

*Pablo Cañete Blanco*

*Journalist. Master's Degree in International Studies and the European Union by the University of Valencia.*

*E-mail: Pablo.Canetebianco@gmail.com*

## JIHADISM AS AN EXPRESSION OF VIOLENCE

### **Abstract**

Violence is an occurrence that is not unrelated to the characteristics of the society in which it occurs. Defining it involves recognising its meaning and significance in the context in which it is used. Though violence tends to be the result of conflict and has a mainly instrumental nature, it seems that a new kind of nihilistic violence has been emerging that, far from being merely a tool, is turning into a purpose that offers a solution to the feeling of existential emptiness. If classic Islamic fundamentalism was the perfect candidate to meet the need for a meaning in life, modern jihadism provides a solution to the need for existence through destruction.

### **Keywords**

Terrorism, violence, jihadism, nihilism, postmodernism, ultraviolence.

## JIHADISM AS AN EXPRESSION OF VIOLENCE

### INTRODUCTION: VIOLENCE AND THE OTHER

“In a highly violent conflict, the question should always be: What is the conflict underlying so much violence? If the violence is the smoke, where is the fire? Journalists are experts in smoke but almost never in fire. In general, they know very little about the fire. Violence is important, there is a great deal of suffering; someone has the hope of winning and there is also the fear of losing. Two questions arise based on the understanding of this violence and suffering: What is the underlying conflict? Is there any solution to this underlying conflict? Naturally, we later do everything we can to discover this solution”<sup>1</sup>.

Defining violence is complicated. In general, all definitions of the term refer to force. They tend to be accompanied by other terms that limit their meaning and that, in general, have negative connotations. Physical, verbal, founding or symbolic violence only serve to add meaning to a (physical or verbal) aggression, an instinct or a form of oppression and/or domination. Manuel Delgado<sup>2</sup> stated that vague definitions of violence such as the “exercise of force” or “non-consensual imposition” may become recognised in any type of coercion or pressure. He considered violence to be a specific quality of certain acts that have become de-socialised, turning any form of public violence into a criminal act, giving the state a monopoly on force, and converting any non-authorised use of said force into violence.

The word itself seems to be without an antonym depending on the meaning we give it, as it calls on a complex reality whose counterpart should almost exclusively be translated as no-violence. It is, however, an historic fact that goes hand-in-hand with the social origins of mankind and his relationship with his peers. So indeed, it could be an integral part of the very essence of being human:

“Force, violence and life are embedded in the human being, whose interaction with the natural environment is conflictive. This complexity is compounded in the social sphere where violence is used as a form of relationship”<sup>3</sup>.

---

1 GALTUNG, J. (2004). «Investigación para la paz y conflictos: Presente y Futuro.» *Todavía en busca de la paz*. Zaragoza: Fundación Seminario de Investigación para la Paz, 2004. 525-542. [Translated from Spanish by translator].

2 DELGADO RUIZ, Manuel. «Discurso y Violencia: La «Fantasmización» Mediática de la Fuerza.» *Trípodos*, 1998: 55-68.

3 AZNAR FERNÁNDEZ-MONTESINOS, Federico. «La violencia y el ser humano.» (Analysis Document) *Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*, 3 June 2015, [http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs\\_analisis/2015/DIEEEA32-2015\\_ViolenciaySerHumano\\_FAFM.pdf](http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_analisis/2015/DIEEEA32-2015_ViolenciaySerHumano_FAFM.pdf) (last consulted 20.03.2017).

Nonetheless, the most distinguishing feature of violence is its disproportionate nature, beyond any type of control (internal or external), and its destructive nature, a kind of overflowing *thanatos* that, while appearing to have a primitive character, has accompanied humankind throughout its history and evolves together with civilisation as it grows both in complexity and in internal contradictions<sup>4</sup>. In line with this criterion, we could subscribe to the definition offered by Galtung<sup>5</sup>, according to which “violence is here defined as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is” that is, violence gauges the degree of damage avoidance of an act. Violence includes not only tangible facts, but also the threat of the existence of the damage and the structural violence (domination and relationships of meaning that perpetuate a sinister *status quo* for a section of the population without anyone actually executing a violent act that could also be called social injustice).

However, this is not the only definition that violence can be given as its meaning, and social perception can vary (particularly if there is a recognised political backdrop). There is, thus, a political violence – often considered legitimate – that a group of people use to wage war, on ideological and political foundations, against a government that is socially accepted (albeit on a sectarian basis). The main problem that political violence – actually the conflict – brings with it is the degree of acceptability and the possibility of the legitimisation of its participants<sup>6</sup>. In other words, what distinguishes a terrorist leader from a hero of freedom? The side, the winner, the means used?

The concept of violence also has a certain degree of volatility. Despite it being a destructive concept, it does not always have a negative value. In many places, violence is a vehicle for social advancement. It is in these cases where the disproportionate exercise of force runs the risk of the means turning into the purpose. This is why violence, a tool, can reach the category of object and can become a component of identity (and even of politics).

Western society has created a metanarrative that not only rejects violence as a form of social interaction, but also softens and conceals all of its aspects. The process was perhaps particularly significant with the transformation of children’s stories from including violent elements to being love stories, thereby removing most of their original pedagogical content. The *disneyfication* that replaced the prince’s rape of

4 AZNAR FERNÁNDEZ-MONTESINOS, Federico. «Reflexiones sobre el empleo de la violencia.» (Analysis Document) *Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*, 10 September 2013, [http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs\\_analisis/2013/DIEEEA47-2013\\_ReflexionesViolencia\\_FAFM.pdf](http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_analisis/2013/DIEEEA47-2013_ReflexionesViolencia_FAFM.pdf) (last consulted 20.03.2017).

5 GALTUNG, Johan. «Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.» *Journal of Peace Research*, 1969: 167-191.

6 COHAN, John Alan. «Necessity Political Violence and Terrorism». *Stetson Law Review*, 2006: 903-981.

Sleeping Beauty with a loving kiss was not limited to children's stories. It was merely a visible element.

Violence, in the collective imagination, has become a concern of "others". Legality (and to a certain extent the *establishment*) deem that use of force cannot be branded violent. Faced with the homogenous and uniform violence carried out by state security corps and forces, we find ourselves before a barbaric, *amateur*, violence that responds to behaviours and never to structures<sup>7</sup>. This process, through which certain forms of direct and structural violence are socially accepted (or even considered correct), is what Galtung calls cultural violence and legitimises the other two forms of violence. Thus, direct violence is an act/event, structural violence a process and cultural violence an invariable, a permanence.

The American wartime film industry offers excellent examples of how direct violence can be perceived not as such at all. The *enemy* falls to the ground or is victim of an explosion that causes him to disappear from the scene while the hero is injured and, if he dies, has some final words to add. It is not unusual for the antagonists in a film to not even speak at all. If we watch *13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi*, we can see that the terrorists have no dialogues, they simply carry out acts of violence (narratively unmotivated). We can also see how in films such as *Lone Survivor*, only the "allied" characters have dialogue. In this film, the only life (in as far as having a biography and personality) is that of the American soldiers and those willing to help them. The rest don't exist. Once again, the Taliban are struck down while the protagonists die slowly and establish signs of empathy.

In the media, it is quite common to read or hear that terrorists are killed or simply die. Drones don't cause massacres, even if they kill 150 terrorists (because this way they are denied their humanity: they are terrorists, not humans) who have been sentenced by a missile with no guarantees or previous trial. And this is where the media tends to use a doublelexicon to refer to the use of force by terrorists or by the state:

- The USA enters Syria and *kills*<sup>8</sup> an Islamic State commander (Headline)<sup>9</sup>.
  - o The operation aimed to capture Abu Sayyaf who *died*<sup>10</sup> in the military operation. (Subheading).

---

7 DELGADO RUIZ, Manuel. *Op Cit.*

8 Author's italics.

9 AYUSO, Silvia. «EE UU entra en Siria y mata a un alto mando del Estado Islámico.» *El País*, 17 May 2015, [http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2015/05/16/actualidad/1431783104\\_211024.html](http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2015/05/16/actualidad/1431783104_211024.html)

(last consulted 20.03.2017).

10 Author's italics.

- From Bin Laden to Jihadi John, the terrorist leaders *killed*<sup>12</sup> by the USA (Headline)<sup>12</sup>.
  - Afghan intelligence services confirmed this Sunday the *death*<sup>13</sup> of Taliban Mullah Mansur in a drone attack on Pakistani territory (Subheading).
- The perpetrator of the Orlando *massacre*<sup>14</sup> called the police during the shooting (Headline)<sup>15</sup>.
  - In turn, the attacker [Omar Mateen] *was shot and died*<sup>16</sup>. (Body of the article).
- US drone *kills*<sup>17</sup> 150 terrorists in Somalia (Headline)<sup>18</sup>.
  - “*We hit the camp*<sup>19</sup> and destroyed it”, explained the Department of Defence’s spokesman to journalists, without stating whether the attack resulted in civilian victims. (Body of the article).

