

Josep Baqués Quesada

University of Barcelona (UB). Member of the Study Group on International Security (GESI).

E-mail: jbaquesq@ub.edu

FUNDAMENTAL LESSONS IN THE WORK OF MAHAN: FROM GEOGRAPHICAL DETERMINISM TO THE COMMERCIAL SPIRIT

Abstract

Alfred Mahan is regarded as one of the main exponents of naval strategy in operational and tactical terms. But underlying these considerations, his work contains other important messages about the creation of naval power that should not be eclipsed by them, beginning with the role of geography, which, although not decisive when it comes to selecting major global powers, can nonetheless play a key role by ruling out certain states. However, these precepts vouch for a strategist concerned with issues of a sociological, economic and political nature, which he translates into conditions enabling ultimate military success, thus escaping the temptation of determinism.

Keywords

Grand Strategy; geopolitics; markets; national character; public politics.

To quote this article:

BAQUÉS QUESADA, Josep. «Fundamental lessons in the work of Mahan: from geographical determinism to the commercial spirit». *Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies*. 2018, n.º 11, pp.

FUNDAMENTAL LESSONS IN THE WORK OF MAHAN: FROM GEOGRAPHICAL DETERMINISM TO THE COMMERCIAL SPIRIT

«The art of war is the noblest of all arts»
Adam Smith. *Wealth of Nations* (1776).

«The standard of naval preparedness should take into account not the most probable of dangers but the most formidable»
Alfred Mahan. *Preparedness for naval war* (1897).

INTRODUCTION

In this article we will identify the requirements of sea power, as defined in the work of Alfred Mahan, as well as its efficient use. Our intention is to present an interpretation of the work of Mahan similar to what we have already done in relation to the work of other classic military strategists. Let us for a moment contemplate the work of Clausewitz. As two centuries have passed since the Prussian theorist wrote his most emblematic work, some of his lessons on the art of war have become less relevant, especially those referring to its operational and tactical dimensions. However, his arguments relating to friction or the fog of war are immortal, while his reflections on the concept of the trinity continue to be useful not only in analysing the present with greater assurance, but also in forecasting, both in geopolitical terms and in their implementation in the field of military affairs.

The final goal of this article is none other than to outline such criteria, potentially resilient to considerations of a circumstantial nature, however in this instance mindful of Mahan's own viewpoint and, especially (though not exclusively) deriving from the reading of his seminal work: *The influence of sea power upon history* (1890). In this way we can extract his input by viewing the author from a political science perspective; an approach not aimed at putting a lid on the issue, but rather of opening it up to academic debate.

In terms of framework, we should bear in mind that when Mahan establishes the principles of sea power he is, in reality, establishing the principles of military power and, ultimately, those of global power. His firm conviction of the supremacy of the

1 Firstly a note of clarification regarding terminology: in this analysis we have given preference to the expression «sea power» as being the most widely used expression. However, depending on the context, «maritime power» could also be used, of which «naval power» is a constituent part, and a very relevant one. Because, according to Mahan, the first refers to the combination of maritime interests (including, for example, those relating to fishing, trade or the naval industry), while the second centres on the war marines, as well as their bases and arsenals. In any case, if we are to follow Mahan, both are inextricably linked.

sea does not exclude the need to attend to other dimensions of war. Mahan can be criticised for his disregard for land warfare. The same cannot be said of him in relation to air traffic for purely chronological reasons. But had he written his principal works just a few decades later, it is likely that his attitude would have remained the same. That being the case, the surprise is relative. After all... how much effort do Clausewitz, Jomini and Moltke devote to war at sea or, at least, to the subject of cooperation between armies and their respective navies?

The truth is that Mahan's sensitivity to the other dimensions of war and to the tasks of his protagonists is relatively low. But in no case is it zero. It could hardly be so when what he is calling for is the control of maritime routes, thinking —it could not be otherwise— of the provision of supplies to positions (civil or military) on the mainland, as well as denying these to the enemy. Notwithstanding which, it is fair to say that Mahan claims the strategic priority of the sea, so that it becomes a necessary condition (although not enough, one must underline) to underpin the success of any global policy.

The explanation of the pre-eminence of maritime matters in his work, as a precondition for military power and, ultimately, of global power, is that, in his own words, the sea is the «cheaper and easier» means of transport far surpassing overland transport: «land carriage, always restricted and therefore always slow, toils enviously but hopelessly behind, vainly seeking to replace and supplant the royal highway of nature's own making». Mahan raises the question of the supremacy of the sea while acknowledging the specific problems of the oceans of his time (he mentions piracy... which still generates problems in our present-day world) as well as the improvements —of which he takes good note— in roads and railways.⁵ However, he insists: most of the world's transport is carried by sea, which, he adds, is a constant, as if to indicate a circumstance that will not change with the passage of time.

With data from United Nations agencies it can be shown that this first affirmation -which constitutes a kind of conceptual framework for all other similar statements dealt with in this article- remains unchanged to this day. Indeed, in 2012, around 80

2 This is exemplified in his reflections on the relationship between admirals -and generals too- and political power, and the criticism levelled at admirals for not sufficiently dominating terrestrial warfare, although he also argues the opposite (MAHAN, Alfred. *La influencia del poder naval en la historia*. Madrid: Ministry of Defence, 2007[1890], pp. 165 and 303), thus constituting an explicit plea in favour of moving towards joint operations, an argument very interesting for its time. Not only that, his work contains comments favouring some of the first (scarce) instances of amphibious war, such as the British assault on Quebec, in 1760.

3 HOBSON, Rolf. *Imperialism at Sea*. Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2002, p. 158.

4 MAHAN, Alfred. *The Interest of America in Sea Power*. National University of Colombia, 1897, p. 31.

5 MAHAN, Alfred. *Idem*, p. 95. The arrival of the railway and the improvement of surfaces on traditional routes were of significant importance in understanding the rise of continental geopolitics especially in the writings of Halford Mackinder, an almost contemporary of Mahan, whose key text dates from 1904.

