitz-que-invitan-actualmente-la-reflexi%C3%B3n>.

54 PALACIOS, op. cit., p. 15.

55 CALDUCH, op. cit., pp. 16-17; PALACIOS, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

Defence depends on the real possibility of a military attack against the nation state, hence only military defence, with the consubstantial participation and support of this people in arms as part of the war effort, would be capable of countering such an attack. National defence is thus linked to military capabilities⁵⁶, the classic idea of defence that was also adopted in our country at the start of the current period of democracy.

Nevertheless, this idea of classic national defence is beginning to change, above all following the fall of the Berlin Wall⁵⁷, a turning point contemporary world history. In Spain, this notion had also begun to be overtaken by overseas missions, which, around this time were being initiated in Spain⁵⁸: to Namibia, Nicaragua, Haiti, Mozambique, Bosnia, etc.⁵⁹ The AF very quickly saw the nature of their missions change, since, without ceasing to carry out their essential work of defending the independence -sovereignty- and integrity of the territory -rephrased as 'the defence of the freedoms and the rights of the Spanish people', in a metamorphosis that is not only aesthetic, but also conceptual and which bears witness to these gradual changes-, they contribute to international peace and security. These are principles that are absolutely fundamental, yet which are clearly far more open-ended than the border situation.

Military defence in Spain, "the *raison-d'être* of armies"⁶⁰, also requires resources that are not strictly speaking military ones and which are necessary in order to respond to crisis situations or to armed conflicts a long way away from our borders where national interests are not always present -or, we would point out, where they are involved in a diffuse manner- but rather where this response is on humanitarian grounds and with a view to achieving this 'international peace'. The barrage of new threats such as international terrorism or climate change, and the political, economic and social transformations that surfaced at the dawn of the new millennium hastened this radical change. All these elements make up a panorama of international "strategic discomposure"⁶¹. Moreover, technological and strategic shifts spurred on the innovative "post-modern

56 MOLINER, op. cit., 113.

57 From this point onwards conflicts took place under the paradigm that Smith calls *war amongst the people*, a graphic description but also a conceptual framework that reflects the end of the old paradigm of industrial warfare between states. SMITH, Rupert, *The Utility of Force*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2007.

58 BALLESTEROS, Miguel Ángel, "Las estrategias de seguridad y defensa", in *Fundamentos de la estrategia para el siglo XXI*, Madrid, Ministry of Defence CESEDEN Monograph 67, 2004, pp. 41-42.

59 You may consult a brief outline of each one of these first missions in FELIÚ, Luis, «Las misiones de las Fuerzas Armadas españolas en el exterior», Foro de la Sociedad Civil, *Documentos del Foro de la Sociedad Civil*, 2010, available online (consulted 25 September 2015): http://forosociedadcivil.org/Resources/file/Misiones_F_A_E_en_el_Exterior.pdf.

60 SERRANO, José Luis, *Manual militar para periodistas*, Granada, University of Granada - Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, 2012, p. 40.

61 VILANOVA, Pere, «Introducción», in Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategy Paper 152 Actores armados no estatales: retos a la seguridad global*, Madrid, Ministry of Defence, 2011, p. 11.

socio-military revolutions”⁶² which put pressure on the military institution to review its organisation and doctrine. All this occurred in societies that are now defined as post-modern⁶³ and post-materialistic⁶⁴, where traditional military values⁶⁵ seem strange in the midst of ‘post-heroism’⁶⁶.

These changes necessitated a drastic sea-change within armies, which were also forced to adapt to the new challenges that the democratisation of Spain brought with it -the financing of democracy or accession to supranational structures such as the European Union or NATO- as well as by the imperative and urgent need to revive their image, which had been tarnished by the stigma that they suffered from among a large part of the population due to the role that they had played in the previous political regime. Armies had focused their attention on the domestic sphere and on national policy and were reluctant, as demonstrated by Spain’s own foreign policy over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, to look beyond our own borders. These elements, which have led to changes in the concept of defence, allow us to thus go into greater depth as regards what its ‘culture’ entails. It is defined in a straightforward manner by Fernández Vargas⁶⁷ as “the degree of knowledge that an average citizen would possess about issues concerning national defence”, which, we would clarify on the basis of Laguna⁶⁸, would relate to “[national defence] problems and current conflicts”. On the other hand, we share Marsal’s view⁶⁹, that this corresponds in particular with the armed forces and how society evaluates them. This point is essential due to two circumstances: one the one hand we have the new dimension and characteristics of the missions of the AF; whilst on the other hand we see the modernisation and transformation that have taken place since they are now a genuinely democratic institution and one at the

62 BAQUÉS, Josep, «Revoluciones militares y revoluciones en los asuntos militares», in JORDÁN, J. (coord.) *Manual de Estudios Estratégicos Y Seguridad Internacional*, Madrid, Plaza y Valdés, 2013, p. 143.