So, we separate violence and force to legitimise ourselves and to deny the other their human character. The natural forms of violence have, in general, a legitimisation that allows the person carrying out the violence this primitive inhibition. Withholding, in contrast, their narrative, their humanity, converts the enemy into a *zombie*, guided by elementary murderous instincts, an entity that exists only through the *animus necandi*. And the effect of removing the narrative from violence is to annihilate its very essence, which is to produce meaning<sup>20</sup>.

11 Idem.

12 GAVIÑA, S. «De Bin Laden a Jihadi John, los líderes terroristas abatidos por EE.UU.» *ABC*, 23 May 2016, [http://www.abc.es/internacional/abci-laden-jihadi-john-lideres-terroristas-abatidos-eeuu-201605230308\\_noticia.html](http://www.abc.es/internacional/abci-laden-jihadi-john-lideres-terroristas-abatidos-eeuu-201605230308_noticia.html). (last consulted 20.03.2017).

13 Author’s italics.

14 Idem.

15 TRILLO, Manuel. «El autor de la masacre de Orlando llamó a la policía en medio del tiroteo.» *ABC*, 13 June 2016: [http://www.abc.es/internacional/abci-autor-masacre-llamo-policia-medio-tiroteo-201606131719\\_noticia.html](http://www.abc.es/internacional/abci-autor-masacre-llamo-policia-medio-tiroteo-201606131719_noticia.html). (last consulted 20.03.2017).

16 Author’s italics.

17 Idem.

18 EFE. «Dron de Estados Unidos mata a 150 terroristas en Somalia.» *El Comercio*, 7 Marzo 2016, <http://elcomercio.pe/mundo/actualidad/eeuu-mata-drones-150-yihadistas-al-shabab-somalia-noticia-1884504>. (last consulted 20.03.2017).

19 Author’s italics.

20 RODRIGO ALSINA, Miquel. «La Narratativització de la violència.» *Quarderns del CAC*, 2003: 15-21.

GUNARATNA, Rohan, Arie W. KRUGLANSKI, and Michele GELFAND. «Terrorism as Means to an End: How Political Violence Bestows Significance.» In *Meaning, Mortality and Choice: The Social Psychology of Existential Concerns*, by Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, 203-213. Washington, D.C. (United States): American Psychological Association, 2012.

## ULTRAVIOLENCE OR NIHILIST VIOLENCE

“Indeed, atomized in the name of freedom, the person now stands alone against the forces of the global market and mega-technology.

Simultaneously, violence associated with impersonal bureaucratic structures, of the kind Hanna Arendt talked about, has now acquired freer play. As wars, direct use of violence against unarmed populations, torture and blatant violation of human rights becomes less and less easy to sell, there is an increase in indirect violence, surveillance and destruction of the life support systems of communities unable to defend themselves by using modern institutional and legal remedies”<sup>21</sup>.

In today’s society, in addition to a *normal* violence conceived as residual, there is also an ultraviolence that is different from the first in that far from being an instrument, it has become an end in itself. In both cases, states try to contain and regulate it, as was done in Ancient Rome and Greece. Currently one of the main social challenges that we face is (distinguishably young and mainly) nihilist violence:

“The cultural values in Ancient Greece and Rome, where there were forces capable of restraining violence and countering its spread, were different to those in today’s society and this is the case because currently we counter violence with values that are either very weak or completely ineffective.” (...) ‘At the beginning of the 21st century, we hit a dangerous turning point as regards certain expressions of violence, giving rise to extreme brutality that has highlighted several issues: on the one hand, that western societies have lost the principle of reality, recognising the existence of an objective and worrying fact: the moral inability of a large portion of western society to oppose certain values and principles in the face of this new type of violence”<sup>22</sup>.

This inconsequential violence created new challenges as it shares little, other than its outcomes, with the violence that we identify as *standard* violence. The social processes that lead to violence have been characterised by a desire to perturb the existing order so as to substitute it for another. This tends to be accompanied by new ethics, morals and aesthetics that back up the new values of the elite assailants and that legitimate the use of violence. Ultimately, we can state that violence within a conflict is a pro-

---

21 NANDY, Ashis. *Development and Violence*. Trier (Alemania): Zentrum für europäische Studien, 1995.

22 APARICIO-ORDÁS GONZÁLEZ-GARCÍA, Luís A. «El origen de la violencia en las sociedades humanas: Violencia simbólica, violencia fundadora y violencia política.» (Opinion Document) *Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*, 24 August 2015, [http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs\\_opinion/2015/DIEEO90-2015\\_OrigenViolencia\\_Sociedades\\_L.Aparicio-Ordas.pdf](http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2015/DIEEO90-2015_OrigenViolencia_Sociedades_L.Aparicio-Ordas.pdf) (last consulted 20.03.2017).

social fact (albeit sectarian and subversive). This is the case because, as pointed out by Federico Aznar<sup>23</sup> “violence is a supplement to conflicts, not their essence”.

In contrast, ultraviolence does not pursue a change to the order but rather an increase in and a perpetuation of violence<sup>24</sup>. It would be similar to a state at war in that “war affects the psychology of the human being introducing him into a universe without rules at the same time as freeing him from the stresses to which he would normally be committed.” (...) “War snatches man from daily life and offers him emotions. Those deployed no longer think about work, taxes, and mortgages”<sup>25</sup>. But, contrary to what happens with war, this movement is not (exclusively) seeking an ideological shock.

This doesn't mean that today's global terrorism (including jihadism) does not develop its own ideological line, as this is of great importance when shaping legitimising and purpose-defining narratives<sup>26</sup>. For example, the most recent nihilistic jihadist ideology is not particularly profound, nor does it have a very well-developed theological component, although it does have a mystical and dogmatic component.

Nihilism is a parallel process to violence. Both exert reciprocal influences and are even interdependent. Nihilism, states John Glassford<sup>27</sup>, takes on concrete form in an individual through apathy and languor that make everything lack value for the individual; a nihilistic anthropology that affects a group and impedes the feeling of community of its members and, finally, Nietzsche's theoretical nihilism together with ethical nihilism that, as a combination of the others, denies the objective existence of morals and values.

One of the major internal tensions of jihadist ultraviolence is its simultaneously nihilistic and fatalistic character<sup>28</sup>. To talk of ultra-religious nihilism, as would be the

23 AZNAR FERNÁNDEZ-MONTESINOS, Federico. «Reflexiones y debates sobre violencia organizada y economía.» (Analysis Document) *Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*, 9 September 2014, [http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs\\_analisis/2014/DIEEEA45-2014-ReflexionesViolencia\\_Economia\\_FAFM.pdf](http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_analisis/2014/DIEEEA45-2014-ReflexionesViolencia_Economia_FAFM.pdf)(last consulted 20.03.2017).

24 For this reason, some authors have started to put forward the new relationships between urban violence and jihad. See: GODARD, B. “La yihad que violenta las calles de media Europa”. *El País*, 4 December 2016, [http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/11/30/actualidad/1480519552\\_169748.html](http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/11/30/actualidad/1480519552_169748.html)(last consulted 20.03.2017).

25 *Idem*.

26 In addition, there is a relationship between ideology and the selection of aims of terrorist groups that makes knowledge of this particularly important. See WRIGHT, Austin L. *Terrorism, Ideology and Target Selection*. Princeton, New Jersey (United States): Princeton University (Department of Politics), 2013 and DRAKE, C.J.M. «The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection.» *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10, nº 2 (1998): 53-85.

27 GLASSFORD, John. *Nihilism and Modernity. Political Response in a Godless Age*. Milton Keynes (United Kingdom): Open University UK, 1998.

28 The fatalism of the Islamic State ideology can be seen throughout its rhetoric. To give an example: “The Islamic State had done everything it could to secure the release of both Sājidah and Ziyād, but




Diagram 1. Comparative and definitory diagram of types of violence.

case for the Islamic State, could prove incredibly paradoxical as it calls upon clearly contradictory perceptions. For this reason, it has been pointed out by some that the ideology of the terrorist group Islamic State cannot be nihilistic:

“And the ethos of ISIS—in which no act is too sadistic if it helps bring an extremist religious state closer to reality—is not nihilistic at all. It is, to the contrary, a reaction to nihilism, a way of fending off its moral challenge by embracing a dangerous and outdated theocratic mentality”<sup>29</sup>.

Indeed, religion has some kind of role in the configuration of jihadist violence. In parallel, we could say that football has some kind of relationship with hooliganism (another form of ultraviolence or of empty/nihilistic violence). The central issue, however, is that in both cases, the end seems to turn into the means; in other words, jihad (religious fundamentalism) and football turn into the means through which an end can be achieved and legitimised: the end being violence. This doesn't mean that hooliganism and jihadism are identical – these two social processes shouldn't be equated – but they do share certain superstructural elements related to the production of meaning and existence<sup>30</sup>.