% of world transport, measured in volume of merchandise, was transported by sea, which was equivalent to more than 70 % of its value.⁶ Even more striking is the fact that in 2014 these percentages had increased slightly, approaching 85 % and 75 %, respectively, to which have contributed the appearance of ship-owners in a greater number of states, as well as the consolidation of new markets in developing countries, despite the ongoing economic crisis⁷. This being the case in both past and present, things seem clear. In the words of one expert on the issue: «the paralysis of trade will force the affected party to ask for peace (...) in the same way, wars are lost if the strangulation of one's own country cannot be prevented»⁸.

However, the subsequent task (of creating that sea power) is huge, and requires state policies carefully designed to that end. It is in this particular arena that we witness the author's most significant contributions. In fact, a rebuttable presumption of the opinion allegedly maintained by Alfred Mahan has to do with the so-called geographical determinism of those capabilities.

Mahan suggests that the geographical position of countries is decisive in achieving an elevated global political status. Sometimes one has the feeling that he ranks countries in relation to that criterion alone. However, the hypothesis of this article is quite different: the advantages derived from geography —or its drawbacks— are not the determinants of sea power (even if they are conditioning factors). In that sense, we will demonstrate how, more than that, Mahan is at pains to focus attention on the other types of considerations that can be availed of in order to take advantage of these premises. Following the same logic, shirking such responsibilities (or their mismanagement) can (usually) ruin the benefits deriving from their geography. That is essentially the main message that the American naval historian wants to get across. This article will define the premises of this sea power -including the creation of sea power- within the framework of what some have defined as the grand naval strategy (Sumida, 1997: 6)⁹.

As a disciplinary mechanism, geographical determinism and commercial spirit (or «tendency to trade») operate here as explanatory —or independent— variables of sea power while the items contributed by Alfred Mahan himself operate as control variables, providing structure to the research. The sections into which the article is divided reflect

6 UNCTAD. *Maritime Transport*. United Nations conference on trade and development. New York, 2012, p. XIII.

7 UNCTAD. *Maritime Transport*. United Nations conference on trade and development. New York, 2014, pp. XI and 9. It is quite striking that one of the areas displaying the most marked increase between 2012 and 2014 was what was termed «South-South» trade in the report (UNCTAD, 2014. *Idem*, p. 20), with an increase of 6 % in this time frame.

8 TERZAGO, Jorge. «Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914). His contribution as historian, strategist, and geopolitician», *Revista de Marina-Revismar*, n.º 4, Viña del Mar, 2006, p. 54.

9 SUMIDA, Jon Tetsuro. *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command. The Classic works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997, p. 6.

this logic. Thus, in the following section (2) we will analyse the geographical constraints effectively adduced by Mahan, as well as their relevance (past and present). Section (3) will expand on the arguments tending to underpin the role of the various actors in the task of implementing and/or maintaining sea power. Thus, reference will be made successively to demographic and sociological considerations (3.1); to the national character and the mentality of the political elite (3.2) as well as to the script that should guide decision-making at the highest level (3.3). To conclude (4), an overall assessment will be made, an all-embracing conceptual summary, extrapolating the main points from the analysis of each section based on these independent variables that will enable us to visualise in a few short paragraphs the authentic hard core of the Mahan's geopolitical contribution.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

Mahan contends that some states are better equipped than others for exerting their influence at sea. The first explanation is always geographical. Both the location of each state, as well as its orography, and even the extension of its seaboard are relevant factors, specifically treated by the historian in two sections of his work. We have grouped them together in this section, with a view to extrapolating their most relevant contributions rather than entering into a mere description of each item.

In the first instance, Mahan indicates that the most privileged geopolitical position is that of large islands or archipelagos that constitute a sole state. In reaching this diagnosis, with its empirical pretensions, the visualisation of the success of the British Empire—especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—is useful.

But Mahan's reflections on the impact of geographical factors are intended to be permanent, and thus go beyond this space-time interval. Because for an island state (or archipelago), the kind of servitude that consists in having to monitor one or (probably) several land borders, is automatically reversed. Insularity also generates certain advantages with regard to defence: attack is rendered more difficult by sea. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of attempts to invade the British Isles failed. Examples subsequent to Mahan's narrative are also citable, reinforcing his thesis. Let us recall the main reason given to justify the launch of the atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in 1945¹⁰. The possibilities these islands can avail of in terms of deployment of forces are not insignificant either... the states whose territory they form part of have a 360 ° circumference. In the case of Britain, Mahan's thesis is as simple as it is compelling because, thanks to its location, «in a strategic sense, the position of Great Britain was central, although geographically peripheral»¹¹.

¹⁰ It was linked to the huge number of losses calculated by the US in the case of invading the archipelago by sea... and all this despite the fact that at the outset of the summer of 1945 Japan was virtually defeated.

¹¹ TERZAGO, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

The current usefulness of Mahan (or of this first section of his contention) is significant, precisely because it contributes to reinforcing theories that may otherwise appear somewhat weak. The case of Immanuel Wallerstein's neo-structuralism is striking. Here is an author who is convinced —although for other reasons— of Japan's potential¹² to replace the US as world hegemon¹³. His theory is internally coherent and contains considerable explanatory potential on the functioning of the world capitalist system, its crises and its leadership changes. However, over the years, his high valuation of Japan has impacted negatively on the body of his work, given the prolonged *impasse* of the Japanese economy. That being said, Mahan's arguments could give new impetus to those of Wallerstein¹⁴, despite being separated by almost a century and although ideologically both authors would be at polar opposites¹⁵. But that is precisely the merit of geopolitics, since economic crises come and go, while Japan's situation on the map is and always will be the same¹⁶. A very similar situation, of course, to that of the

12 Mahan singles out Japan in positive terms in spite of a professed scepticism with regard to other Asian states. That being said, he pointed out that Japan apart from its undeniable geographical potential, had other additional virtues, relating to its capacity for economic modernisation. (DENNETT, Tyler. «Mahan's "The Problem of Asia"», *Foreign Affairs*, 1935, Vol. 13, p. 466). It is important not to forget this with a view to the final assessment of the two independent variables. Furthermore, Mahan feared that the Hawaiian crisis of 1893 (long before Pearl Harbour) would be used by Japan to make demands over these islands (ASADA, Sadao. *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012).

13 WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel. *Geopolitics and Geoculture. Essays on the Changing World System*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 36ff.