63 LIPOVESKY, Gilles, *La era del vacío. Ensayos sobre el individualismo contemporáneo*, Barcelona, Anagrama, 1986.

64 INGLEHART, Ronald, *Modernización y posmodernización*, Madrid, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1998.

65 These would be determined both by the supremacy of order and the importance of power and security, according to Huntington, and also by economic, social and political conservatism in the words of Janowitz. HUNTINGTON, Samuel P., *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge (United States), Harvard University Press, 1985; JANOWITZ, Moris, *The Professional Soldier*, United States, Free Press, 1960.

66 The paradigm of post-heroic warfare was underscored first of all by Luttwak as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and its associated strategic paradigm. LUTTWAK, Edward N., «A Post-Heroic Military Policy», *Foreign Affairs* 75 (4): 33–44, 1996; LUTTWAK, Edward N., «Toward Post-Heroic Warfare.» *Foreign Affairs* 74 (3): 109–22, 1995.

67 Cited in FERNÁNDEZ VARGAS, Valentina, and RODRÍGUEZ-TOUBES Jaime, «Diez reflexiones sobre la cultura de defensa en España», *ARBOR Ciencia, Pensamiento y Cultura*, CLXXXIV Annex 2, 2008.

68 LAGUNA, op. cit.

69 MARSAL, op. cit.

service of constitutional order. This latter aspect -their image and how they are judged- is one that we must underscore, since it is essential to understanding the meaning and the distinctive uniqueness that the culture of defence possesses with respect to other potential expressions of this public policy: its efforts made vis-à-vis the recognition and support expressed for the work of the army⁷⁰.

We can observe that all of these standpoints tally with the meaning given to the culture of security and defence as part of political culture that we put forward in the earlier sections of this article. This is perhaps why the most developed and disseminated definition of the culture of defence is that put forward by Ballesteros, who enrichingly defines it as: “the system of expressions, knowledge, lifestyles and degree of development regarding collective defence with a society, and the part of political culture that refers to how a society conceives its protection against external threats and risks”⁷¹. A definition that could also serve as a summary of what has been stated above and which allows us to appreciate the premises that underpin this public policy.

In conclusion, the culture of defence is action aimed at improving general knowledge

-understanding knowledge, not just as an accumulation of information, but instead also as the affiliations and positions towards political subjects that we described in the second section- among the population of national defence issues, supporting the missions and new characteristics that the AF are currently developing, as well as the effort that this entails at all levels -politically, strategically, economically and socially-. It will also seek to ensure that the population places special value on the work that armies do at the service of national defence.

Culture of security and defence: extended concept and approach

It was exactly this wider dimension of the role of the AF and their inevitable visibility in the international arena that soon called for a rethink regarding the design of this policy. Just a few years after the arrival of the ‘culture of defence’, people are beginning to talk about the *culture of security and defence*, since international security has direct

70 This was what the Minister of Defence, Carme Chacón, highlighted when she wrote that the culture of defence has the specific purpose of providing societal support for the armed forces. Although we must warn that, conversely, the culture of defence should not exclusively be identified with knowledge of the armed forces, according to Tamarit, but that instead, as we explain, this must refer to both aspects: to summarise this in a few words, national defence and the army. CHACÓN, Carme, «Prólogo de la ministra de Defensa», in LÓPEZ MORA, F. and BALLESTEROS, M.A. (eds.) *Ensayos sobre la cultura de defensa y la paz en la España actual*, Cordoba-Madrid, University of Cordoba-General Directorate-General of Defence Institutional Relations, 2011; TAMARIT, op. cit., 320.

71 BALLESTEROS, op. cit., p. 53.

repercussions on internal security and defence, whereby a change in name has considerable theoretical and practical effects.