Allah decreed that they would return to Him as shuhadā' [martyrs], an incomparable honour which they had both desired, eagerly pursued, and supplicated their Lord for. We consider them so, and Allah is their judge" (...) “We ask Allah to take revenge for the Muslims and the mujāhidīn, and rain fire and destruction upon the infidels and apostates wherever they are”, see DABIQ. «The Burning of the Murtadd Pilot.» *Dabiq. From Hypocrisy to Apostasy*. Rabi' Al-Akhir de 1436: 5-8 <https://clarionproject.org/docs/islamic-state-dabiq-magazine-issue-7-from-hypocrisy-to-apostasy.pdf> (last consulted 04.07.2017).

29 ZARETSKY, Robert, and David MIKICS. «Is ISIS an army of nihilists? Just the opposite.» *Boston Globe*, 31 August 2014, <https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/08/30/isis-army-nihilists-just-opposite/GqLQ6Wt6ucso7G4CKLmCwN/story.html>(last consulted 20.03.2017).

30 You can read comments about the phenomenon of ultraviolent Russian hooliganism in PUGMIRE, Jerome. «Vicious Russian hooligans at Euro train and prepare to fight.» *USA Today*,

If the traditional pattern of the search for meaning was precisely spirituality as an end, the problem currently transcends these grids. As F. Nietzsche said “he who has a why to live for can bear almost any how”. This reveals a lack of meaning (that we can still consider to be present in our society today) that could be satisfied by a further belief that inspired social life.

“The only way to have a meaningful life in the present age, then, is to let your involvement become definitive of reality for you, and what is definitive of reality for you is not something that is in any way provisional -- although it certainly is vulnerable. That is why, once a society like ours becomes rational and reflective, such total commitments begin to look like a kind of dangerous dependency”<sup>31</sup>.

The issue of meaning has been described from the perspective of psychology by various authors, including Arie W. Kruglanski who has specialised in the area of jihadist terrorism. This author states that the *quest for significance*, a potential catalyst for radicalism and extremism, may be awakened by the loss of group significance (think of Chechnya or Palestine), by the confrontation and threat to significance (for example through a pledge of an attack that can no longer be taken back) or by the opportunity to attain a high level of group significance (see the case of Osama bin Laden or of Muhammad Atta)<sup>32</sup>. Personal trauma, ideological motives and social pressure (bearing in mind the modulator that is the personality of each individual) play a fundamental role in the loss and the restoration of significance<sup>33</sup>.

---

13 June 2016, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/soccer/2016/06/13/vicious-russian-hooligans-at-euro-train-and-prepare-to-fight/85820646/> (last consulted 20.03.2017); in RAINSFORD, Sarah. «Is Russia exporting a new breed of football hooligan?» *BBC*, 15 June 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36515283> (last consulted 20.03.2017). Or in QUINTON, Matt. «Russian hooligans are neo-Nazis hooked on violence and crystal meth out to wage war on England fans at Euro 2016 in France.» *The Sun*, 13 June 2016, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/sport/football/1278060/russian-hooligans-are-highly-organised-and-motivated-and-want-to-wage-war-on-england-supporters-at-euro-2016-in-france/> (last consulted 20.03.2017); And in greater depth in HODOROWSKI, Danny, and Donna OLIVER. *The Faces Behind the Flags: Football-Hooliganism's connections to Civil-Society in Moscow*. Des Moines, Iowa (United States): Drake University, 2012.

31 DREYFUS, Hubert L. «Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology and Politics.» In *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, by Charles B. Guignon, 345-372. Cambridge (United Kingdom): Cambridge University Press, 2006.

32 GUNARATNA, Rohan, Arie W. KRUGLANSKI, and Michele GELFAND. *Op. Cit.*

33 KRUGLANSKI, Arie W., Michele J. GELFAND, Jocelyn J. BÉLANGER, Anna SHEVELAND, Malakanthi HETIARACHCHI, and Rohan GUNARATNA. «The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism.» *Political Psychology*, 2014, pp. 69-93. KRUGLANSKI, Arie W., Xiaoyan CHEN, Mark DECHESNE, Shira FISHMAN, and Edward OREHEK. «Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers' Motivation and the Quest for Personal Significance.» *Political Psychology*, 2009, pp. 331-357. KRUGLANSKI, Arie W., y E. OREHEK. «The Role of the Quest for Personal Significance in Motivating Terrorism.» In *The Psychology of Social Conflict and Aggression*, by J. Forgas, A. Kruglanski and Williams K. (Eds.), pp. 153-166. New York (United States): Psychology Press, 2011.

However, the current problem doesn't seem to be merely an issue of meaning, but rather also of existence. It is no longer about self-recognition, but about being recognised in the social group as an existing individual; in other words, it is not about looking in the mirror but rather about recognising oneself in the gaze of others. This drive for existence has frequently resorted to violence.

Not only external (aggression towards others), but also internal (suicide) and mixed (suicide with murder<sup>34</sup>).




Diagram 2. Simplified structures of creation of meaning of life or feeling of existence through violence and religion.

Olivier Roy<sup>35</sup> believes that an act of jihadist violence (including suicide) has the capacity to go beyond local news, that it is capable of generating social impact and giving importance to the act<sup>36</sup>. It would be equally true to say that many social

34 Think of the case of the so-called “martyrdom”. From a non-religious point of view, it is a simple suicide attack or a suicide that incorporates the element of murder in its actions.

35 ROY, Olivier. «What is the driving force behind jihadist terrorism?» *Inside Story*, 23 March 2016, <http://insidestory.org.au/what-is-the-driving-force-behind-jihadist-terrorism>. last consulted 20.03.2017).

36 This explains why the Orlando murderer, Omar Siddique Mateen, searched for himself on social networks while carrying out the shooting; or why Tashfeen Malik uploaded a post to his Facebook account during the attack in San Bernardino proclaiming his allegiance to Islamic State. See: EL MUNDO. «Omar Mateen, el asesino de Orlando, buscó en Facebook el atentado mientras disparaba.» *El Mundo*, 17 June 2016, <http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2016/06/17/5763b68722601d39478b45d1.html>. (last consulted 20.03.2017). EUROPA PRESS. «Omar Mateen escribió a su mujer e hizo búsquedas en Facebook para saber si se hablaba de su ataque.» *ABC*, 17 June 2016, <http://www.europapress.es/internacional/noticia-omar-mateen-escribio-mujer-hizo-busquedas-facebook-saber->

processes and processes of collective meaning has been emptied of meaning and that it is precisely the measures used that, in a way, create a meaning, thus expediting a model in which the means displaces the end and governs it.

Even so, modern jihadism is not the only movement or train of thought that latches on to the nihilistic current, and neither is it the first. In the West, we witnessed – mainly through music – the birth of a generation that demanded their existence and not only their meaning. Youth, in particular, symbolised through destruction (including their own destruction) a sort of violent romantic fatalism.

I'm a street walking cheetah with a heart full of napalm  
 I'm a runaway son of the nuclear A-bomb  
 I'm a world's forgotten boy  
 The one who searches and destroys  
 Honey, gotta help me please  
 Somebody gotta save my soul  
 Baby, detonate for me

(Iggy & The Stooges - Search and Destroy)

Come as you are, as you were,  
 As I want you to be  
 As a friend, as a friend, as an old enemy  
 Take your time, hurry up  
 The choice is your, don't be late  
 Take a rest as a friend as an old memoria  
 Come doused in mud, soaked in bleach  
 As I want you to be  
 As a trend, as a friend, as an old memoria  
 And I swear that I don't have a gun  
 No I don't have a gun

(Nirvana – Come as you are)

These, and many other songs (mainly from the 90s) show a recurring trend towards violence and destruction, a constant call to another who is not able to help us or to which we deprive of any type of logic or meaning. At times, in a more or less explicit manner, there is some kind of existential reference proposing our own existence and the nihilistic character through ontological and epistemological references.

.....  
[si-hablaba-ataque-20160617094215.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/16/omar-mateen-searched-for-facebook-posts-about-orlando-shooting-w/). (last consulted 20.03.2017). ALEXANDER, Harriet. «Omar Mateen searched for Facebook posts about Orlando shooting while he was carrying it out.» *The Telegraph*, 16 June 2016, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/16/omar-mateen-searched-for-facebook-posts-about-orlando-shooting-w/> (last consulted 20.03.2017). ENGEL, Pamela. «Here's the ISIS message the female San Bernardino shooter posted on Facebook during the attack.» *Business Insider*, 17 December 2015, <http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-message-tashfeen-malik-posted-on-facebook-during-attack-2015-12> (last consulted 20.03.2017).