14 According to Wallerstein, the only three powers that would have achieved the status of hegemon in the historical capitalist period were Holland, the United Kingdom and the United States: all of them maritime powers. In turn, in the phase prior to capitalism (the mercantilist era) the great power was Spain. Our Mediterranean and Atlantic outlook was decisive in this. To become familiar with the concept of hegemony managed by this author, see WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel. *The Politics of the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984: pp. 37-46.

15 Brzezinski and Mearsheimer also position Japan in the global geopolitical scenario, although with more reservations, due to the rise of China, which complicates Japan's overland projection of power, or at least the way it did until 1945 (MEARSHEIMER, John. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. London/ New York: Norton C. 2001: p. 396-397). Even so, Mearsheimer suggests that Japanese rearmament is a likely outcome if the US relaxes its presence in the area. For his part, Brzezinski argues that nowadays Japan is not a «geostrategic player» (BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew. *El gran tablero mundial*. Barcelona: Paidós, 1998, p. 53) although he adds that it has an «evident potential» to achieve «global influence», as long as it refrains from attempting to attain this via Asian «regional power» (*Idem*, p. 196). The striking thing about his argument is that this was the British strategy in its golden years, availing of its insularity, as well as the control of commercial routes, but without insisting on controlling continental Europe (*idem*, p. 29). Quite a Mahanian proposition.

16 Here I have adopted the thesis -criticism- put forward by Vice Admiral Albert that Mahan perhaps failed to analyse the influence of history on naval power (ALBERT, Julio. «Los olvidos de Mahan», *Cuadernos de Pensamiento Naval*, n.º 20, 2016, p. 103). Unquestionably. History and its circumstances explain the reasons why geographical advantages do not always become reality. But, in addressing that very issue, it may be interesting to combine the contents of this second section with those of the third section of this analysis and, in general, to weigh up the two variables that contribute to it.

British Empire at the time of running for world hegemony that it would end up finally capturing following the defeat of Napoleon; similarities between the two states not only in terms of size and distance from the coast, but also in the type of relations they maintained with their continental neighbours¹⁷.

The second best geographical position is attributed to continental states with extensive outlets to the sea, especially if they converge in different seas and especially if they have direct access to the open sea. In this case, the potential of Spain, France or the US itself is remarkable, and historically this has been borne out. From this (geographical) perspective, it should not be otherwise. At the time of writing, Mahan staunchly supports the Panama Canal (not yet in service) as well as its control by the US¹⁸, as the Canal was to facilitate the US Atlantic and Pacific fleets, turning his country into «almost» an island¹⁹. This is interesting for operational purposes, at times for the benefit of the navy, at others as a mechanism for controlling maritime traffic that henceforth would have strong incentives for using this new route.

Mahan's dream went further: it consisted in the Caribbean ceasing to be a terminus for international trade to become one of the great highways of the world of much higher commercial volume²⁰. It is in this context that Mahan elaborates the concept of *permanent base*, which he attributes to the USA in America and the United Kingdom in Europe, due to the proximity of their main ports and arsenals to the busiest communications hubs of the time. But he calls on the US to make a further effort with a view to bringing some critical infrastructures closer to the Caribbean gateway. For similar reasons, the Iberian Peninsula was a nightmare for France (making it difficult to connect its Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets) while British control of the Isthmus of Gibraltar was a hindrance for us in Spain.

Of course, Mahan is not satisfied with making the annotations indicated in terms of the location on the map of the aspiring power states. Their orography is also relevant. Mahan's analysis in this respect is very detailed. Because the existence or not of good natural shelters or good estuaries is highly relevant. The former contributes to the establishment of these *permanent bases*; their absence dilutes the expectations mentioned above.

17 After all, the United Kingdom's relationship with France, Spain or Holland in the eighteenth century was not much better —and sometimes even worse— than Japan's current relationship with China, Russia and North Korea. In addition, both the United Kingdom of the past and the Japan of today lack raw materials and energy sources essential for their development. However, far from being a problem, this is typically an incentive to increase the required naval power and guarantee the security of supply lines.

18 MAHAN, 2007, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-99 y p. 101.

19 GONZÁLEZ, Andrés, and AZNAR, Federico. «Mahan y la Geopolítica». *Geopolítica(s). Revista de estudios sobre espacio y poder*. Vol. 4, n.º 2, 2013, p. 346.

20 CROWL, P. A. «Alfred Talyer Mahan: el historiador naval», in PARET, Peter (ed). *Creadores de la estrategia moderna*. Madrid: Ministry of Defence, 1991, pp. 479-481.

This, however, is not the main lesson to be deduced from his writings. Mahan is a dialectical author and this is immediately apparent. For example, having important cities at the mouths of navigable rivers, with well-endowed ports, is an enormous advantage from a geostrategic point of view. Cases such as London, Lisbon or New York (on the Thames, the Tagus²¹ and the Hudson, respectively) are emblematic. One cannot refrain from looking back with longing at the golden age of Seville, on the Guadalquivir. Nevertheless, he warns us that where a power's strongest point is located, therein also lies its weakest point, in the sense that it constitutes an object of seduction for the adversary: a useful piece of information for other areas of war, although the specific examples he refers to are naval.

To cite but one example: the two-week incursion of the Dutch navy on the Thames, in 1667, which caused considerable mayhem and constituted a warning to the British. Accordingly, Mahan invites military planners to shield such vantage points, to ensure against them being turned into disadvantages. The lesson to be learnt from Mahan is meaningful: we must assume that where our greatest advantage lies will also be our greatest vulnerability²².

In this vein, Mahan alludes to the tasks that remain to be carried out by the US before it is in a position to become a true global power. Geography is favourable, but he also suggests that it is not everything. Hence his lament, in August 1890, when he affirms that «the United States is woefully unready, not only in fact but in purpose, to assert in the Caribbean and Central America a weight of influence proportioned to the extent of her interests»²³. And he ratifies that statement at a later date (July 1894) when he claims «The difficulty is that the United States, as a nation, does not realize or admit as yet that it has any strong interest in the sea», given the erroneous belief—he adds—that «our ambitions should be limited by the three seas that wash our eastern, western, and southern coasts»²⁴.