Indeed, defence has developed an increasingly security-based approach, with regard today to “our military units also undertaking activities that belong to this field [that of security]”⁷² with the objective of guaranteeing a stable world and in pursuit of the safeguarding of national interests, wherever these may be. In the present day, states are far more interdependent on one another, engulfed in a global world and in a process of globalisation in which they must also address the problems and needs of other countries as well as international commitments and even embark upon missions as a matter of humanitarian duty. This is a crucial moment in time. Defence no longer corresponds and responds to a direct external military threat, but instead also has to tackle multifaceted hazards and threats both of a military and non-military nature, whereby not only defensive-military action may be necessary, but also where it is essential to also pay attention to a host of other factors, such as economic; social and environmental factors etc. Plus “national defence, exclusively understood to be the immediate defence of a country’s borders, no longer makes sense when the threats are global and total”⁷³, in a context where borders -in other words this stable, peaceful order, as well as the safeguarding of national interests- are also defended thousands of kilometres away. Security and defence align with one another in a context of global (in) security⁷⁴.

The concept of security and defence is a broad one, which is not only engaged within the parameters of defence, but which also works to safeguard security. With this new backdrop, the AF remain necessary as the main instrument of defence, yet also as an instrument of security and of “foreign policy”⁷⁵. In the view of Ballesteros⁷⁶, international peace missions, for instance, require a combination of civilian and military capabilities that make it more necessary than ever to ensure that a culture of security and defence exists within Spanish society. The roles performed by the armed forces are new ones, “both as part of national policy and as part of their containment role in

72 *Ibidem*.

73 SERRA, Eduardo, «Prólogo» in *Libro Blanco de La Defensa 2000*, Madrid, Ministry of Defence, 2000, p. 17.

74 BIGO, Didier, «Globalized (in)Security: The Field and the Ban-Opticon», *Muslims in Europe and in the United States: A Transatlantic Comparison*, Cambridge (United States), Harvard University, 2006, available online (consulted 16 June 2015):

<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ces/conferences/muslims/Bigo.pdf>.

75 RAMÍREZ, Alfredo, «La seguridad y defensa europea: la contribución del Eurocuerpo a este proyecto común», Granada, Club de la Constitución, 2015, available online (consulted 2 June 2015):

http://clubdelaconstitucion.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=255:video-teniente&catid=57:videos-del-curso-201415&Itemid=110.

76 BALLESTEROS, op. cit., p. 58.

new wars”⁷⁷, where the success of their deterrent function “is assessed on the basis of the dangers and damage that are avoided”⁷⁸.

For this reason, it became clear that the term culture of defence was not able to encompass the whole spectrum of national defence objectives, as it ground to a halt due to “the evolution of the reality”⁷⁹ in place both within politics and in national and international societies. Hence the notion of security and defence emerges as a wider concept of defence, with a view to underlining the missions and activities undertaken by the armed forces, “the military sector of civil society”⁸⁰, which are rather more linked to security than with defence strictly speaking.

In addition to this material distinction, security and defence are differentiated on the basis of their different approaches to tackling problems: whilst defence is a way of countering a danger or threat as a reaction thereto, security is of a more anticipatory and proactive nature since it aims to keep those persons and goods subject to security away from all risk, danger and/or threats, and to prevent potential hazards from becoming vital threats⁸¹. This is also why the term security and defence is used to reflect this twofold difference: the typology of risks, threats and dangers; as well as the anticipatory duties -the security approach- to which military capabilities are directed.

We may thus assert that *security* is, in fact, a broader concept than *defence*⁸², since the former requires a level of protection in any circumstance that, in addition to safeguarding territorial integrity and the lives of citizens, guarantees the functioning of institutions and the exercise of public and individual freedoms, in any of the spheres of activity of a nation and faced with any risk or threat that may infringe upon its territorial integrity, independence and survival. Security focuses to a greater extent on the final beneficiaries -citizens and societies-, than on the threats and potential aggressors, which is a reason for it not to be exclusively, or pre-emptively, military⁸³.

77 In our view, this role of deterrence and prevention goes far beyond the classic military notion of conflict to also include countering all these other threats and risks. KALDOR, op. cit., 2010, p. 129.