However, it is not exclusively in popular music culture that nihilism can be found. It is also present in various film and artistic references. We should bear in mind that nihilism is represented in society and that art is a means of describing and narrating society. An extraordinary example of this nihilistic narrative is the short stage production by Stefanie Grob, *Supermodels*, that looks at different aspects related to the terrorist phenomenon and the poor understanding of it. It also highlights the high level of incoherence and of discursive emptiness that nonetheless appears ordered, rational and tailored<sup>37</sup>. The play, that features two models and their runway coach, shows a fashion show rehearsal in which the new suicide bomber look, complete with explosive belt, is being presented. At the end, the coach gives a speech opening the show explaining the reason for this look:

“Only when one (behaves) in this way and not another...which, beyond being understandable, is explicable...can the motives, causes, the why and what for be understood...this rawness, coldness, stepping over corpses without blinking...without compassion, without commiseration, made of steel, remaining icy cold, vile, cruel, brutal, malicious, inconsiderate, ruthless. And in addition,...the only thing left to be done, frankly...is to suggest unequivocally, with no frills, to say what we...cannot follow...behind the indolence...and we cannot continue to delude ourselves...fool ourselves, settle for words, give free lunches, pull the wool over our eyes, swallow that, turn a blind eye with dirty mud”<sup>38</sup>.

## JIHADISM AS A FORM OF VIOLENCE (CONSTRUCTION OF THE NARRATIVE)

“In the moments before he raped the 12-year-old girl, the Islamic State fighter took the time to explain that what he was about to do was not a sin. Because the preteen girl practiced a religion other than Islam, the Quran not only gave him the right to rape her — it condoned and encouraged it, he insisted”<sup>39</sup>.

---

37 CALERO VALERA, Ana R. «La cara oscura de la globalización: Supermodels by Stefanie Grob and Öffentlichkeitsarbeit by Daniel Goetsch.» 2015.

38 GROB, Stefanie. «Supermodelos.» In *Art Teatral. Cuadernos de minipiezas ilustradas*, by Eduardo (Director) Quiles and Brigitte E. (Coordinador) Jirku, 17-23. Rafaelbunyol, 2007. [Translated from Spanish by translator].

39 CALLIMACHI, Rukmini. «ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape.» *New York Times*, 13 August 2015, [https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theology-of-rape.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theology-of-rape.html?_r=0) (last consulted 20.03.2017).

The Islamic State has established itself as a place of terror. The rape of minors is systematic<sup>40</sup>, as is the persecution and defenestration of gay people<sup>41</sup>. Summary executions have been frequently televised and recorded in high definition (mass beheadings, immolations etc.). All of these acts, a priori classified as barbaric, respond to a careful and measured communications policy. In order to unravel it, we should separate what is done (and what the aim of this action is) from how it is done (and why it is done in this manner).

The homophobic, sexist, backward etc. public policies aim to create a heteropatriarchal identity (an issue that comes up in many states around the world) based on fear (hence the choice of the death penalty as punishment). The choice of the means for carrying out the sentence – beheadings, defenestration, a shot to the back of the head, or a howitzer – and it being recorded, has a clear propaganda component with a very specific target audience.

“Islamic State men [are] everywhere, they are fighters and warriors”<sup>42</sup>.

In their videos and magazines, violent content is the main focus, with the justification of the violence coming in a close second. Slow motion scenes of war, shootings, and executions take precedence over any religious reference. What is shown is not religion, it is religious justification, it is ultraviolence executed on the unbeliever, the apostate, the crusader, the infidel; it is a brutal demonstration of epic proportions. The Islamic State aims to seduce a young target audience who are looking to give meaning to their life, and through imitation of cinema and video games manages to attract them to a heroic reality of which they will be the protagonists<sup>43</sup>.

---

40 CALLIMACHI, Rukmini. «To Mantain Supply of Sex Slaves, ISIS Pushes Birth Control.» *New York Times*, 12 March 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/13/world/middleeast/to-maintain-supply-of-sex-slaves-isis-pushes-birth-control.html> (last consulted 20.03.2017).

GREENFIELD, Daniel. «Islamic State: If 10 Muslims Rape a Non-Muslim Woman, She Becomes Muslim.» *Frontpage Mag*, 9 October 2015, <http://www.frontpagemag.com/point/260395/islamic-state-if-10-muslims-rape-non-muslim-woman-daniel-greenfield> (last consulted 20.03.2017).

41 THAROOR, Ishaan. «The Islamic State’s shocking war on gays.» *The Washington Post*, 13 June 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/13/the-islamic-states-shocking-war-on-homosexuals/> (last consulted 20.03.2017). ZELIN, Aaron Y., and Jacob OLIDORT. «The Islamic State’s Views on Homosexuality.» *The Washington Institute*, 14 June 2016, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-islamic-states-views-on-homosexuality> (last consulted 20.03.2017).

42 ALBATTAR. *Orlando Attack*. s/l, 14 June 2016.

43 WILLIAMS, Lauren. *Islamic State propaganda and the mainstream media*. Sydney (Australia): Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2016. WINTER, Charlie. *The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy*. London (United Kingdom): Quilliam Foundation, 2015. FERNANDEZ, Alberto M. *Here to stay and growing: Combating ISIS propaganda network*. Washington D.C. (United States): The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, 2015.

“Those who study theoretical jihad, meaning they study only jihad as it is written on paper, will never grasp this point well. Regrettably, the youth in our Umma<sup>44</sup>, since the time when they were stripped of weapons, no longer understand the nature of wars. One who previously engaged in jihad knows that it is naught but violence, crudeness, terrorism, frightening (others), and massacring – I am talking about jihad and fighting, not about Islam and one should not confuse them”<sup>45</sup>.

From there, it is clear to see new forms of leadership and new models of behaviour that make the martyr and the jihadist a model empty of meaning<sup>46</sup>:

“Some forms of worship of the dead are also transcendent. Modern heroes are ephemeral and sometimes virtual; in a post-heroic society like today’s, they are at times mere shells behind which there is absolutely nothing, what is known and accepted without, paradoxically, thereby ceasing to be a reference of supposed virtues, even in death”<sup>47</sup>.

Today’s global jihadist movement is barely, or not at all, religious. While it is true that in the case of al-Qaeda, religion and politics intermingled as aims and final destinations, the same cannot be said of the Islamic State. Osama bin Laden, like Ayman al-Zawahiri, didn’t hesitate to use violence and even to turn it into a propaganda tool, but his messages, his speeches, his metanarrative and his objectives were clearly political, heirs to Qutbism) inspired by a radical version of the Islamic religion.

For their part, the followers of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi have a clear political objective legitimised by religion. Jihadism in Syria and Iraq, just as in some parts of Africa,

44 Global Community of Muslim believers. A type of transnational identity construction that encompasses all those who embrace Islam independently of any other identity criteria (gender, nationality, race, etc.).

45 NAJI, Abu Bakr. *The Management of Savagery*. Translated by William McCants. Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States): John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies (Harvard University), 2006.

46 This could be due to the fact that in the modern world, anything that at any time conjured up a task – a cause, ultimately a why – had lost its authority. It was, as Heidegger stated, an inability by the movements and the causes to request the support and its continuity from the individual. Life stopped having a meaning because the public world was lacking scripts and lines; the modern human being had the power to generate his own values though himself. See Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche*. Translated by Juan Luis Vermal. Barcelona: Ediciones Destino S.A., 2000.

47 AZNAR FERNÁNDEZ-MONTESINOS, Federico. «Reflexiones y debates sobre violencia organizada y economía.» (Analysis Document) *Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*, 9 September 2014, [https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjqiYiTmejSAhXB8RQKHausDo8QFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ieee.es%2FGalerias%2Ffichero%2Fdocs\\_analisis%2F2014%2FDIEEEA45-2014\\_ReflexionesViolencia\\_Economia\\_FAFM.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGVfBmnIuRiYiWEnZifXbTgiCjrnA&sig2=ofa\\_X3Ikj2ZjQB7ZLrUq6Q](https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjqiYiTmejSAhXB8RQKHausDo8QFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ieee.es%2FGalerias%2Ffichero%2Fdocs_analisis%2F2014%2FDIEEEA45-2014_ReflexionesViolencia_Economia_FAFM.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGVfBmnIuRiYiWEnZifXbTgiCjrnA&sig2=ofa_X3Ikj2ZjQB7ZLrUq6Q). (last consulted 20.03.2017).

adopts the form of a State<sup>48</sup>. This article does not aim to analyse all of the aspects of terrorism, nor to define all jihadism as a form of violence. I do not consider that the killing in Orlando and the war in Syria are the same phenomenon, but rather that they are events that are growing and developing in parallel, with multiple relationships and interdependencies.

Focusing once again on the religious decoupling from nihilistic jihadism, we can see several examples of how a large part of its propaganda and rhetoric is based on issues that are only tangentially related to religion. Marta Pons<sup>49</sup> pointed out that the main objective of the new Islamic fundamentalists is the deculturation of Islam, removing it from its cultural context; this would explain why those in charge of proselytism in the Islamic State try to create a distancing from religion, from the sectarian perspective; in other words, guaranteeing that all *religious knowledge* comes from controlled *ideological sources*.