In view of what we have seen so far, and despite these last references, which serve as a bridge to the next section of this article, it cannot be said that Mahan has abandoned the temptation of determinism. States that are not in either of the two privileged situations described above would be left out of the fight for global power or, at least, would have to bear a heavy burden in geographical terms. However, as we will see in the following sections, having certain geographic advantages is not everything. It

21 The Tagus is navigable by boats and shallow-draft barges in many of its sections. But that navigability could have been significantly increased if any of the projects long since in existence, at least since the era of Philip II, had been executed. As a general criterion, the non-exploitation of these possibilities is questioned by Mahan.

22 This concern is recurrent in other texts by the same author, as can be seen in his reflections on the defence of ports in MAHAN, 1897, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

23 MAHAN, Alfred. *The Interest of America in Sea Power*. Colombia National University, 1897, p. 14.

24 *Idem*, p. 62. Note that Mahan criticises the fact that seas and oceans are conceived as frontiers instead of being regarded as global motorways.

is still possible that a geographically well-positioned state could squander its legacy; while states considerably less well-favoured geographically, could perhaps overcome their difficulties and get the better of their situation with the implementation of the appropriate policies.

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS OF NAVAL POWER

The demography... and the sociology of naval power

The population element does not go unnoticed by our author. The birth rate and urban growth are always significant for geopolitical purposes. But Mahan also attaches great importance to the social outlook. He sees clear how the demographic variable maximizes its analytical usefulness if it addresses the uses and customs of the people concerned. In other words, the number of inhabitants is not enough information when it comes to assessing what some contemporary authors refer to as the «potential power»²⁵ of a state (in the same way that, as we have seen, the mere number of kilometres of seaboard is not sufficient as a criterion to make the geopolitical aspirations of a state plausible). In the opinion of this US naval school professor, we must pay attention to the sensitivity of these people towards the sea, something that is usually related to the activities they carry out on a daily basis.

The history of the Netherlands provides a good example. In its moment of splendour (mid-seventeenth century) a substantial part of its population made a living from fishing or commercial trade. That does not mean they were all on board ships. Some were, while others earned their livelihood from logistical tasks —many of them port-based— or commercial functions associated with these main activities. Data at the time was not as reliable as nowadays, but Mahan estimates that one fifth of the active population lived off fishing (herrings, in particular) while the same could be said of maritime transport, with roughly 10,000 vessels in service and about 170,000 people working on board, in addition to another 260,000 employed in related tasks, but on the mainland²⁶. And one might also add those who worked overseas for the *Company of the Indies*, either enlisted on their ships, or at their terminals (Ceylon, Cape Town or New Amsterdam —the present-day New York— among many others) in commercial activities or security.

According to the American historian, a society that takes on board these standards as a matter of course is especially well prepared to overcome greater challenges in the military and political field. If necessary, its population can be readily embarked on

25 Nowadays, John Mearsheimer likes to use this concept, as a useful indicator to express both the future perspectives of each power as well as the foundation upon which their military capacity can be based.

26 MAHAN, Alfred. 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

ships (also on warships) as well as easily employable in ports or shipyards, and even in other tasks related to the naval, civil or military industry, today we would speak in terms of adequate social capital for R&D²⁷. A society with these credentials, aware of the importance of ensuring these activities, these trade flows with their routes, and these jobs, is a society that will ask the state to make the relevant (including budgetary) efforts to equip itself with a powerful navy. On the other hand, a society that turns its back to the sea will see how such an initiative will languish and fade away. In such instances, although the state may reinforce other dimensions of the war by proposing zero-sum games (a very frequent question everywhere), it will have irreversibly short-circuited the mechanisms that in other circumstances would allow it to maintain the medium and long-term war effort (also in the interest of the army's ground forces).

National character

Under the heading «national character» Alfred Mahan alludes to a political project that includes a mental willingness on the part of its rulers. But he raises it in this way, alluding to the concept of national character, because he is aware that there can be no split between the people and elites. So we have here his particular version of the Clausewitz trinity. As we will see, this synergy (or its absence) is also transferred to the military institution²⁸. Probably, this is the Gordian knot of his argument. Because Mahan understands that you can only build and sustain a long-term naval power when squarely backed by a commercial mentality. The word commercial is in this case capitalist (although it is not the word used for it) and is opposed to mercantilist²⁹. In terms of concepts, it is feasible to begin the task of building a strong economic power based on other standards (if Mahan were alive, he would also allude in a critical sense—and, if possible, with greater vehemence—to what we call «real socialism»). The problem is that these alternatives are evanescent. This can be explained by the fact that trade is the basis of the need to develop an armed wing on the high seas, but also the stimulus that energises the economy and reproduces in the long term the conditions to sustain that effort. Without a business model, the momentum to maintain that armed wing would be much weaker.

Mahan sets forth his most compelling arguments: the states which developed economic models that we would today define as resource-based were neglecting

27 PARKER, Ronald D. *Mahan for the Twenty First Century*. Quantico: Marine Corps University, 2003, p. 19. Parker points out that, despite the current demographic weakness of the US with respect to China or India, the sociological aspects would have been taken care of in the last decades (much more than they were during the lifetime of Mahan, who always wanted further progress on this issue), thus palliating the population differential (*idem*: 20 y 30).

28 See, *infra* (at the end of the same heading) the case of France, a good example of *a sensu contrario*.

29 BRADFORD, James C. *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880-1930*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013, p. 57.

the entrepreneurial spirit and with it some of its incipient manufactures. Instead, encouraging private investment in emerging markets they consolidated growth dynamics³⁰ that, in the end, allowed them to expand their maritime presence to consolidate as great military powers and even as hegemon³¹. In the first group would be Spain and Portugal; in the second, Holland and the United Kingdom³². One might add that he places France between those two. It has been rightfully commented, that Mahan's analysis leaves out the period of Spanish naval supremacy³³. But that should not prevent one from taking on board part of the criticism that is reasonable and useful in understanding the inherent defects of the period covered by his research. Be that as it may, in Mahan's eyes the explanatory variable of stagnation or political and military success lies, ultimately, in the approach that each society (and each state, guided by its elite) assigns to the main lines of its economic expansion.