78 CALDUCH, op. cit., p. 86.

79 Although the author is referring here only to the Spanish social reality, we also consider political and economic transformations, both national and international ones, and other types as well, such as environmental ones. BENEDICTO, Miguel Ángel, «España en la Unión Europea: Una reflexión sobre la política de seguridad y defensa» in LÓPEZ MORA, F. and BALLESTEROS, M.A. (eds.) *Ensayos sobre la cultura de defensa y la paz en la España actual*, Cordoba-Madrid, University of Cordoba-General Directorate-General of Defence Institutional Relations, 2011, p. 60.

80 ALONSO, op. cit., p. 38.

81 BALLESTEROS, op. cit., 2011; DÍEZ ALCALDE, op. cit.; PALACIOS, op. cit.

82 CALDUCH, op. cit., p. 81; MOLINER, op. cit.

83 PALACIOS, op. cit., 18-20.

On the basis of all these arguments, our point of view reflects the idea of a distinct status, in formal and material terms, of *defence* and *security*, although this does not preclude appreciation of the strong ties and proximity between both fields⁸⁴. Their parallel paths, which frequently intersect, help us to develop a broader concept and one which is clearly more abundant and that allows us to accommodate the intrinsic characteristics of the culture of defence, but to adopt these from a security-based approach.

The culture of security as a new conceptual paradigm

The culture of security -the term that has appeared most recently- would, in turn, correspond to a new conceptual paradigm, more explicitly in line with the second formal dimension that we outlined in the previous section, where the culture of defence, as Blanco⁸⁵, maintains, is but a constituent part of the culture of security.

From the beginning of the start of the Cold War onwards, security has been understood, in the view of those who defend the concept, in far too restrictive terms, ones centred on the state as the object of reference, and excessively constrained to the military sphere, whereby it is thus entrenched within this sector and political power⁸⁶. However, the different definitions of security that scientific literature has presented until the present day⁸⁷, have generally interpreted it as the absence of dangers and

84 Despite what is described here, there are authors, such as Feliú, who do not agree with the complementary use of both terms, as they state that the first term, security, addresses the objective to be achieved, whereas the second, that of defence, is the set of instruments, measures and actions aimed at guaranteeing security -security as the defence of vital and strategic interests, as well as of “our values”-. This is why he is reticent to adopt the extended nature put forward in our paper and rejects all the more this hypothetical evolution of defence towards security -as is examined more extensively in section 3.3.-, although he does indeed recognise that national defence cannot currently refer to merely military defence. This medial vision of defence is also one shared by, inter alia, Quero, Alonso and Laguna, for whom the exercise of defence enables security to be maintained which in turn permits a state of order of peace. We, for our part, decouple both dimensions from one another both in a material and a formal sense, just as we have explained and justified. However, the interesting insights of these authors allow us to reaffirm the close link between security and defence. FELIÚ, Luis, «La confusa terminología de la seguridad y la defensa», Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, *Opinion Paper 06/2012*, 2012, pp. 2-3, available online (consulted 20 February 2015):

http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2012/DIEEEE062012_ConfusaTerminologia_Seg.Def_GB_Feliu.pdf; QUERO, op. cit., p. 52; ALONSO, op. cit., pp. 8-9, 41; LAGUNA, op. cit., p. 8.

85 BLANCO, José María, *Hacia una cultura de seguridad nacional*, Instituto Universitario de Investigación sobre Seguridad Interior, No. 1 *Cultura de Seguridad*, 2013, available online (consulted 25 February 2015):

http://www.iuisi.es/20_fuentes_abiertas/001%20HACIA%20UNA%20CULTURA%20DE%20SEGURIDAD%20NACIONAL.pdf.

86 ULLMAN, Richard H, «Redefining Security» *International Security*, 8 (1): 129-153, 1983; BUZAN, Barry, DE WILDE, Jaap, and WAEVER, Ole, *Security: A New Framework For Analysis*, United States, Lynee Rienner Publishers, 1998.

87 Moliner makes a sound summary of the different perspectives from which security may be addressed: psychologically, socially, strategically and politically. In turn, in order to consult the different security concepts

threats to certain values, the latter quality being one that we may deem essential to its definition. Despite attempts to achieve a satisfactory formulation to describe it, the idea of security is poorly conceptualised, perhaps because of the abstract and adaptable nature of its objective. This paradoxically transforms it into an “attractive and inviting”⁸⁸ idea, as well as “politically powerful”⁸⁹ one. This is why “the security paradigm shift”⁹⁰ and its key title role in recent years has made it the prevailing perspective from which to work.