“Alex has lived with her grandparents for almost all of her life. She learned that there was a mosque five miles away, but Faisal told her she should not go there”<sup>50</sup>.

We have seen in numerous reports and documentaries how the Islamic State is developing in a very un-religious way in the West. Seeing how difficult it is to obtain information about the organisation through other means, these are often of great help to understand intra-group relations, and the aspirations and motivations of their members, etc. And that is where we see that their fundamentalist teachings have a fragile theological basis that is moderately removed from the tendencies followed by

48 Stating that it is a state doesn't lend nor strip legitimacy from the activities and policies that take place inside it. If it is able to coordinate the provision of certain basic services to the population and exercise power over the territory it controls (as well as having a tax system), then it is a state, politically speaking. A state at war that uses terrorism against its enemies and against its own population, but ultimately a state.

49 PONS SOLER, Marta. «La analogía entre la radicalización islámica y una campaña de marketing exitosa.» (Opinion Document) *Instituto Español de Estudios estratégicos*, 3 June 2016, <https://www.google.es/>

[url?sa=t&rcct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=oahUKEwjO8POgmejSAhWC7RQKHamtA9MQFggdMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iece.es%2FGalerias%2Ffichero%2Fdocs\\_opinion%2F2016%2FDIEEO56-2016\\_Radicalizacion\\_Marketing\\_MPons.pdf&usg=AFQjCNG\\_s](http://www.iece.es/2016/06/03/la-analogia-entre-la-radicalizacion-islamica-y-una-campana-de-marketing-exitosa/)

[W9RNmmP7qF6geBMILNggnyVQ&sig2=2SJwnn6VhV-dq3KAPetdlQ&bvm=bv.150120842,d.d24.](http://www.iece.es/2016/06/03/la-analogia-entre-la-radicalizacion-islamica-y-una-campana-de-marketing-exitosa/)

(last consulted 20.03.2017).

50 CALLIMACHI, Rukmini. «ISIS and the Lonely Young American.» *The New York Times*, 27 June 2015, <https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rcct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=oahUKEwjzmOfCmejSAhWDVxQKHRncBiMQFggcMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2015%2F06%2F28%2Fworld%2Famericas%2Fisis-online-recruiting-american.html&usg=AFQjCNEjMmPS4wt5PdSpl-RQgJnxSTHWgw&sig2=wyNoyKPvatVAo-SFpoBuKg>. (last consulted 20.03.2017).

other jihadist groups and traditions. For this reason, some jihad theorists consider that the Islamic State is a plague fighting against Muslims<sup>51</sup>. For their part, Islamic State has denied the division and lack of support from the side of some Salafist scholars (especially Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi) for their cause<sup>52</sup>.

With the Islamic State currently being the global jihadist body with the greatest capacity for uptake and presenting the biggest threat – at practically all levels –, we need to understand what ideological relationship they have and what their link could be with specific forms of execution of violence. With that in mind, some studies have pointed out different correlations between political attitudes and the use of violence, particularly as related to authoritarianism<sup>53</sup>, but also with models and specific ideologies such as modern developmentalism:

“(.. .) development tends to sharpen religious, interregional and ethnic tensions by ‘pitting’ traditional communities against each other. This does not mean that such tensions were non-existent in the past or that the planners provoke them. It means that by giving absolute priority to interests over passions, instrumental rationality over visions and worldviews, development converts the rich, multilayered relationships among the

---

51 VV.AA. «Fatwa of Some Jihad Scholars Regarding the Group IS and its Attack on the Mujahideen.» *Al-Minara*, 3 June 2015, <https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=oahUKEwi7ldrLmejSAhXDwBQKHUyQDOsQFggcMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Falminara.wordpress.com%2F2015%2F06%2F03%2Ffatwa-of-some-jihad-scholars-regarding-the-group-is-and-its-attack-on-the-mujahideen%2F&usg=AFQjCNF41fRXIHmSD-gANc7whpYYUm-vQIA&sig2=CCyLGL66RflBuduo-YiB3A>. (last consulted 20.03.2017). AL-FILISTINI, Abu Qatada. «A Message to the People of Jihad and those who Love Jihad.» 28 April 2014, <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/abc5ab-qatc48idah-al-filiserb9adc4abnc4ab-22message-to-the-people-of-jihc48id-and-its-admirers22-en.pdf>. (last consulted 20.03.2017). AL-MAQDISI, Abu Muhammad. «A call to the Ummah and the Mujahideen.» May 2014, <https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=oahUKEwi6ocDcmejSAhVFVRQKHfCOD2oQFggoMAI&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gatestoneinstitute.org%2Fdocuments%2Fbaghdadicaliph.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHs73-QbwTbaCZIEG3cSGMgGM7ivw&sig2=YH8WadXjydyce6AdHzeQA>. (last consulted 20.03.2017). JOSCELYN, Thomas. «Officials from Al Nusrah Front, Ahrar al Sham vow to continue fight against Islamic State.» *Long War Journal*, 20 July 2015, [https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=oahUKEwi4eLnmejSAhUSGhQKHfYGNBccQFggfMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.longwarjournal.org%2Farchives%2F2015%2F07%2Fofficials-from-al-nusrah-front-ahrar-al-sham-vow-to-continue-fight-against-islamic-state.php&usg=AFQjCNEyEPsjtBeNSzEQGv5sqPKW9\\_tEA&sig2=bg\\_7aC2ZRoTixm-9opWDdQ](https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=oahUKEwi4eLnmejSAhUSGhQKHfYGNBccQFggfMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.longwarjournal.org%2Farchives%2F2015%2F07%2Fofficials-from-al-nusrah-front-ahrar-al-sham-vow-to-continue-fight-against-islamic-state.php&usg=AFQjCNEyEPsjtBeNSzEQGv5sqPKW9_tEA&sig2=bg_7aC2ZRoTixm-9opWDdQ). (last consulted 20.03.2017).

52 DABIQ. «Foreword.» *Dabiq. Al-Qa'idah of Waziristan. A testimony from within*, Rabi' Al-Awwal 1436 (Islamic), <https://clarionproject.org/docs/isis-islamic-state-magazine-issue-6-al-qaeda-of-waziristan.pdf> (last consulted 20.03.2017) .

53 BENJAMIN, Arlin James. «The relationship between right-wing authoritarianism and attitudes toward violence: Further validation of the attitudes toward violence scale.» *Social Behavior and Personality*, 2006: 923-926.

FISH, M. Steven. «Islam and authoritarianism.» *World Politics*, 2002: 4-37.

communities into a unidimensional, interest-based, competitive relationship. (...) What was a complex encounter of cultures becomes, thus, a hard-eyed battle for the 'concrete' development-related gains"<sup>54</sup>.

Bearing this in mind, and considering that the original conflict was born of a clash between ideologies that, in part, seems to have become a confrontation of violences, we should consider which ideological elements are capable of converting jihadism into a form of violence by the different players involved.

### *Construction of the villain and the hero*

"If our enemies (and the other "villains" in our psychic narratives) help give us a sense of who we are not, of what we stand against, then, conversely, our heroes help tell us who we are, what we stand for"(...) "Initially, [Alan] Moore suggests that, given the black-and-white, all-or-nothing mentality of the kind of person who would become a hero (a person who wants to believe in "absolute values" but encounters only "darkness and ambiguity"), nihilism is a natural fall-back position"<sup>55</sup>.

We first come across the phenomenon of villanisation which is a structuring and enabling factor. Marilyn Manson said that "in any story, the villain is the catalyst. The hero's not a person who will bend the rules or show the cracks in his armour. He's one-dimensional intentionally, but the villain is the person who owns up to what he is and stands by it". The hero is made up (in part) as a logical response to the existence of the enemy and owes him his existence as, without him, he would never be a hero. In other words: without a villain (enemy) and without heroic cause (legitimation) there can be no hero. If at times the questions are more important than the answers – as the answers are logical conclusions of the questions – knowing the enemy can offer a possibility to unravel the basis of the construction of the self.

Some of the principal characteristics of the "enemy" are his lack of faith or religious zeal<sup>56</sup>, nationalist philosophies<sup>57</sup>, tendency towards stealth, falsehood and

54 NANDY, Ashis. Op. Cit.

55 THOMSON, Iain D. «Deconstructing the Hero.» In *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, by Iain D. Thomson, 141-168. Cambridge (United Kingdom): Cambridge University Press, 2012.

56 "This attitude is also one of dhann (weak thinking) of the jāhiliyyah [ignorant]". See DABIQ. (Dhul-Hijjah de 1435 (Islámico)). Foreword. *Dabiq. The Failed Crusade* (4). <https://clarionproject.org/docs/islamic-state-isis-magazine-Issue-4-the-failed-crusade.pdf>. (last consulted 20.03.2017).