In that sense, while procuring precious metals was a stimulus for all the great powers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (including the Anglo-Saxons) the problem lay perhaps in the relative weight of these extractions in their respective economies, as well as in their systemic impact on the most productive activities, such as emerging industries. The penalties that Mahan detects ultimately affect the states that are more concerned with financial matters than encouraging the creation of wealth.

In America, the Spanish presence proved useful in furthering progress in agriculture, with the introduction of improvements such as hoes, wheeled vehicles or winter cereals—which allowed for two crops a year—as well as domestic animals. The resulting savings in terms of manpower permitted an increase in the mining work force³⁴. However, the priority given to bringing back precious metals from the Americas brought about strong inflationary trends in several European countries, with particular relevance for the Iberian Peninsula³⁵. This weakened the ability of our manufactures to compete with those of other countries (especially France, England and Flanders)³⁶.

30 HAWA, Samy. «Influencia del Almirante Mahan en la Marina del Japón durante la II Guerra Mundial», in *Revista de Marina-Revismar*, n.º 4, Viña del Mar, 2012, p. 358.

31 All this has a residue that connects Mahan sensitivities to other present-day arguments, such as those of Acemoglu and Robinson who, on that basis further develop claims that are merely implicit in Mahan's case, such as legal security and respect for the rule of law. Notwithstanding, the criticism elaborated by Mahan is perfectly compatible with that of these professors.

32 PARKER, Ronald, 2003, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

33 ALBERT, Julio, 2016, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

34 KALMANOVITZ, Salomón. *Nueva Historia Económica de Colombia*, 2010, pp. 42 and 44, Bogotá & Madrid, Taurus.

35 PIEPER, Renate. «Las repercusiones de los metales preciosos americanos en Europa, siglos XVI-XVIII», in HAUSBERGER, Berndt, and IBARRA, Antonio (coord). *Oro y plata en los inicios de la economía global: de las minas a la moneda*, 2014, pp. 273-298. México DF: Colegio de México.

36 GARCÍA SANZ, Ángel. «Auge y decadencia en España en los siglos XVI y XVII», in *Revista de Historia Económica*, n.º 1, p. 19.

This method of accumulating wealth caused a decline in productive savings for (re) investment, to the benefit of mere hoarding —complemented by the acquisition of land that often remained barren—³⁷.

Therefore, throughout the seventeenth century, things changed for the worse for the extractive economies: there were hardly any exports; the volume of imports of processed products from powers competing for European³⁸ and, in practice, global domination, increased³⁹; these deficits were financed with more precious metals, wherever possible⁴⁰; state finances were in decline due to the lack of a solid tax base; investment in transport infrastructure decreased; in particular, work at the ports slowed down (even in Bilbao and Seville); there were chronic insufficiencies in the construction of galleys while the dockyards entered a period of crisis (including the Catalan shipyards)⁴¹.

While these dynamics were escalating in the Iberian nations, their competitors were strengthening their first multinationals, in the form of the Companies of the Indies, and were preparing to fill the gap left by the crisis-hit Spanish-Portuguese manufactures. Because of this, they also specialised in maritime transport, so that their merchants reached a sort of natural oligopoly, based on the excellent quality-price ratio of their ports. Thus, it was not unusual to observe Dutch ships transporting the gold and silver extracted from the present territories of Peru and Bolivia to Europe;

37 CUENCA, José Manuel. *Historia de España (2 Vols)*. Barcelona: Danae, 1973, Vol. II, p. 19.

38 GONZÁLEZ ENCISO, Agustín. *Historia Económica de España*, 2013, p. 114, Barcelona, Ariel.

39 To this one can add the purchase of textiles and ceramics from China and, to a lesser extent, from India, since the 16th century. Precious metals from the America's whetted appetites and opened up possibilities to the detriment of the growth of the local economy and, decades later, helped to fuel protectionist dynamics, as well as to force belated and inefficient import substitution policies. (PIEPER, 2014, *op.cit.*).

40 Not all American gold and silver came to Spain. A portion had to be earmarked for the defence of the overseas territories, either against the English or Dutch pirates, while another portion ended up financing smuggling activities with the possessions that those two States had in the Caribbean. (vid. KALMANOVITZ, *op. cit.*, p. 49).

41 In Spain, some products held up well despite everything, such as aluminium (Almadén), iron (Vizcaya) and certain dyes (in Ciudad Real and Ocaña), as well as exports to America of wine, olive oil and dried fruits. But the wool industry collapsed, thus necessitating the import of cloth from Flanders and France. Paper also came from France and hardware from Flanders. There were even imports of wheat and fish (the latter from Brittany). Certain emblematic products from America (such as dyes) were re-exported to those same European countries, where demand was stronger with a greater spending capacity. In these conditions, previous works have highlighted surprising conclusions. For example, based on previous research by Kamen, Morineau and Everaert, Oliva Melgar points out that at the end of the seventeenth century the value of Spanish industrial merchandise exported to America along the Indies Route hardly exceeded 5 % of the total. On the other hand, French exports were over 36 %, while British goods were close to 14 %, with Dutch at 11 % and Flemish 6 %. (vid. OLIVA MELGAR, José M.^a. *El monopolio de Indias en el siglo XVII y la economía andaluza*. Ediciones Universidad de Huelva, 2004, p. 133).

or British ships doing the same with metals of Brazilian origin. That enterprise was to constitute the premise of the constant reinforcement of their navies. The final result of all this was a transfer of income between powers, a circumstance that some historians describe in a clear, respectful manner⁴², but Mahan, for his part, in a somewhat more sarcastic manner⁴³.

In his opinion, France was at an intermediate point between Iberian logic, more aligned with extractive tendencies, and the bourgeois free-market drive, typical of the Anglo-Saxon world. Louis XIV, to cite one example, freed his nobility of all reproach if involved in investing in business concerns (something frowned upon in the Old Regime). This included channelling their investments towards the shipping companies. But he continued to object to their involvement in retail trade, to avoid jeopardising their aristocratic status. So France only partially enjoyed the kind of attributes that can make a nation great, which, while it did not prevent it from competing with the United Kingdom for dominance of the seas, was not sufficient to bring about victory in that endeavour⁴⁴.