The term *security* has increasingly acquired a polysemic meaning, since it is now seen alongside various adjectives given coverage due to the international context: ecological, food, health, energy, economic, information security etc.⁹¹. There have been a series of changes to the global outlook that result in new conceptual frameworks with a view to better understanding the emergence of real and potential dangers - “international terrorism, dysfunctional consequences of globalisation, an exacerbation of identity crises, the reinstatement of the principle of humanitarian intervention, etc.”⁹²-. These risks and threats stem from not only the attacks of other states, but also from other groups or individuals who are able to undermine security structures and terrorise a population, which is what Didier Bigo called “capillarisation of violence”⁹³. Thus, the idea of security as centred on the state and its military instrument is unsuitable or, rather, not sufficiently broad and versatile to cope with these new realities, in which it is not so straightforward to draw a distinction between “civilian and military, exterior and interior”⁹⁴. These realities can be included within the five factors of “the security of human collectives” described by Barry Buzan -political, military, social, economic

put forward, we refer the reader to the compilation put together by Barry Buzan and Javier Jordán. MOLINER, Juan, «Política de Defensa de España ante amenaza terrorismo yihadista», *Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional*, Vol. 1 No. 1, Summer 2015, p. 2; BUZAN, Barry, «People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era», *Revista Académica de Relaciones Internacionales*, no. 9, 2008; JORDÁN, Javier, «¿Por qué los estudios de seguridad son objeto de interés para la ciencia política?» Grupo de Estudios En Seguridad Internacional, *Análisis GESI 3/2015*, 2015, available online (consulted 24 February 2015): [http://www.seguridadinternacional.es/?q=es/content/%C2%BFpor-qu%C3%A9-los-estudios-de-seguridad-son-objeto-de-inter%C3%A9s-de-la-ciencia-pol%C3%ADtica\(2015\)](http://www.seguridadinternacional.es/?q=es/content/%C2%BFpor-qu%C3%A9-los-estudios-de-seguridad-son-objeto-de-inter%C3%A9s-de-la-ciencia-pol%C3%ADtica(2015)).

88 QUERO, op. ci., p. 25.

89 BUZAN, op. cit. 2008, p. 5.

90 BLANCO, op. cit., p. 3.

91 ROLDÁN, Javier, «La política exterior española de seguridad y defensa. La vertiente exterior de las Fuerzas Armadas» in Javier Roldán Barbero, coord., *La nueva política de seguridad de la Unión Europea*. Granada: University of Granada-Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, 2012, p. 189.

92 LÓPEZ MORA, op. cit., p. 94.

93 BIGO, Didier, «Guerres, Conflits, Transnational et Territoire (Parte 1)», *Cultures & Conflits*, no. 21-22, 1996, p. 6.

94 LABORIE, Mario, «La Evolución Del Concepto de Seguridad», Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, *Framework Document 05/2011*, 2011, p. 3. Available online (consulted 13 April 2015):

http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_marco/2011/DIEEEM05-2011EvolucionConceptoSeguridad.pdf

and environmental factors -», which are heavily interrelated due to the globalisation process that we referred to in previous paragraphs.

With this multidisciplinary approach, defence of territory finds a new focus with the defence of the individual, of the population, at the heart of such an approach. The security “of nations and of all the international community is built”⁹⁵, upon the basis of the security of the citizen, with the aim of thereby achieving overall security. This is the approach adopted in our country as part of a comprehensive and sustainable concept of security, which combines three elements: national, human and collective security⁹⁷. This has occurred in such a way that this concept of security encompasses both aspects of defence and of diplomacy, internal security and intelligence etc.⁹⁸. To speak of national defence is thus to speak of national security, an idea that stresses “the state’s public interest in security”⁹⁹.




Figure 3: Security in 4D. Source: García Palomero and Moure.

95 BUZAN, Barry, «New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century», *International Affairs* 67 (3): 431-451, 1991.