57 "The Taliban released another written statement fabricated with a nationalist tone and dialect in the name of the deceased Mullā 'Umar, congratulating the Ummah on Eid al-Fitr and supporting the national Afghan reconciliation with the apostate regime". See DABIQ. (Dhul-Qā'dah de 1436 (Islámico)). Foreword. *Dabiq. From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the war of coalitions* (II). <https://clarionproject.org/docs/Issue%20II%20-%20From%20the%20battle%20of%20Al-Ahzab%20to%20the%20war%20of%20coalitions.pdf>. (last consulted 20.03.2017).

misrepresentation<sup>58</sup>, aversion to Islam (mainly by *the crusaders*<sup>59</sup>), racism<sup>60</sup> and a lack of ethics/morals<sup>61</sup>.

In turn, the enemy can be subdivided into two main groups: one internal (the *apostate tyrant*) in Islamic lands (dar-al-islam) and an external one (the *crusader/infidel*) in lands of war (dar-al-harb). While at the beginning, the Islamic State's main enemy was an internal one – contradicting the legacy of al-Qaeda and its external enemy – over time, attention has turned towards the external enemy<sup>62</sup>.

It is the external enemy that is hit particularly by ultraviolence and by the Manichaeism, totalitarian and fatalistic construction. The external enemy cannot be beaten by the Islamic State, it can only be pounded from the long-term effects of the propaganda, i.e., carrying out attacks and promoting radicalisation from within its borders, with a double effect: boost the morale of those living under the Islamic State who see these acts as a kind of payback/retaliation/response to Western bombings, and increase the international appeal of the organisation and promote new attacks. The internal enemy is fought from within the territory and there the communication and narrative manoeuvres have different characteristics. There must be a differentiation between the enemies and they must be given different roles because only by doing that

58 “They immediately began searching for anything negative that they could use against him, and subsequently began reporting numerous allegations made against him in an attempt to smear his character and, by extension, the noble cause that he was fighting for – the cause of Allah (ta’ālā)”. See DABIQ. (Rabi’ Al-Awwal de 1436 (Islámico)). Foreword. *Dabiq. Al-Qa’idah of Waziristan. A testimony from within* (6). <https://clarionproject.org/docs/isis-islamic-state-magazine-issue-6-al-qaeda-of-waziristan.pdf>. (last consulted 20.03.2017).

59 An empty signifier used to describe principally the United States, other Christian states (or states perceived as such) and international organisations that defend the *Christian bloc* such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

60 “The past year has seen a number of high-profile race-related incidents dominate the headlines in America, bringing the topic of racism back into the spotlight across the country, and like most other major issues that take center stage in the crusader media, racism does not go ignored by the Muslim minority living in the lands of kufr”. See DABIQ. «Wala and Bara versus American Racism.» *Dabiq. From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions*, Dhul-Qa’dah 1436 (Islamic): 18-21 <https://clarionproject.org/docs/Issue%2011%20-%20From%20the%20battle%20of%20Al-Ahzab%20to%20the%20war%20of%20coalitions.pdf>. (last consulted 20.03.2017).

61 “With the advent of the “sexual revolution” five decades ago, the West was plunged into a downward spiral of sexual deviance and immorality”. See DABIQ. (Rabi’ Al-Akhir de 1436). Islamic State Reports. *Dabiq. From Hypocrisy to Apostasy* (7), págs. 26-45. <https://clarionproject.org/docs/islamic-state-dabiq-magazine-issue-7-from-hypocrisy-to-apostasy.pdf>. (Last consulted 20.03.2017).

62 SAVERIO ANGIÒ, Francesco. «Cambio Estratégico de Daesh: “Queremos París”, desde la lucha contra el enemigo cercano a la lucha contra el enemigo lejano.» (Opinion Document) *Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*, 7 January 2016, [https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjlx7i2m-jSAhXCwBQKHTIvBpEQFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ieee.es%2FGalerias%2Ffichero%2Fdocs\\_opinion%2F2016%2FDIEEEE004-2016\\_CambioEstrategico\\_Daesh\\_Saverio\\_Angio.pdf&usq=AFQjCNHbx7U3OpqPjuCOrc8QtJhdmASToA&sig2=N-DA-HGDBzYjo694FhkZkA](https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjlx7i2m-jSAhXCwBQKHTIvBpEQFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ieee.es%2FGalerias%2Ffichero%2Fdocs_opinion%2F2016%2FDIEEEE004-2016_CambioEstrategico_Daesh_Saverio_Angio.pdf&usq=AFQjCNHbx7U3OpqPjuCOrc8QtJhdmASToA&sig2=N-DA-HGDBzYjo694FhkZkA). (last consulted 20.03.2017).

is it possible to understand the Islamic State's communication ploy. Their barbaric acts in Syria and Iraq have propagandistic consequences *inside* and *outside* these territories.

The use of extreme violence with beheadings and terrorist attacks aims to endorse a message of being the winner, to show growing strength. Their brutality shows bodily force and the ability to strike back and punish their enemies while at the same time imposing their will on the local population. In addition, this propaganda plays down their losses and disguises their weaknesses: the day they lost the Syrian city of Kobane, they released a video of the immolation of the Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasabeh (despite the fact that the video had been recorded beforehand and held back)<sup>63</sup>.

Their enemies – infidels, apostates, heretics, crusaders, etc. – are dehumanised through their ideology and are shown as trophies when they are killed. So, victims of the Islamic State are said to be, for example, homosexuals, apostates or pagans (depriving them of any other type of identification that gives them identity and humanity) and then they are executed, with the result shown down to the very last detail (a defenestrated corpse, a beheaded body or a body destroyed by an explosion, etc.).

This Manichaeian vision can be seen not only in the case of the Islamic State (and its leader)<sup>64</sup> and al-Qaeda, but also in the messages conveyed by jihadists and pro-jihadists who exploit a division between good, the community of believers, the *Ummah* and bad, the community of infidels, the *kuffar*. See how these terms are used by the jihadist Zahra Halaneto dehumanise the “enemy”<sup>65</sup>.

There is also a hyper-militarisation of the message: almost half of the photos that are published in the Islamic State's magazines and the scenes in their videos contain military paraphernalia, weapons or scenes of war. The hero is generally a man who, following a difficult life (for example time in prison or having been brought up in an *infidel* country) and numerous military feats, is killed by a *drone* bringing about his *instant death* and turning him into a martyr for the cause of God. There is thus a mediatic exaltation, not of a warrior but of a *berserker*, he who sought out death and who aspires, above all, to Valhalla<sup>66</sup>.

63 GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, Daveed, Nathaniel BARR, and Bridget MORENG. *The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy*. The Hague (The Netherlands): International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016.

64 GEORGES, Amaryllis. *ISIS Rethoric for the Creation of the Ummah*. Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates): Trends Research & Advisory, 2015.

65 SALTMAN, Erin Marie, and Melanie SMITH. *'Till Martyrdom Do Us Part'*. London (United Kingdom): Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2016.

66 HALVERSON, Jeffrey R., H.L. GOODALL, and Steven R. CORMAN. *Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism*. Hampshire (United Kingdom): Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

The exemplar jihadist is not trying to build a caliphate but is trying to find his final destination, martyrdom, be a witness. This postmodern *shahid*<sup>67</sup> draws from mythical elements and from primitive narratives that transform the soldier into a being who should not be seeking victory in battle, but rather death in battle. Just as the driver committing suicide in the film *Mad Max* proclaimed “witness me” while the others watched on, and once the act of suicide was completed, evoked their God<sup>68</sup>, the *shahid* invokes a declaration of faith (*shahada*) and their observers proclaim that “God is the greatest” once the martyrdom has been performed. In this way, the act of suicide, culturally repudiated and religiously forbidden in Abrahamic religions, is transformed into a glorious act.

“Some Muslims may perhaps regard death in a suicide attack as predestined (maktub) and criticism of it as an unlawful querying of a decree of divine providence”<sup>69</sup>.

“Salafi jihadists believe that suicide operations against “infidels” and “apostates” (i.e., non-Muslim heretics and nominally Muslim “traitors”) represent the ultimate form of devotion to God and the optimal way to wage jihad. They present jihad and self-sacrifice as the antithesis to everything the West stands for—hence the mantra, “The West loves life, while true Muslims love death”<sup>70</sup>.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS

Jihadism is a phenomenon that is far too complex to be considered merely as a form of terrorism. The Islamic State has shown that *jihad* can permeate the essence of a state, of a lone wolf and of a terrorist organisation. It is a term that appeals to very different realities and that nonetheless generates interdependencies and synergies.

Would the murderer in Orlando, Omar Mateen, have committed the attack if the Islamic State hadn't existed? And could the Islamic State exist without the thousands of Europeans who have travelled to fight for it, attracted by its victories and heroic narrative? Would Al-Shabaab exist if Somalia was a state and not a failed state? Would there be young people in Europe prepared to go to Syria if they felt their lives were full of meaning?