All this does not necessarily infer a causal relationship between the struggle for markets and the beginning of the war, although some of Mahan's critics have tried to focus it in this way⁴⁵, even suggesting that Mahan's geopolitics were indeed deterministic, not from a geographical but from an economic perspective⁴⁶. In fact, what Mahan argues is that, regardless of the causes of wars (economic, dynastic, religious, ideological or, what is very likely, a combination of these) only those achieving supremacy at sea will

42 CUENCA, José Manuel, 1973. Cuenca underlines that, throughout the seventeenth century, transactions between Spain and the other European powers «progressively transformed into a one-way current that the Spanish monarchy paid off with white metal from America» (*idem*: II, 20)), which did nothing but provide feedback to the problem of an obsolete model.

43 He contends that the English ended up «buying the vineyards of Oporto with Brazilian gold» (MAHAN, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 117), thanks to the revenue earned through its transport from America to the Old Continent.

44 Mahan is critical of France's continental mentality and its obsession with focusing on central Europe, which he views as having been detrimental to its naval potential. It is an opinion accepted even by authors who are critical of Mahan (see Kennedy, 1988: pp. 88-90). However, it also connects entrepreneurship—including the associated risk-taking—with the military naval mind-set. That is to say, he considers that French faintheartedness when competing in the major markets suggested a parallel timidity when confronting risks on the high seas, especially when this meant being on the look-out for a combat. In justifying his claim, he quotes the observations of a French officer, Julien de la Gravière, according to whom... «our squadrons frequently left our port (...) with the intention of avoiding encounters with the enemy; if they stumbled upon them, this was already considered a stroke of bad luck, and in this vein our ships entered into combat, submitting to the wishes of the adversary, instead of forcing ours upon theirs». (MAHAN, *op. cit.*, 2007, p. 141).

45 KENNEDY, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. Unwin Hyman Ltd, London: Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1988, pp. 97-98; HOBSON, Rolf. *Imperialism at Sea*. Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2002, p. 160.

46 ASADA, Sadao. *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012.

be in a position to achieve victory. And he adds that sea control is derived from other aspects, neither military, nor self-induced by geography.

Nevertheless, Mahan has some words of reproach for societies that, having gone so far down the road of promoting commercialism, tend to forget about militarism. This, in his opinion, was not the case with Britain. However, with the exception of certain notable examples of individual heroism, in the case of the Dutch, the «commercial aristocracy» that led the country had considerable difficulty in taking on the challenges involved in the creation of a great power⁴⁷. Therefore, for the political elite, society and soldiers to walk side by side, it is essential to feed back into military virtues, as it is for the political elite to share this logic. It is a debate deeply rooted in that Enlightenment that so influenced Mahan's homeland since its birth as a state. Resonating there are the voices of Montesquieu⁴⁸ and Rousseau, as endorsers of the eighteenth-century version of the republican *virtú res-publicana* —compatible, of course, with parliamentary monarchies— when they contrast the Athenian and the Spartan model⁴⁹, opting for the latter, whose prescient symbol is the citizen-soldier, but also the communion of the habits and customs of society as a whole.

Once again, Mahan's dialectic is clear: without a commercial society and without the corresponding leadership of the political elite with the same objective, it is not possible to constitute an authentic naval power and, therefore, a military power worthy of that name. However, the *ethos* of the commercial elite generates externalities that must be assimilated and mitigated in order for the project to reach a successful conclusion...

Political decision-making

Mahan occasionally refers to «class of government»⁵⁰ to indicate issues that in our days could easily be defined as drawing up public policies or even as decision-making —especially in delicate situations— which is, at the same time, another type of public

47 MAHAN, 2007, *op. cit.*, pp. 156 y 165.

48 MONTESQUIEU, Barón de. *El Espíritu de las leyes*. Madrid: Tecnos, 1985[1735] p. 20. The French author is very critical of the bad influence exerted by love of luxury and ostentation.

49 ROUSSEAU, Jean-Jacques. *El Contrato Social*. Barcelona: Altaya, Barcelona, 1988 [1762]. He declares, setting forth his love of Spartan virtues... «If Sparta and Rome have perished, what state can hope to last forever?» (*Idem*: p. 87). For an extension of Rousseau's approach to Sparta, see FORNIS, César. «Sparta as model and counter-model in the Enlightenment», in SANCHÓ, Laura (coord.). *Antiquity as a paradigm. Mirages, myths and silences*. Zaragoza: Pressas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, 2015, where it is indicated that «with Jean-Jacques Rousseau (...) Sparta is consolidated in modern thought as an immutable model of a virtuous and incorruptible society» (*idem*: p. 36). For his part, Mahan vindicates militarism as necessary for the protection of trade (MAHAN, 1897, *op. cit.*, p. 64).

50 MAHAN, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

policy. Nations that seek to obtain this status of great power, especially if it includes hegemonic claims, must act accordingly. There are no shortcuts. But that means having a vision of the future, understood as a state policy⁵¹, in addition to avoiding quite a few pitfalls.

Again, his praise is directed to certain master lines that governed the construction of the British Empire. For example, the way in which they handled the question of Gibraltar in the Utrecht Treaty (no less than the way in which they successfully disputed New York with the Dutch or Ceylon, or the French in Canada); support for their Company of the Indies, in competition with the Dutch and to the detriment of the Belgian and Danish attempts to do the same; or the deployment of the Royal Navy, in virtually all latitudes, to lend credibility to a project of such magnitude... all of which implied weaving an impressive network of naval bases. In terms of concepts, this is not strictly speaking geographical determinism either, since it involves political decision-making and establishing priorities, far beyond the initial geographical tyranny inferable from the initial location of each power with global aspirations⁵².

They are all policies that deserve Mahan's applause, although they promote a race between powers that is not without risk⁵³. The key lies in expanding the control of the main routes of passage, straits, estuaries and naval stations (especially at the expense of a direct competitor) even when that means neglecting a terrestrial front⁵⁴.

Some authors indicate that with his theory, Mahan defends colonialism⁵⁵. Mahan was aware that supremacy at sea was achieved in this way in the past. But we know that what Mahan's model demands is achieving the facilities to establish naval bases

51 LÓPEZ, José Ignacio. «Una visión de futuro: la geopolítica de Alfred Mahan», *Revista Universidad Eafit*, Vol. 29, n.º 91, Medellín, 1993, p. 74.