96 DÍEZ ALCALDE, op. cit., p. 84.

97 LABORIE, op. cit., p. 5.

98 BLANCO, op. cit., p. 1.

99 VIRILIO, Paul, *El accidente original*, Buenos Aires, Amorrortu Editores, 2009, p. 107.

Nevertheless, all of these challenges require, just as in the past, the vital support of society, which will only endorse and assume security if it deems it necessary¹⁰⁰. This is why some authors¹⁰¹ have proposed the very interesting approach of “Security in 4D”, as illustrated in Figure 3, which, in addition to the classic dominant ideas defence, development and diplomacy –as the 3D-, also includes the ‘dissemination’ of security policies for a successful outcome¹⁰².

In short, the culture of security, as a public policy, has basic and defining qualities in common with the other two, but it delves deeper into the all-encompassing nature of the concept of security itself: protection against the risks and threats that pressurise society -internationally too-, and is promoted from more of a proactive perspective than a reactive one. In addition, it far surpasses the bounds of defence in order to pursue an integrated and cross-cutting approach.

CONCLUSIONS

From the perspective of the scientific and academic field of Political Science it is possible to go into greater conceptual depth when studying the culture of security and defence, thereby enriching the debate surrounding this public policy.

Firstly, analysis of the concept *political culture* allows us to confirm that the *culture of security and defence* is not merely the degree of information or knowledge that citizens have regarding the issues pertaining to these matters, but also the set of affiliations and attitudes that enable a citizen to interpret issues relating to their political subjects, how these are interrelated and how they feed back into the political system, thereby exerting an influence both on the inputs received and the outputs generated. This first conclusion is extremely useful vis-à-vis political action, since it suggests that one should proceed by bearing in mind that the *culture of security and defence* operates on both super-imposed levels.

This study also helps to properly qualify the assertions often made about this ‘weak culture’ [within Spanish society], which could give rise to distortions when it comes to putting public policy into practice. This perspective may facilitate more effective work, for instance, concerning the affiliations and positions of groups that remain

100 DÍEZ ALCALDE, op. cit., p. 93; QUERO, op. cit., p. 43.

101 GARCÍA PALOMERO and MOURE, op. cit.

102 From our point of view, the box to the right of Fig. 3 could even be shortened to just ‘culture of security’, in accordance with the differences explained in section 2.4 between culture and awareness and why the former is to be adopted. Moreover, we consider that transparency must unfailingly accompany public security and defence policy -safeguarding national security, but without turning this into just a pretext for opaque management-, given that transparency and public debate are of decisive importance that results “in greater robustness and social support for the decisions adopted”, SERRA, op. cit., p. 16.

on the margins of such policy. Likewise, we have demarcated the concept of 'public opinion', the victim of widespread confusion that could be detrimental to greater effectiveness upon implementation of policy.

As a public policy, this approach emphasises its instrumental nature in regard to ensuring that citizens become aware of the importance of security and defence as guarantees of a society's well-being, where any support they garner stems from the free reflection, critical judgement and public debate that underpin any public policy, thus constructing a desirable shared vision regarding threats, risks and joint security and defence projects and thereby avoiding perceptions of a purely subjective nature and one of value-ascription, ergo exclusive to individuals, vis-à-vis 'awareness of defence'.

The second main section of this paper has examined the terminology used over the course of these years. Of all those outlined, it draws the conclusion that it may be most convenient and beneficial to continue to use the term *culture of security and defence* for this policy, given that it encompasses and implies: 1) A specific procedure to safeguard national defence, in readiness for a response to any danger, yet above all endeavouring to prevent and anticipate existing risks and threats -defence from a security perspective; 2) An extended concept of defence, insofar as national defence and the protection of national interests no longer merely involves protecting a country's territory *stricto sensu*: this also includes all the security dimensions and responses that these require in a global and globalised society; 3) The continued presence of the term 'defence', which allows for the consolidation and emphasis of, first and foremost, the mission(s) of the AF as an instrument of this policy, but also of those relating to security and foreign policy, an essential dimension that would otherwise be diluted as just another aspect of national security policy; and 4) With respect to this last aspect, the relevance of the role of the AF, the aim being that their work does not become blurred following a new multifaceted paradigm, which would undermine the primordial purpose of this public policy.

This paper, from the approach afforded by Political Science, proposes a conceptual construction that may be of use to political activity, and hence the choice of the culture of security and defence in accordance with these parameters as the leitmotiv and aim of this public policy. On the basis of this in-depth conceptual insight, the intention is to also contribute to improving the future design and implementation of such policy, such as the drawing up of a new Master Plan for a Culture of Security and Defence.

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