Jihadism is not unrelated to other current social processes that affect very different but increasingly interconnected societies. That is why it changes its nature, its discourse and its objectives. While in the past, Palestine was an almost omnipresent element

---

67 Arabic term meaning “witness” or “he who dies deliberately for the cause of God”.

68 See the clip on <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LCMBPjCnOg8>. (Last consulted 20.03.2017).

69 SCHIRRMACHER, Christine. «Suicide, Martyrdom and Jihad in the Koran, Islamic theology and society.» *Institute of Islamic Studies*, 2004: 10-14.

70 MOGHADAM, Assaf. «Motives for Martyrdom.» *International Security* 33, nº 3 (2008): 46-78.

in jihadist rhetoric, now the narrative has fragmented and adapted to new global audiences (more abstract and less concerned by successes and specific causes).

On the postmodern stage – where reality and power have become perhaps more elusive than ever before – a type of violence is consolidating that, while not new, is growing in importance due to its effects and increasing presence. Nihilistic violence, i.e. violence as an ultimate goal, is not a direct product of jihadism but rather the result of a *mainly western* social and psychological process – that even has *western roots*. It is not a question of an instrumental use of religion for political purposes, but rather the use of religion for violent purposes that, in this case, the Islamic State is able to channel in the pursuit of a political project. In other words, extremist entities are channelling and offering an (interesting) escape to this alienated population as opposed to the nation states doing so.

Combatting this hollow violence involves thinking about the narratives and also the circumstances in which they can be developed. The constant call for the *need for a counter-ideology* or to *win on the battlefield of ideas* may lead to forgetting that ideologies are not only fought with counter-ideologies, but that they are also fought by offering ideologies capable of replacing them. And for these ideologies to take shape, a social basis shared by the majority of the population capable of avoiding falling into nihilism needs to be created. Offering meaning and existence is, however, a tough challenge when adopting public policies.

The consequences of the nihilistic process impact on security and defence but have much deeper roots that affect all manner of issues and that, ultimately, are closely related to the level of social cohesion and to the ability to recognise the value of the individuals that make up the social group. The integration, not only of different needs but also of ideologies, reactive identities etc., is necessary. Ultimately, there is a need to recognise diversity in an increasingly uniform and standardised world that is experiencing huge human displacements and in which, however, dialogue has been eliminated as a form of encounter (to be substituted by confrontation).

Many of the necessary integration policies should not be implemented vertically because this makes it more likely to come to a disagreement. Recognition is achieved with time and cohabitation, not imposition and coexistence. Public authorities should be charged with creating a framework for cohabitation through public policies, but it should also be the state institutions who are in charge of implementing them through cohabitation with neighbours, forums for dialogue, discussions, etc., as far as possible.

State police and security forces, as well as the armed forces, should also take initiatives capable of contributing to this cohabitation. This should translate not only into appropriate training for personnel, but also in being able to confront the weight and capacities of the institution regarding the social reality it contributes to and works for. As guardians and guarantors of legal violence, they have a fundamental responsibility in its use.

The same is true of those whose job it is to inform on the reality (journalists and other players in the media and social media). Their responsibility when defining and

making recognisable violence, its sources and its motives is fundamental for an effective understanding of conflicts (a necessary first step to finding a possible resolution to conflicts).

Nonetheless, it is important to define the scope of this process and situate it within a broader context. Not everyone who joins the Islamic State does so in order to exercise ultraviolence. In many cases, it is down to issues of belonging and identity and (lack of) social cohesion, and thus far it is only a limited (but very visible) group that gives outlet to their nihilism through these practices. And yet, the fact that it is precisely the Islamic State reaching a greater number of followers (in the West and the rest of the world)<sup>71</sup> means that the risks associated with their policy of hate management are particularly high.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

ALBATTAR. *Orlando Attack*. s/l, 14 June 2016.

ALEXANDER, Harriet. «Omar Mateen searched for Facebook posts about Orlando shooting while he was carrying it out.» *The Telegraph*, 16 June 2016.

AL-FILISTINI, Abu Qatada. «A Message to the People of Jihad and those who Love Jihad.» 28 April 2014.

AL-MAQDISI, Abu Muhammad. «A call to the Ummah and the Mujahideen.» May 2014.

APARICIO-ORDÁS GONZÁLEZ-GARCÍA, Luís A. «El origen de la violencia en las sociedades humanas: Violencia simbólica, violencia fundadora y violencia

---

71 SETAS VÍLCHEZ, Carlos. «El Estado Islámico es más 'sexy' que Al Qaeda.» *esglobal*, 19 September 2014, [https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiH2YPqm-jSAhXGOxQKHS0EA3gQFggcMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.esglobal.org%2Fel-estado-islamico-es-mas-sexy-que-al-qaeda%2F&usg=AFQjCNGBxTC71wCBvHsQlxgCOUVa\\_DXGDA&sig2=6o5sMeqsed2xrL8cGb\\_nTA](https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiH2YPqm-jSAhXGOxQKHS0EA3gQFggcMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.esglobal.org%2Fel-estado-islamico-es-mas-sexy-que-al-qaeda%2F&usg=AFQjCNGBxTC71wCBvHsQlxgCOUVa_DXGDA&sig2=6o5sMeqsed2xrL8cGb_nTA). (last consulted 20.03.2017). RT. «Crece alarmantemente la captación de yihadistas españoles por parte del Estado Islámico.» *RT*, 29 March 2016, <https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwidpJ6AnOjSAhWKvBQKHazSChoQFggaMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Factualidad.rt.com%2Factualidad%2F203321-yihadistas-espana-siria-estado-islamico&usg=AFQjCNGIuec5cRTswo3tkZ4-6UtFb8tYrA&sig2=E3fuiTeAQYl8zP26vkchvg&bvm=bv.150120842,d.d24>. (last consulted 20.03.2017). GUTIÉRREZ, Óscar. «El Califato no pierde atractivo.» *El País*, 10 August 2015, [https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwi647OJnOjSAhXB1xQKHTniDBoQFggfMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Finternacional.elpais.com%2Finternacional%2F2015%2Fo8%2Fo9%2Factualidad%2F1439132728\\_703778.html&usg=AFQjCNEIoCoWOoqmc6lMtwF9cQY\\_d9hGoCA&sig2=W28cmDvp68dSpbDbiXYMkQ](https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwi647OJnOjSAhXB1xQKHTniDBoQFggfMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Finternacional.elpais.com%2Finternacional%2F2015%2Fo8%2Fo9%2Factualidad%2F1439132728_703778.html&usg=AFQjCNEIoCoWOoqmc6lMtwF9cQY_d9hGoCA&sig2=W28cmDvp68dSpbDbiXYMkQ). (last consulted 20.03.2017).

- política.» (Opinion Document) *Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*, 24 August 2015.
- APARICIO-ORDÁS GONZÁLEZ-GARCÍA,. «La violencia en las sociedades humanas. Una nueva connotación sobre la violencia: El tiranicidio. Desarrollo teórico y justificación.» (Opinion Document) *Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*, 28 August 2014.
- AYUSO, Silvia. «EE UU entra en Siria y mata a un alto mando del Estado Islámico.» *El País*, 17 May 2015.
- AZNAR FERNÁNDEZ-MONTESINOS, Federico. «La violencia y el ser humano.» (Analysis Document) *Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*, 3 June 2015.
- AZNAR FERNÁNDEZ-MONTESINOS. «Reflexiones sobre el empleo de la violencia.» (Analysis Document) *Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*, 10 September 2013.
- AZNAR FERNÁNDEZ-MONTESINOS. «Reflexiones y debates sobre violencia organizada y economía.» (Analysis Document) *Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*, 9 September 2014.
- BENJAMIN, Arlin James. «The relationship between right-wing authoritarianism and attitudes toward violence: Further validation of the attitudes toward violence scale.» *Social Behavior and Personality*, 2006: 923-926.
- CALLIMACHI, Rukmini. «To Mantain Supply of Sex Slaves, ISIS Pushes Birth Control.» *New York Times*, 12 March 2016.
- CALLIMACHI. «ISIS and the Lonely Young American.» *The New York Times*, 27 June 2015.
- CALLIMACHI y RUKMINI. «ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape.» *New York Times*, 13 August 2015.
- COHAN, John Alan. «Necessity, Political Violence and Terrorism.» *Stetson Law Review*, 2006: 903-981.
- DABIQ. «Foreword.» *Dabiq. Al-Qa'idah of Waziristan. A testimony from within*, Rabi' Al-Awwal 1436 (Islamic).
- DABIQ.. «Islamic State Reports.» *Dabiq. From Hypocrisy to Apostasy*, Rabi' Al-Akhir 1436: 26-45.
- DABIQ.. «The Burning of the Murtadd Pilot.» *Dabiq. From Hypocrisy to Apostasy. The extinction of the Grayzone*, Rabi' Al-Akhir 1436: 5-8.
- DABIQ.. «Foreword.» *Dabiq. From the Battle of Al-Ahزاب to the war of coalitions*, Dhul-Qa'dah 1436 (Islamic).
- DABIQ.. «The Evil of Division and Taqlid.» *Dabiq. From the Battle of Al-Ahزاب to the War of Coalitions*, Dhul-Qa'dah 1436 (Islamic): 10-15.