52 We recall the phrase that Mahan attributes to Napoleon, commenting on the British bid to control the naval base of Valletta: «I would have preferred to see the English on the hills of Montmartre than in Malta» (MAHAN, Alfred. 1897, *op. cit.*, p. 24).

53 TERZAGO, Jorge. 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

54 One of the main (and recurrent) criticisms launched by Mahan against Louis XIV has to do with the Sun King's poor management in the English Revolution of 1688 in not impeding the arrival of the Protestant William of Orange with his fleet, and, even worse, his failure to disembark in Ireland in support of the Catholic James II, who was finally defeated (MAHAN, *op.cit.*, 2007, pp. 230-231). Later on, he demonstrates how the French navy went into decline at the end of the seventeenth century, which would be followed by the decline of France as such, suffering an «exhaustion» caused by «the excessive expenses of the continental war» (*idem*: p. 243). Something similar arises in the case of Spain, given the enormous wear and tear that meant keeping the «Spanish road» open to the Netherlands (*idem*, p. 109). In general, Mahan criticises the Spanish policy of tolerating its Empire having been left without a navy adapted to its needs...

55 HICKEN, Victor. *U.S. History. People Who Helped Make the Republic Great. 1620-Present*. Carson-Dellosa Publishing Co, 2006, p. 78; y ADAMS, John A. *If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War*. Indiana University Press, 2008, p. 3.

and logistical facilities overseas. Not (necessarily) more than that⁶. To this effect, it is useful to remember that Mahan distinguished between colonies and «dependencies», rejecting the first option outright every time he looked to the future of the United States. In fact, Mahan felt uncomfortable when referring to the persistence of the old colonies⁷. On the other hand, the notion of «dependence» was better suited to the new reality *in fieri* that he was already predicting. Something similar to what China has been achieving over the last two decades with its rental of docks and the establishment of bases, but also along the lines of what the US did in the past when the traditional empires were collapsing. So the arrival of raw materials and energy sources could be achieved through trade agreements or, simply, by displaying a position of advantage in order to benefit from market rules.

It is striking that one of his most glowing praises is addressed to a seventeenth century English law, the *Navigation Act*. It merits our attention, I say, because we have seen that Mahan is, above all, a defender of private initiative and the free market, while that law had clearly protectionist overtones. Perhaps for this reason, some of his analysts have argued that Mahan hardly started out as an «agnostic» in the free market debate, although he admits that he finally embraced the liberal cause⁸. What was really happening?

The *Navigation Act* was an attempt by London to curb Dutch momentum in sea transport. The Dutch offered the cheapest ports, so that their merchant ships were the most requested by third parties. In the seventeenth century, one of the nations on the rise, the Netherlands, was clearly winning the struggle with England for commercial leadership. Against this background, the *Navigation Act* only allowed access to English ports to merchant vessels operating under the British flag (wherever they were bringing the goods from) or commercial vessels flying any other flag, but on condition that the products transported in their holds were originally from the country that armed the vessel. Thus, the possibility of Dutch ships operating in English ports decreased drastically.

Mahan defends this ruling, arguing that it was necessary to adopt «energetic legislative measures for the growth of commerce and the merchant navy of his country»⁹. Then, despite his pro free-market stance, he opts for combining—or even demanding—apparently contradictory measures when the ultimate goal is the defence of a state's own business fabric. Another example of the Mahanian dialectic? Probably. What Mahan advocated just over a century ago could be compared, if not in its letter, at

56 HICKEN, Victor. *U.S. History. People Who Helped Make the Republic Great. 1620-Present*. Carson-Dellosa Publishing Co, 2006, p. 78; y ADAMS, John A. *If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War*. Indiana University Press, 2008, p. 3.

57 BRADFORD, James C. *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880-1930*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013, pp. 48 y 69.

58 HOBSON, Rolf. 2002, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-166.

59 MAHAN, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 124; MAHAN; 1897, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

least in its spirit, with some of the positions adopted at times by the current president of the United States, with whom his predecessor would share an ideological DNA, and similar concerns regarding competitors capable of offering the same services at better prices, against a background of rivalry between the major powers for hegemonic positions.

Interestingly, among the great supporters of the *Navigation Act* we also find... Adam Smith! In fact, at the end of the eighteenth century, the Scot—and great British patriot to boot—defended the relevance of the old ruling, with criteria similar to those put forward by Mahan: once again, the economy should be placed at the service of the national interest—of national defence, he says—and not vice versa⁶⁰, despite the fact in the short term such policies could be counterproductive in terms of competitiveness. Hence the quotation that I selected as a title for this article: a true reflection of Mahan's deepest theories, in tune with the non-incompatibility (or even the indispensable synergy) of a commercial mentality and the promotion of national defence.

CONCLUSIONS

Mahan starts from an objective reality that is confirmed with the passage of time, namely, that most of the world trade takes place at sea. Bearing in mind the improbability of a state being self-sufficient in everything necessary to sustain its population and industry, the nations that aspire to the status of world power must seek to control these routes, either to guarantee access to the sources of energy and raw materials that they lack, or to deny that option to their adversaries.

This proposition is backed up by various reflections of the author at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Some are still useful, while others are obsolete, given that Mahan refers above all to deployments and combats typical of the time of sailing ships, (despite already living in the dawn of the era of the great battleships and being one of their endorsers). He has even commented on the inconvenience of taking at face value his teachings in the operational and tactical fields⁶¹. Now, as some analysts admit, «Mahan did not seem to care whether his students were able to accurately memorise the smallest details of the Battle of Trafalgar. What seems to him nevertheless transcendental is that they knew why the United Kingdom won the war and the others lost it»⁶².

It probably interested him that his naval academy students were capable of making the connection between his ongoing work and the concept of national interest, the

60 SMITH, Adam. *La Riqueza de las Naciones*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1994[1776], pp. 557-558.

61 HAWA, Samy. 2012, *op. cit.*, pp. 364-365.

62 GÓNZALEZ, Andrés, and AZNAR, Federico, 2013, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

analysis of responsibilities and opportunities at strategic level, and (planning) the composition of the fleets, logistical easements or the provision of the resources to provide a full response to all those closely intertwined issues⁶³. In Mahan's work it is difficult to distinguish between strategies for peacetime and in time of war, since much of his input has to do with the management of the former, but without losing sight the possibility of the latter⁶⁴. Following this approach, our analysis has been aimed at identifying the key underlying messages in Mahan's work: those that, beyond strictly military considerations, are required pre-conditions for the creation of sea power.

In Mahan's view, the endeavour entails certain prerequisites. There are windows of opportunity as well as geographical constraints that facilitate or hinder the creation of a sea power. Not surprisingly the great powers have always been actors with extensive outlets to the sea. Notwithstanding, an opening to the oceans is no guarantee of success.

According to certain approaches to Mahan's work, US dominance over areas such as the Caribbean would occur with «mathematical certainty», due in large part to their geographical location⁶⁵. However, a closer examination of the work of the Naval War College lecturer demonstrates that this is not feasible without addressing the role of each society, its economic elites and its leaders when designing a plausible strategy for acquiring sufficient capabilities to exploit their geographical advantages.

In our analysis under point 2) of this article concerning geographical factors (independent variable based on the primacy of geography), it can be seen that the successes of the best positioned nations in this regard depend greatly on meeting the expectations cited in the various headings under point 3), and in particular point 3.2), relative to national character, which in turn hinges on a trading spirit. The primary powers (British Empire and USA), attained their position not (only) due to this kind of geographical privilege, but *when* and *to the extent that* —both being significant— they have been able to enhance those aspects of their society, their mentality and their economy, with their logical —logical, that is, in Mahan's opinion— naval military corollary. Therefore, not before or after the moment in which this dynamic —not at all deterministic but constructed as a result of putting in place the appropriate public policies— has shown its best effects.

In fact, from our analysis of the impact of the sociological component in the constitution of sea power (section 3.1), it is easy to deduce that achieving this component also depends on the promotion of a commercial spirit, which gives full meaning to the opening of these people (and their minds) to the sea. Likewise, the *raison d'être* of the public policies he underscores (section 3.3.) is contingent on the promotion of that spirit instilled in the corresponding national character (section 3.2).

63 TERZAGO, Jorge. 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

64 HOBSON, Rolf. 2002, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

65 MAINGOT, Anthony. 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

In reality, Mahan was addressing the political elite of his country, as much or more than the military itself. He insisted on following the British example, knowing that Washington had the ingredients (including the geographical elements) to be a great world power, but also knowing that it still needed to consolidate its achievements in terms of a commercial mind-set and its logical military naval corollary, as we have discussed, before being able to meet those expectations. It is interesting to remember what Mahan commented on in relation to the scant commercial mentality of the United States at the end of the nineteenth century⁶⁶.

This does not mean that the aspects mentioned in point 2) of this article are not relevant. The fact that geography carries weight can be indicated by the difficulties encountered by Germany in both world wars to become a global power (although at the beginning of the twentieth century it controlled Cameroon, Togo, Tanzania, etc.), despite the fact that Mahan's work became a source of inspiration for some plans to modernise its navy⁶⁷.

The fact that the influence of the geographical variable is not enough can be certified by the limitations of the Empire of the Rising Sun, which, while capable of defeating the Russians in 1905 (largely due to the difficulties encountered by the Tsarists in moving their Baltic Fleet to the Sea of China) was in turn defeated in 1945 by a power much more advanced in all the constructivist parameters underlined by Mahan and discussed here in the various sections of point 3). Once again, we can confirm this, even though Japanese admirals can rightly be considered to be disciples of Mahan⁶⁸. On the other hand, it would have been very useful for Japan if Mahan's work had been the bedside reading of its political elite, precisely because of the importance of promoting a commercial spirit as an independent variable. In Mahan's eyes, Japanese insularity helps, but it is no guarantee of anything. It is a window of permanent opportunity that can be exploited, or not, depending on whether it is used to combine with aspects related to the commercial spirit.

On the other hand, any hypothetical comparison of the Russian situation with Mahan's thesis would be useless, superfluous. One only needs to recall how, with the assistance provided by the great maritime powers via the Murmansk route (facilitated by the Royal Navy and the US Navy), the USSR was able to receive adequate supplies to defeat Germany on the terrestrial front. Thus, a state with a geopolitically Mackinderian profile like Russia could succeed while it enjoyed the support of the two main «commercial» powers of Mahanian lineage. But, in the long run, by not sufficiently promoting the type of economy (and the associated mentality) endorsed by Mahan, its evanescence and its ultimate failure was only a matter of time.

66 See footnotes pages 22 and 23 of this article.

67 MacMILLAN, Margaret. 1914. *De la Paz a la Guerra*. Madrid: Turner Publications, S.L., 2013, p. 142.

68 ASADA, Sadao, 2012, *op. cit.*, y HAWA, Samy, 2012, *op. cit.*, pp. 361-362.

To sum up, throughout this article we have managed to trace the ways and means of achieving the goal of sea power. The societies that know how to appreciate the true value of the sea (which, as indicated, is something far more complex than having coasts or warships) are best positioned for that purpose. The supremacy of the seas is the condition of possible global dominion. But it is not something that can be automatically deduced from geographical location. On the other hand, the prior provision of a commercial spirit is a condition *sine qua non* for this.

This approach is even clearer, seen *a sensu contrario*: those nations that incur in what has sometimes been defined—in the words of Mahan—as «naval laziness»⁶⁹ are condemned to the irrelevance or failure of their (other) endeavours. Only societies with a pure commercial spirit identify the importance of the sea as the easiest and cheapest way to develop this activity, with the addition that only when one is aware of its consequence is the military arm exploited to the full (naval, but ultimately not only naval) which is an indispensable condition when opting for regional or even global supremacy.

In this sense, Mahan—and similarly Clausewitz—is among those who, are not content with developing strictly military analyses leading to an understanding of the reasons for the success or failure of (and in) wars. His remarkable sensitivity for sociological, economic and political issues is not the most generally recognised aspect of his input; however, over and above the relevant discussion on its details, that is where we find his most incisive contributions and, in all likelihood, the most lasting.

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69 LÓPEZ, José I. 1993, *op.cit.*, p. 74.

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- Submitted: October 19, 2017.

- Accepted: November 3, 2017.