- DABIQ.. «Wala' and Bara' versus American Racism.» *Dabiq. From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions*, Dhul-Q'adah 1436 (Islamic): 18-21.
- DABIQ.. «Foreword.» *Dabiq. The Failed Crusade*, Dhul-Hijjah 1435 (Islamic).
- DELGADO RUIZ, Manuel. «Discurso y Violencia: La 'Fantasmización' Mediática de la Fuerza.» *Trípodos*, 1998: 55-68.
- DRAKE, C.J.M. «The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection.» *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10, nº 2 (1998): 53-85.
- DREYFUS, Hubert L. «Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology and Politics.» In *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, by Charles B. Guignon, 345-372. Cambridge (United Kingdom): Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- EFE. «Dron de Estados Unidos mata a 150 terroristas en Somalia.» *El Comercio*, 7 March 2016.
- EL MUNDO. «Omar Mateen, el asesino de Orlando, buscó en Facebook el atentado mientras disparaba.» *El Mundo*, 17 June 2016.
- ENGEL, Pamela. «Here's the ISIS message the female San Bernardino shooter posted on Facebook during the attack.» *Business Insider*, 17 December 2015.
- EUROPA PRESS. «Omar Mateen escribió a su mujer e hizo búsquedas en Facebook para saber si se hablaba de su ataque.» *ABC*, 17 June 2016.
- FERNANDEZ, Alberto M. *Here to stay and growing: Combating ISIS propaganda network*. Washington D.C. (United States): The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, 2015.
- FISH, M. Steven. «Islam and authoritarianism.» *World Politics*, 2002: 4-37.
- GALTUNG, Johan. «Cultural Violence.» *Journal of Peace Research* 27, nº 3 (1990): 291-305.
- GALTUNG, Johan. «Investigación para la paz y conflictos: Presente y Futuro.» *Todavía en busca de la paz*. Zaragoza: Fundación Seminario de Investigación para la Paz, 2004. 525-542.
- GALTUNG, Johan. «Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.» *Journal of Peace Research*, 1969: 167-191.
- GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, Daveed, Nathaniel Barr, and Bridget Moreng. *The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy*. The Hague (The Netherlands): International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016.
- GAVIÑA, S. «De Bin Laden a Jihadi John, los líderes terroristas abatidos por EE.UU.» *ABC*, 23 May 2016.
- GEORGES, Amaryllis. *ISIS Rhetoric for the Creation of the Ummah*. Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates): Trends Research & Advisory, 2015.

- GLASSFORD, John. *Nihilism and Modernity. Political Response in a Godless Age*. Milton Keynes (United Kingdom): UK Open University, 1998.
- GREENFIELD, Daniel. «Islamic State: If 10 Muslims Rape a Non-Muslim Woman, She Becomes Muslim.» *Frontpage Mag*, 9 October 2015.
- GROB, Stefanie. «Supermodelos.» In *Art Teatral. Cuadernos de minipiezas ilustradas*, by Eduardo (Director) Quiles and Brigitte E. (Coordinator) Jirku, 17-23. Rafaelbunyol, 2007.
- GUNARATNA, Rohan, Arie W. KRUGLANSKI, and Michele GELFAND. «Terrorism as Means to an End: How Political Violence Bestows Significance.» In *Meaning, Mortality and Choice: The Social Psychology of Existential Concerns*, by Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, 203-213. Washington, D.C. (United States): American Psychological Association, 2012.
- GUTIÉRREZ, Óscar. «El Califato no pierde atractivo.» *El País*, 10 August 2015.
- HALVERSON, Jeffrey R., H.L. Goodall, and Steven R. Corman. *Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism*. Hampshire (United Kingdom): Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin. *Nietzsche*. Translated by Juan Luis Vermal. Barcelona: Ediciones Destino S.A., 2000.
- HODOROWSKI, Danny, and Donna Oliver. *The Faces Behind the Flags: Football-Hooliganism's connections to Civil-Society in Moscow*. Des Moines, Iowa (United States): Drake University, 2012.
- JOSCELYN, Thomas. «Officials from Al Nusrah Front, Ahrar al Sham vow to continue fight against Islamic State.» *Long War Journal*, 20 July 2015.
- KRUGLANSKI, Arie W., Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. Bélanger, Anna Sheveland, Malakanthi Hetiarachchi, and Rohan Gunaratna. «The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism.» *Political Psychology*, 2014: 69-93.
- KRUGLANSKI, Arie W., Xiaoyan CHEN, Mark DECHESENE, Shira FISHMAN, and Edward OREHEK. «Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers' Motivation and the Quest for Personal Significance.» *Political Psychology*, 2009: 331-357.
- KRUGLANSKI, Arie W., and E. OREHEK. «The Role of the Quest for Personal Significance in Motivating Terrorism.» In *The Psychology of Social Conflict and Aggression*, by J. Forgas, A. Kruglanski and Williams K. (Eds.), 153-166. New York (United States): Psychology Press, 2011.
- MOGHADAM, Assaf. «Motives for Martyrdom.» *International Security* 33, n° 3 (2008): 46-78.
- NAJI, Abu Bakr. *The Management of Savagery*. Translated by William McCants. Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States): John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies (Harvard University), 2006.

- NANDY, Ashis. *Development and Violence*. Trier (Germany): Zentrum für europäische Studien, 1995.
- WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION. *Changing cultural and social norms that support violence*. Malta: World Health Organisation, 2009.
- PONS SOLER, Marta. «La analogía entre la radicalización islámica y una campaña de marketing exitosa.» *Instituto Español de Estudios estratégicos*, 3 June 2016.
- PUGMIRE, Jerome. «Vicious Russian hooligans at Euro train and prepare to fight.» *The Washington Post*, 13 June 2016.
- QUINTON, Matt. «Russian hooligans are neo-Nazis hooked on violence and crystal meth out to wage war on England fans at Euro 2016 in France.» *The Sun*, 13 June 2016.
- RAINSFORD, Sarah. «Is Russia exporting a new breed of football hooligan?» *BBC*, 15 June 2016.
- RODRIGO Alsina, Miquel. «La Narrativització de la violència.» *Quaderns del CAC*, 2003: 15-21.
- ROY, Olivier. «What is the driving force behind jihadist terrorism?» *Inside Story*, 23 March 2016.
- RT. «Crece alarmantemente la captación de yihadistas españoles por parte del Estado Islámico.» *RT*, 29 March 2016.
- SALTMAN, Erin Marie, and Melanie SMITH. *'Till Martyrdom Do Us Part'*. London (United Kingdom): Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2016.
- SAVERIO ANGIÒ, Francesco. «Cambio Estratégico de Daesh: «Queremos París», desde la lucha contra el enemigo cercano a la lucha contra el enemigo lejano.» (Opinion Document) *Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*, 7 January 2016.
- SCHIRRMACHER, Christine. «Suicide, Martyrdom and Jihad in the Koran, Islamic theology and society.» *Institute of Islamic Studies*, 2004: 10-14.
- SETAS VÍLCHEZ, Carlos. «El Estado Islámico es más 'sexy' que Al Qaeda.» *esglobal*, 19 September 2014.
- THAROOR, Ishaan. «The Islamic State's shocking war on gays.» *The Washington Post*, 13 June 2016.
- THOMSON, Iain D. «Deconstructing the Heroe.» In *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, by Iain D. Thomson, 141-168. Cambridge (United Kingdom): Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- TRILLO, Manuel. «El autor de la masacre de Orlando llamó a la policía en medio del tiroteo.» *ABC*, June 13 2016.

- VV.AA. «Fatwa of Some Jihad Scholars Regarding the Group IS and its Attack on the Mujahideen.» *Al-Minara*, 3 June 2015.
- WILLIAMS, Lauren. *Islamic State propaganda and the mainstream media*. Sydney (Australia): Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2016.
- WINTER, Charlie. *The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy*. London (United Kingdom): Quilliam Foundation, 2015.
- WRIGHT, Austin L. *Terrorism, Ideology and Target Selection*. Princeton, New Jersey (United States): Princeton University (Department of Politics), 2013.
- ZARETSKY, Robert, and David MIKICS. «Is ISIS an army of nihilists? Just the opposite.» *Boston Globe*, 31 August 2014.
- ZELIN, Aaron Y., and Jacob OLIDORT. «The Islamic State's Views on Homosexuality.» *The Washington Institute*, 14 June 2016.

---

*Submitted: October 15, 2016.*

*Accepted: April 19, 2017.*

---